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ABSTRACT 
A METHODOLOGY TO DEVELOP A DECISION MODEL USING A LARGE 
CATEGORICAL DATABASE WITH APPLICATION TO IDENTIFYING CRITICAL 
VARIABLES DURING A TRANSPORT-RELATED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE 
 
Renee M. Clark, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006 
 
 
An important problem in the use of large categorical databases is extracting information to make 
decisions, including identification of critical variables.  Due to the complexity of a dataset 
containing many records, variables, and categories, a methodology for simplification and 
measurement of associations is needed to build the decision model.  To this end, the proposed 
methodology uses existing methods for categorical exploratory analysis.  Specifically, latent 
class analysis and loglinear modeling, which together constitute a three-step, non-simultaneous 
approach, were used to simplify the variables and measure their associations, respectively.  This 
methodology has not been used to extract data-driven decision models from large categorical 
databases.   
      A case in point is a large categorical database at the DoT for hazardous materials releases 
during transportation.  This dataset is important due to the risk from an unintentional release.  
However, due to the lack of a data-congruent decision model of a hazmat release, current 
decision making, including critical variable identification, is limited at the Office of Hazardous 
Materials within the DoT.  This gap in modeling of a release is paralleled by a similar gap in the 
hazmat transportation literature.  The literature has an operations research and quantitative risk 
assessment focus, in which the models consist of simple risk equations or more complex, 
theoretical equations.  Thus, based on critical opportunities at the DoT and gaps in the literature, 
the proposed methodology was demonstrated using the hazmat release database.  The 
methodology can be applied to other categorical databases for extracting decision models, such 
as those at the National Center for Health Statistics. 
      A key goal of the decision model, a Bayesian network, was identification of the most 
influential variables relative to two consequences or measures of risk in a hazmat release, dollar 
loss and release quantity.  The most influential variables for dollar loss were found to be 
variables related to container failure, specifically the causing object and item-area of failure on 
the container.  Similarly, for release quantity, the container failure variables were also most 
influential, specifically the contributing action and failure mode.  In addition, potential changes 
in these variables for reducing consequences were identified.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  Agency within the 
DoT that undertook the Safety Data Initiative. 
 
DoT United States Department of Transportation. 
 
GeNIe Software for decision modeling, including the development 
of Bayesian networks.  Developed by the Decision Systems 
Lab at the University of Pittsburgh and used within this 
research. 
 
HMIRS Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System.  Large 
database maintained by the Office of Hazardous Materials 
(OHM) within the DoT to record releases of hazardous 
materials during commercial transport.  Informally referred 
to as the Release database. 
 
Lambda/ Loglinear Parameter(λ) Parameter indicating the strength of the effect or 
association between two or more variables.  Variables X 
and Y are not directly associated if max|λij| < 0.20, where i 
and j represent any category combination of X and Y. 
 
Latent Gold Software for performing latent class analysis. Developed by 
Statistical Innovations, Inc. and used within this research. 
 
 xvi
Marginal association Association between two variables determined by summing 
over, or ignoring, all other variables in the model. 
 
Partial association Association between two variables after adjusting or 
correcting for the effects of other variables.  If there is a 
partial association between two variables, they are not 
conditionally independent given other variables. 
 
Modified LISREL Approach Latent structure modeling in which latent class analysis and 
loglinear modeling are performed simultaneously.  
Implemented in the LEM software.  Categorical analog to 
LISREL modeling. 
 
NCHS National Center for Health Statistics.  Agency with the 
Center for Disease Control and Department of Health and 
Human Services that produces health data for policy and 
decision making. 
 
OHM Office of Hazardous Materials.  Agency within the DoT 
that regulates hazardous materials transport. 
 
SDI (Safety Data Initiative) Effort undertaken by the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics to improve safety data collection and empirical 
analysis. 
 
Three Step Correction Procedure Procedure involving matrix algebra in which the matrix of 
the observed and predicted latent variables is corrected, 
thereby greatly reducing the bias due to the classification 
error of the latent variables.  The result is a corrected 
matrix of the observed and true latent variables. 
 
 xvii
Three Step Modeling Latent structure modeling in which standalone latent class 
models are built and then used in a structural (loglinear) 
analysis.  Similar to the Modified LISREL approach, but the 
latent class analysis and loglinear modeling are done 
separately and in succession. 
 
 Bayesian network containing two random variables X and 
Y, which are represented by circles or ovals.  Variable X 
has a direct effect on Y, as represented by the arc.  The 
absence of an arc represents independence between two 
variables. 
Y X 
 
L2 Likelihood ratio chi square statistic.  Primary test statistic 
used in loglinear modeling. 
 
P(A|B,C) Conditional probability of variable A given its parent 
variables B and C. 
 
[X] [Y] Loglinear model notation indicating the lack of interaction, 
or association, between variables X and Y.  This is also 
known as the model of mutual independence for X and Y. 
 
[X Y] Loglinear model notation indicating an interaction, or direct 
association, between variables X and Y.   
 
A⊗B Kronecker product of matrices A and B.  The super matrix 
formed from all possible products of the elements of A and 
B.  Used in the three step correction procedure. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Databases play an important role in today’s organizations and may be used both tactically and 
strategically by businesses and organizations.  From a tactical standpoint, they are used to 
support day to day operations and for reactive decision making.  However, data may also be used 
proactively for business growth or informed governmental policies by applying the decision 
analysis process.  This process dictates that the overall structure of the problem be represented 
using a model, from which inferences are made for insight and explanation, thereby improving 
decision making.  Although models may be expert or data-driven, they have traditionally been 
based on expert knowledge.  This research takes the non-traditional data-driven approach in 
constructing a decision model. 
      In taking a non-traditional approach, a model can be extracted from a database using various 
statistical, data analysis, or machine learning techniques, including those for categorical data.  
Large categorical databases are common in today’s organizations, as the prevalence of 
categorical data has increased and categorical data is ubiquitous.( )1   However, for the most part, 
knowledge and use of categorical data methods has remained limited to the social, biomedical, 
and behavioral sciences as well as education and marketing.( )2   Historically, categorical analysis 
methods were stimulated by research in the social and biomedical sciences, where categorical 
scales are now pervasive for measuring attitudes, opinions, and medical outcomes.( )3   However, 
as an indicator of the penetration of categorical methods into engineering analysis, only one of 
the ten top industrial engineering departments for 2005 offers a statistics course focused on 
categorical data, although most offer courses in basic statistics or continuous data analysis.( )4   
1 
 Yet, the application of statistical techniques can be challenging when using large categorical 
databases containing many records, variables, or categories.  When the number of variables is 
large, the number of possible associations between all variable pairs considering all other 
variables is also large.  The large size also leads to problems with convergence, testing, and 
interpretation of models.  In general, when working with a large categorical database, there are 
challenges in creating a compact, data congruent model for decision making, such as an 
influence diagram. 
      A case in point is a database maintained by the Office of Hazardous Materials within the 
Department of Transportation.  This agency develops and recommends regulatory policy changes 
for the commercial transport of hazardous materials.( )5   This transport activity poses risks to life, 
health, property, and the environment due to the possibility of an unintentional release.  This 
database houses data on hazmat release occurrences, including characteristics such as date, time, 
location, material type, container failure descriptors, and consequences.  The database is largely 
categorical and contains tens of thousands of records.  The use of the database by this hazmat 
agency has been largely reactive and in support of normal operations, such as investigations 
surrounding exemptions, occurrence spikes, and cost/benefit analysis.  This database has not 
been used to extract a model of a hazardous materials release.  The absence of a model limits the 
information available during regulatory decision making.  
      The absence of a modeling approach by this DoT agency is paralleled by and perhaps partly 
the result of the absence of a similar approach in the hazardous materials transportation 
literature.  This literature base has an operations research focus, with a large number of the  
 
2 
 articles involving route optimization or path selection problems.  The objective functions in these 
articles make use of existing, oftentimes simple equations for risk, and the articles do not aim to 
develop new, multivariate risk models. 
      Another possible challenge to any previous development of a hazmat release model has been 
the lack of penetration of categorical data methods into the engineering domain, as mentioned 
previously.  Thus, a methodology for extracting a data-congruent decision model from a large 
categorical database using statistical methods has not been applied in the engineering arena.  
Categorical data methods are a recent advance relative to their continuous counterparts and 
continue to be used mostly by social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences.  By the mid 1900’s, 
there was widespread adoption of regression and ANOVA techniques.  Conversely, analogs for 
categorical data received little attention by the social and biomedical research community until 
the 1960’s.( )6   Loglinear modeling, which is used to assess associations and can be considered a 
categorical analog to regression, was mainly developed in the 1970’s and gained popularity in 
behavioral and life sciences in the 1980’s.( )7   Latent class analysis, which is used for variable 
simplification and can be viewed as a categorical analog to factor analysis, was developed in the 
1950’s by sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld for binary survey data.  It was extended in the 1970’s to 
include multi-category data and has become a standard tool in social, biomedical, education, and 
marketing research.( )8
      In this research, I provide an approach to the analysis of a large database based on statistical 
and decision analysis methods from the field of categorical data modeling.  Therefore, the 
contribution made by this research is as follows: using existing categorical data methods, a 
decision model was extracted from a large categorical database, using the hazmat release  
3 
 database as the worked example.  Since statistical methods were used to build the association 
structure of the decision model, the relationships among the variables were not based on hunches 
or assumptions and therefore provide a data-driven basis for decision making.   
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A critical problem related to large categorical databases is effective use of the data for decision 
modeling.  Traditional empirical modeling techniques, such as multiple regression analysis or 
neural networks, are more conducive to continuous types of data.  In addition, a challenge with a 
very large amount of data is an inability to use significance testing, since the results tend to 
become significant.  Decision analysis in the presence of many categorical variables necessitates 
extracting a model using a methodology involving exploratory methods for categorical data. 
Although the application of categorical exploratory methods is present in the literature, a 
common methodological approach for extracting a decision model, particularly for engineering 
based problems, is not present.  In the case of large amounts of data, a methodology is necessary 
given the complexity of the data in terms of many records, variables, and categories. 
      Consider the following related and real situation.  The Department of Transportation 
maintains a large categorical database on hazmat release occurrences in the United States.  The 
database consists of a large number of records and nominal, multi-category variables, whose 
associations are unknown.  Critical information needed from this database includes the 
identification of influential variables and categories relative to the outcomes of a hazardous 
materials release incident.  This is important because the most influential variables and 
categories are control points from which operational or policy changes can be made.( )9  Another  
4 
 useful type of information is a characterization of a high-consequence event based on its most 
likely combination of variables.  In this way, the question “What does a high consequence 
hazmat release most often look like?” can be answered. 
      This database has not previously been used for proactive decision modeling either by the 
DoT or researchers in the literature.  Existing literature on hazmat releases is unrelated to this, as 
it focuses on mathematical programming formulations to minimize risk along a transport route.  
The literature also focuses on risk calculations using analytical equations as part of quantitative 
risk assessment studies.  For the modeling approach taken in this research, the release has 
already occurred, and the actual consequences and influencing variables are known.  Hence, a 
decision model of the variables and events in a hazmat release can be built to answer questions 
about the critical variables and their categories.  Thus, there are gaps that can be filled through an 
exploratory analysis of this large database for decision modeling.  Given this, a methodology for 
simplification and measurement of associations among many categorical variables is needed. 
      In summary, using the DoT database as the worked example, this research endeavors to 
establish a categorical analysis methodology for developing decision models.  In establishing this 
methodology, critical research based questions about the variables related to the release of 
hazardous materials can be addressed, which in the past were only speculated within the 
literature.  The application of this methodology to a hazmat transportation problem makes a 
needed inroad into this policy area as well as other decision problems in the engineering arena.  
In addition, the questions related to critical variables faced by the DoT are similar to those within 
other organizations, such as the Center for Disease Control or the Department of Homeland 
Security, where policies and decisions can be driven by the data collected by these agencies.   
 
5 
 1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for development of a decision model consists of three separate analyses of the 
data.  They center on simplification, measurement of associations, and creation of a Bayesian 
network model.  Simplification of the variable domain was accomplished using Pareto analysis, 
data aggregation, discretization, and latent class analysis.  Latent class analysis was used for 
simplification by combining related variables to form a latent variable.     
      The determination of the association structure of the decision model began with a temporal 
layout of the simplified variables.  The temporal layout resulted in five distinct stages of a 
hazardous materials release.  These stages are identified as follows: pre-failure initiation, failure 
initiation, container failure, hazmat release, and realization of consequences, such as dollar loss.  
After this base structure was created, the associations between the variables were measured using 
the exploratory technique of loglinear modeling.   An exploratory approach was taken in order to 
create an accurate, data-driven structure.  A modeling approach that uses latent class analysis and 
subsequent loglinear modeling is described in the literature as a three-step, non-simultaneous 
modeling approach.( )  10 It is similar to the LISREL approach for continuous data that 
simultaneously combines factor analysis and path analysis. 
      The variables and data-driven associations determined in the three-step modeling approach 
were used to build the structure of a Bayesian network, a type of decision model consisting only 
of random variables and their relationships.  Given that a categorical database of uncertain events 
and variables surrounding a hazardous materials release was the data source for this analysis, a 
Bayesian network was a natural fit, since its strength exists in modeling complex relations 
between uncertain variables.  In addition, a Bayesian network was a natural fit because the 
identification of important variables was a key goal of this research.  Using the Bayesian 
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 networks developed in this research, the most influential variables relative to two outcomes of a 
hazardous materials release were identified.  In addition, since Bayesian networks allow for 
computing the impact of some variables on the probabilities of others, desirable policy or 
operational changes for the explanatory variables were identified.  A summary of the 
methodology developed in this research to analyze a large categorical database is shown below. 
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Figure 1: Methodology for Building a Decision Model. 
 
 
 
1.3 ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology proposed for building a data-driven Bayesian network using a large categorical 
database it not limited to the modeling of hazardous materials releases.  For example, within the 
Department of Transportation in general, there is an opportunity and need for growth and 
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 improvement in the analysis of data.( )11   This gap was formalized in 1999 by the creation of the 
Safety Data Initiative (SDI) by the DoT.  This program was undertaken by Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) to improve data collection and analysis.  Although this program 
is on hold due to budget cuts resulting from the events of September 11, 2001, its sentiments 
regarding the need to improve safety data analysis remain the same.( )12   One of the goals of this 
initiative was critical variable or leading indicator identification based on demonstrated 
correlations with consequences, and this remains a goal within the DoT.( , )13 14   The SDI 
maintained that the DoT’s data analysis proficiency was not at the level necessary for good 
program effectiveness.( , )15 16   Within the DoT currently, efficient data collection has achieved 
proficiency.  The next step for sound decision making and enhancement of program effectiveness 
is improvement of analysis abilities and techniques.( )17
      At the state level, transportation authorities could utilize decision support tools when 
establishing routing designations for hazardous materials.  In specifying a routing designation, a 
state must determine the extent to which certain factors specified by the DoT are incorporated.  
The DoT maintains that the weighting of these factors is mostly judgmental and should reflect 
their “expected influence” and the community’s consensus.( ) 18  Based on the limited decision 
support provided for this, the states could benefit from decision models that assist in determining 
how the factors should be incorporated in routing designations. 
      Considering areas outside the transportation domain for application of this methodology, the 
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), which is part of the Center for Disease Control 
(CDC), collects categorical data conducive to the extraction of a decision model representing an 
overall system or problem network.  However, system or network models have not been 
commonly or formally used by NCHS statisticians, although there is interest in them.( , )19 20   
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 Another potential area for application of this methodology is threat characterization, a required 
capability within the Department of Homeland Security.( )21   These two federal agencies are 
examples of organizations that could apply this methodology to develop decision models based 
on categorical data. 
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2.0 LITERATURE SEARCH: HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION 
 
Risk is an integral part of the hazardous materials transportation literature.  The majority of 
articles are operations research studies for minimizing risk on a transport route.  The risk 
equations in the O.R. studies tend to be relatively simple and are often variations on the release 
probability or the product of release probability and consequences.  Other articles focus on 
calculating risk as part of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) studies of hazmat transport.  These 
articles are typically written by environmental, civil, and chemical engineers who incorporate 
demographic, meteorological, and chemical databases in calculating risk.  The analytical 
equations in the QRA studies are often mathematically complex and theoretical in nature.  These 
O.R. and QRA studies are focused on releases that occur on the road or along railways.  There is 
not a focus on transport-support activities, such as loading or unloading of containers.  Although 
there are differences in the accident scenarios surrounding these two activities, many of the 
variables and associations and hence the general Bayesian network structure are the same.    
      Thus, the great majority of existing studies attempt to minimize or calculate the risk of 
potential future occurrences.  In general, the hazmat literature has not modeled release incidents 
that have already occurred to determine the influence of the relevant variables.  One notable 
exception is a study by Burns and Clemen in which various sociological, behavioral, and 
perceptual variables affect the impact of a hazmat release, as depicted using an influence 
diagram.  This study is a continuous-data analog to the present work, and it used a covariance 
structure, or LISREL, model to construct the influence diagram.( )22   The present research 
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 contributes to the literature by using categorical data methods to build the decision model, 
suggested as future work in the Burns article.  In addition, the variables considered in the present 
work are objective variables that describe the accident scenario surrounding a hazmat release to a 
larger extent.   
      The decision model by Burns and Clemen is unique within the hazmat transport literature by 
virtue of its exploratory, statistical nature.  In general, this literature lacks a focus on data-driven 
analyses of outcomes relative to the influencing variables.  The literature does not contain 
multivariate statistical or other exploratory models of risk, due in part to the goals of the 
researchers.  A notable example is the probability of an accident or release, which has 
traditionally displayed a gap in exploratory modeling of its critical variables.  Accident and 
release probabilities have been estimated for a given road and area type using averaged values, 
which have limited sensitivity in specific situations.( )23   However, some recent empirical work 
involving fuzzy logic incorporated multiple parameters into a determination of the accident 
frequency.( )24   Additional exploratory work on accident probabilities is still needed.  
      The primary goal within the hazmat literature has been the use of various risk equations in 
route optimization and quantitative risk assessment studies.  Many of the equations used in the 
route optimization studies are straightforward in terms of their formulation and are reused across 
articles.  An example of a straightforward risk formulation is the release probability or product of 
release probability and consequence level.  In fact, the straightforward formulations typically 
contain one or more of the following high-level variables: 1) accident or release probability, 2) 
consequence level, 3) population count, and 4) exposure amount, such as amount of hazmat 
transported.  Several authors whose risk equations are limited to these high level variables 
characterize their risk models as “simple.”( , )25 26    
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       More complex formulations for risk, which are often used in the QRA studies, include the 
above high-level variables along with variables such as 5) wind probability or 6) fatality 
probability, also known as vulnerability.  These latter variables are often specified in terms of 
sub-variables, or input parameters.  However, the numerical relationships of the sub-variables to 
the higher level variables or outcomes are not provided to the reader and are therefore not a 
discussion focus.  For example, in one equation, the release probability calls for the use of 
vehicle type and material type as sub-variables.  However, the exact numerical relationship of 
vehicle type or material type to release probability is not discussed or provided in the article.( )27   
In another equation, the following are identified as sub-variables of vulnerability: wind direction, 
meteorological condition, and final outcome. However, the numerical strength and empirical 
relevancy of these sub-variables to vulnerability is not demonstrated or a focus of discussion.( )28   
In general, the determination of high-level variables based on their sub-variables is not described 
in the literature.  This indicates a gap in terms of identifying critical variables. 
      There are a variety of risk equations used in the risk optimization and QRA studies based on 
differences in both structure and variables.  Thus, there is a lack of agreement on how hazmat 
transport risk should be represented, as noted in the literature.( )29   Based on an analysis of the 
hazmat transport literature, seven categories for risk were identified, as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Hazmat Transport Risk Categories. 
1  Accident or Release Probability 
• Probability of a vehicular accident of a hazmat truck 
• Probability of a vehicular accident that leads to release 
• Probability of a release 
2 Consequence Probability 
• Individual Risk 
• Societal Risk 
3 Numerical Indices 
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 Table 1 (continued). 
4 Consequences 
5 Exposure and Product of Exposures 
6 Expected Value 
7 Variations on Expected Value 
       
 
 
In contrast to the various equations, risk is sometimes represented using only statements or 
definitions versus analytical equations containing variables.  In addition, the definitions are often 
accompanied by assertions of the important variables.  The prevalence of these qualitative 
representations is a further indication of the lack of modeling focus in the hazmat literature.  The 
discussion in the following sections, which is organized based on the different risk 
representations in Table 1, will elaborate on the issues raised in the previous paragraphs 
concerning the lack of statistical or exploratory modeling in the hazmat transport literature. 
 
2.1 ACCIDENT/ RELEASE PROBABILITY 
Accident, release, and conditional release probabilities have been proposed in the hazmat 
transport literature as measures for risk.  Harwood et al. define risk as the number of releases or 
vehicular accidents divided by an exposure measure, such as truck miles.  Their formula for risk 
is as follows: 
 
 ,
Exposure
EventsRisk =  Equation 1 
 
 
 
 
where an event is an accident or release.  Their accident rates are calculated using truck data 
from three states, which are combined to produce a weighted average.( , )30 31   The Harwood et al. 
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 rates are those most often used to estimate probabilities in risk studies.  However, there is 
concern that application of these rates may lead to inaccuracies in the calculation of risk.  For, 
when using averages, parameters that apply in specific situations cannot be set or altered.  For 
example, in a study performed by Argonne National Lab for the DoT in 2000, the accident and 
release rates used are stated as a limitation of the study.  The study claims that these national 
averaged rates do not account for local or specific factors that may affect risk.( )32   Likewise, 
Hobeika and Kim suggest that specificity is an important characteristic of accident rates.  They 
feel that state-derived rates should be used instead of national default rates since “each state has 
unique hazmat transport characteristics.”( )33   Doug Reeves of the OHM also believes that the use 
of a general, average rate to calculate risk in specific circumstances, such as for a given highway 
route, may be inaccurate.  However, a challenge in the use of Equation 1, especially for specific 
scenarios, is the availability of associated data for use in the denominator.( )34    
      There is a separate group of articles that cover vehicle accidents that do not necessarily 
involve hazmat.  These articles on general accidents contain regression models that use highway 
geometric and traffic variables to model accidents.( , , , , ) 35 36 37 38 39  The pertinent question is why 
haven’t similar regression models been developed in the hazardous materials transportation 
literature for modeling accident probabilities?   
      
2.2 CONSEQUENCE PROBABILITY 
Models for the probability of a consequence include those identified as Individual or Societal 
Risk in the hazmat literature.  Individual Risk is most commonly defined as the probability of 
death to an individual due to a hazmat release and is represented by either analytical equations or 
qualitative statements or definitions.  The definitions are often further described by the variables 
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 believed to be important.  Societal Risk is represented by means of F/N curves, where F is the 
cumulative frequency of an accident with N or more fatalities.  Analytical equations are used to 
calculate both F and N. 
2.2.1 Individual Risk 
The analytical equations for Individual Risk are often detailed or mathematically complex and 
have been implemented in software by environmental or chemical engineers for quantitative risk 
assessment along transport routes.  The following high level variables are present in an equation 
for Individual Risk proposed by Leonelli et al.: 1) frequency of release, 2) probability of final 
outcome given a release, 3) wind PDF, and 4) vulnerability.  This equation, which is 
implemented in software, is given as 
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Equation 2 
 
 
 
 
The various sub-variables, or input parameters, are the road link or segment, season, type of 
outcome, meteorological condition, wind direction, and vehicle typology, which is a combination 
of vehicle and material type.  The meteorological condition is described by the wind velocity and  
atmospheric stability class.  However, the numerical relationship of the sub-variables to the 
higher level variables and the details of their calculation are not provided in the article and are 
thus not a focus of discussion.( )40    
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       As a second example, Bubbico et al. present a similar equation for Individual Risk in their 
quantitative risk assessment.( )41   Their equation contains several of the same factors as Equation 
2, such as a meteorological factor (wind direction), the probability of a fatality, and the release 
probability, as shown below. 
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However, there are differences in the sub-variables in Equation 2 versus Equation 3.  For 
example, the probability of a fatality in Equation 3 does not have a meteorological or wind-
related sub-variable, as in Equation 2.  In addition, season and vehicle typology are not used as 
sub-variables for the release probability in Equation 3, as in Equation 2.  Thus, the question of 
which equation and sub-variables more-accurately describe Individual Risk can be raised. 
      In addition to these equations, various authors provide qualitative statements or definitions 
for Individual Risk.  Saccomanno and Shortreed define Individual Risk as the annual probability 
of death at various distances and suggest that hazmat quantity and traffic level are leading 
indicators of this risk.  Roodbol states that Individual Risk is the annual probability that a 24-
hour, unprotected resident at a certain distance from the incident will be killed.  According to this 
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 author, risk depends on material, quantity, population density, and traffic safety mechanisms 
such as speed limit, guidance systems, traffic separation, and infrastructure.( )42
 
2.3 NUMERICAL INDICES 
A risk index of a hazardous materials incident was developed by Scanlon and Cantilli, who 
approach risk from a transportation and safety engineering perspective.  Their risk index consists 
of numerous independent variables, as shown below. 
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The accuracy of this equation and its coefficients and the relevancy of the independent variables 
are unknown.  Evidence of empirical validation is not provided.  Potential data sources for 
several of the independent variables, such as driver level and condition of traffic control devices 
and medians, are not provided.  Therefore, the feasibility of applying this equation, especially in 
a large area, is questionable.  The authors do not demonstrate their risk index in a real-life 
application.  Their equation for the risk level of a motor vehicle incident, a factor in the previous 
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 equation, contains several variables for roadway characteristics and is depicted in the following 
manner: 
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Although the authors developed these indices using a multi-variable approach, they did not 
provide justification or rationale for the variables or coefficients chosen.( )43   
      In addition, recent work has been done in the development of a transportation risk index that 
incorporates hazard rankings for amount transported, nearest habitation distance from a release, 
material dispersion characteristics, and chemical properties of the material.  These inputs 
determine a risk index intended to be used as a practical guideline versus a model for 
transporting various chemicals.( )44
 
2.4 CONSEQUENCES 
Risk is also represented in the literature as the undesirable consequences from a release.  
Consequences include monetary losses, injuries, and fatalities.  The DoT considers consequences 
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 as a measure of risk, but this has the drawback of year-to-year variation.  For example, based on 
data in the HMIRS, there were 120 fatalities in 1996, versus an average of about 11 per year 
from 1993-2001, excluding 1996.  The large number of fatalities in 1996 was due to the crash of 
a commercial airliner, which caught fire due to the hazmat it was transporting in a non-regulatory 
manner.  However, it is questionable as to whether the overall risk was higher in 1996 versus in 
other years.   
      Although the literature does not include equations for calculating consequences, there are 
various qualitative statements concerning consequences.  Erkut and Verter define exposure risk 
during a release as the undesirable consequences, which are stated to be dependent upon vehicle 
design, material, geography, and meteorology.( )45   In a maritime hazmat article, risk is 
represented using natural resource restoration costs, which are given as dependent upon the type 
of material.( )46    
      Some recent work in railway transportation of hazardous materials considers the initiating 
events leading to a loss of containment, which is a type of consequence.  Although this recent 
work focuses on collisions and derailments during rail transport, it uses an event, or fault, tree to 
model a release and therefore has similarities to the present research.  However, it does not 
perform decision modeling, such as Bayesian networking, based on the event tree.  Its 
framework is that of a chain of events leading to an ultimate event, or loss of containment.  It 
also differs from the present work in how it calculates various frequencies or probabilities.  
Specifically, input from experts is used to determine certain frequencies.  In addition, 
consequence probabilities, including the probabilities of death or injury, are calculated using 
probit equations based on the effects of concentration level and material type.  Derailment 
frequencies are calculated using analytical equations that make use of detailed rail infrastructure 
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 data.  The use of equations to calculate probabilities are in contrast to use of frequency data or 
counts from a database to calculate probabilities, as was done in this research.( )47
 
2.5 EXPOSURE AND PRODUCT OF EXPOSURES 
Exposure is sometimes defined in the hazmat literature as opportunities for incidents to occur.  
Therefore, exposure exists in the form of number of shipments, amount of material shipped, or 
distance traveled.  Exposure is also defined as the number of people potentially subjected to a 
release of material.  ReVelle et al. propose their “tons-past-people” measure of perceived risk.  
This is calculated as the product of tons of waste transported on a link and the population within 
a certain bandwidth of the links, summed over all links, as given by 
 
 
   . n link ijandwidth o certain bn within a populatioGij 
ijg on link aste movin tons of wTij 
where
GTRisk
ij
ijij
=
=
=∑
 Equation 6 
 
 
 
 
This equation for risk is used within their multi-objective programming problem for 
transportation policy analysis.  Based on the authors’ statement, “tons-past-people” is a simple 
risk measure, and better measures of risk should be developed in future research.( )48   Their 
statement points to the desirability of detailed modeling of risk. 
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 2.6 EXPECTED VALUE 
An expected value representation for risk is advocated by the Department of Transportation and 
is the most common model for risk in the hazmat literature.  In general, the expected value model 
is calculated as the product of a 1) probability and a 2) consequence or exposure.  The DoT 
defines risk as the product of the probability of an accident that results in a release and the 
population within the impact area.( )49        
      There are variations on the probabilities used in the expected value representation for risk.  
One such probability is the probability of an accident.  For example, Sivakumar et al. define risk 
using the following equation: 
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This model is used in their risk minimization routing problem for the transportation of hazardous 
materials.  Although they indicate that weather conditions and time of day affect the accident 
probability, it is not their goal to determine the actual relationship.  They make use of accident 
probabilities that are generated randomly and not modeled.( )50    
      Jin et al. also use the probability of an accident in their expected value calculation of risk, 
which is used within a risk minimization problem.  Despite noting that environmental influences 
such as design speed, pavement wetness, and visibility influence the accident probability, they 
calculate accident probability as the product of the segment length and a uniform random number 
between 0.01 and 1.  Thus, the influence of specific environmental factors on accident 
probability is not taken into account.( )51
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       Glickman and Sontag use the probability of an accident-causing release in their expected 
value risk calculation.  They acknowledge that their risk calculation does not take factors other 
than road length and type and population density into account due to the unavailability of such 
data on a nationwide basis.( )52   This may provide some insight into the lack of detailed 
representation or modeling of probabilities and consequences in hazmat routing studies.   
      Taking a slightly different approach, Patel and Horowitz, who combine industrial and civil 
engineering perspectives, view risk as the expected concentration level of a released gas.  They 
model the concentration level using the Gaussian plume model, a common dispersion model that 
incorporates the mean wind speed, gas emission rate, and atmospheric stability.  To calculate the 
expected concentration, or risk, the concentration level is multiplied by the potential for a vehicle 
crash.( ) 53
 
2.7 VARIATIONS ON EXPECTED VALUE 
Perceived risk has been modeled using an exponent on the exposure in the expected value 
representation for risk discussed previously.  This exponent is known as the risk preference 
parameter.  The larger the risk preference parameter, the higher is the decision maker’s aversion 
to risk.  Such a model has the following form: 
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A value of q > 1 represents risk averse behavior, while a value of q = 1 indicates risk 
neutrality.( , )54 55   As with the expected value representation for risk, the factors in this equation 
are limited to high level variables. 
 
2.8   CONCLUSION  
In general, the studies in the hazmat transport literature do not have an exploratory modeling 
focus.  Rather, various analytical equations for risk are used in route optimization or quantitative 
risk assessment research.  The lack of focus on exploratory modeling of risk in terms of its 
important variables presents a gap or opportunity in the hazmat literature.  This research 
contributes to the literature by introducing a data-driven Bayesian network model of a hazardous 
materials release during unloading operations.   
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3.0 LITERATURE SEARCH: CATEGORICAL DATA METHODS 
 
In order to develop a methodology to analyze a large categorical database, a literature search on 
data analysis topics was done.  The specific subjects searched include categorical data analysis, 
simplification of a large categorical database, identification of critical variables, and exploratory 
construction of a decision model based on categorical data.  The following main topics were 
uncovered: 
 
• Path Analysis 
• Structural Equation Modeling (LISREL) 
• Modified LISREL Approach 
• Three Step Latent Structure Modeling 
• Loglinear Modeling 
• Latent Class Analysis 
• Decision Tree Entropy Analysis 
• Bayesian Networks 
 
 
 
These topics will be discussed in the following sections in order to provide background for the 
methodology established by this dissertation. 
 
3.1 PATH ANALYSIS 
Path analysis is a graphical method used to model the relationships among a group of linearly-
related continuous or binary variables.  The goal is to measure the direct and indirect paths, or 
effects, between variables.  Thus, path analysis is a means to assess the influence of certain 
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 variables on other variables.  An example path diagram, which can be analyzed using path 
analysis, is provided below in Figure 2.  Both W and X have a direct effect on Y, which has a 
direct effect on Z.  Both W and X have only an indirect effect on Z. 
 
W
X
Y Z
a
b
c
 
Figure 2: Example Path Diagram. 
 
 
 
A direct effect, also known as a path coefficient or beta weight, measures the direct influence of 
the variable at the tail of the arrow on the variable at the head of the arrow, with the other 
variables held constant.  In Figure 2, the path coefficients are a, b, and c.  An indirect effect 
between two variables “passes through,” or involves, other variables in the model.  Thus, an 
indirect effect is a compound path and is calculated as the product of the path coefficients, or 
direct effects, along the path.  The path coefficients correspond to beta weights in a regression 
equation, which is one method of solution.( , , , , )56 57 58 59 60   A path diagram can be solved as a 
series of multiple linear regressions, with one equation per dependent variable in the diagram.  
The second solution method is an algebraic solution based on the decomposition of the overall 
correlation between two variables into various effects, including direct and indirect.    
      Path analysis is generally not performed with multi-category nominal variables.  First, there 
is no formal decomposition relationship of the overall association into the various effects, as 
there is for continuous variables.( , , , )  61 62 63 64 This decomposition rule forms the basis of the 
algebraic solution method within path analysis.  Second, although various researchers have 
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 proposed the use of dummy variables for accommodating nominal-scaled variables in the 
regression formulation of path analysis, this is a tedious if not impractical effort in the case of 
numerous multi-category variables.( , , )65 66 67   Dichotomization of the multi-category variables has 
also been suggested, but this involves subjective judgment about the similarity of the 
categories.( )68    
 
3.2 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 
Path analysis is one of the major components of structural equation modeling (SEM), also known 
as LISREL or covariance structure modeling.  SEM is used with continuous variables to build a 
structural model consisting of both latent and observed variables.  With SEM, path analysis is 
simultaneously combined with factor analysis, which is used for developing latent variables.( , 
)
69
70   LISREL is a software product that performs SEM. 
 
3.3 MODIFIED LISREL APPROACH 
The categorical variant of SEM is known as the Modified LISREL approach.  A Modified 
LISREL approach simultaneously combines latent class analysis for development of latent 
variables and loglinear analysis for structural modeling.  It is a one-step, simultaneous estimation 
approach that provides unbiased estimates of the relationships among the observed and latent 
variables.( , , )71 72 73
      The software available for Modified LISREL modeling has limitations in terms of the models 
that can be built, however.  The only product available was LEM, an academic, non-commercial 
product.( )74   LEM does not have some important functionality available in its commercial 
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 successor, Latent Gold, such as automated executions of the model using a predetermined 
number of sets of randomly-generated start values.( )75   This functionality is critical when 
building latent class models of a complex nature.  Based on this, LEM was not feasible for 
building the latent class models in this research.  In addition, according to LEM’s designer and 
developer, LEM has difficulty analyzing large modified LISREL models containing multiple 
observed and latent variables, especially when the latent variables have several indicators.( )76    
 
3.4 THREE STEP MODELS 
The three step approach to modeling categorical latent and observed variables is similar to the 
Modified LISREL approach in that it involves latent variable development and structural 
modeling.  However, with the three step approach, standalone latent class models are built first 
and then used in a structural analysis.  Thus, the latent variable development and structural 
modeling are not done simultaneously.  The latent class models or variables are built using some 
of the observed variables in the domain, which serve as indicator variables.  Then, the latent 
variables are modeled along with the remaining observed variables in a loglinear analysis.  Thus, 
the latent variables are cross classified with the observed variables.  This is done using the latent 
class scores, which are assigned to the latent variables during the classification stage of the latent 
class analysis.  The latent variables are essentially treated as observed variables in the structural 
model.( , )77 78    
      The three-step approach was used in this research, in large part due to the limitations posed 
by the software available for one-step modeling, in which the latent class analysis and structural 
modeling are done simultaneously.  The only product available for one-step modeling was LEM.  
Dr. Jeroen Vermunt, developer of the product, confirmed that LEM would have difficulty 
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 modeling the five latent and six observed variables in this research simultaneously due to the 
complexity.  This recommendation was also based on three to four indicator variables per latent 
variable and two to nine categories per indicator variable.  Dr. Vermunt recommended a stepwise 
creation of the overall model in this case.( )79   This has also been recommended in the 
literature.( )80
3.4.1 Advantages of a Three Step Approach 
There are several additional reasons for using a three step versus a simultaneous approach.  First, 
when a structural model is built in pieces, the possibility for misspecification of the overall 
model is decreased.  This is due to a smaller chance of excluding important associations or 
masking poor fit in one portion of the model due to good fit in other portions.  In addition, a 
stepwise approach is better suited for cases in which the model building is exploratory, as in this 
research.  In this way, the researcher does not have to specify a priori the complete model with 
all latent and observed variables.  If a correct or best-approximating model is not known 
beforehand, a one-step or full information method is usually not the best approach.  The 
researcher should instead use an approach that divides the global model into different 
autonomous parts and fits each separately.( , ,81 82  83)  Disadvantages to the use of a three step 
approach will be discussed in a future section. 
       
3.5 LOGLINEAR MODELING 
Loglinear modeling is a method for detecting associations among multiple categorical variables 
and is the component of the modified LISREL approach that performs structural analysis.( , )84 85   
Using maximum likelihood estimation, the cell frequencies are estimated based on the specified 
model.  The lambdas (λ), or effect parameters, are then determined as part of the loglinear 
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 modeling.  A main effect parameter indicates the effect that an individual variable has on the cell 
frequencies.  An interaction effect parameter indicates the presence of an interaction, or 
association, between two or more variables.( )86    
      The expected frequencies are used to assess the goodness of fit of the loglinear model by a 
comparison to the observed frequencies.  Either the Pearson chi square statistic (χ2) or the 
Likelihood Ratio chi square statistic (L2) can be used to assess the fit, although L2 is the preferred 
statistic.  The Likelihood Ratio statistic has additive properties and can be partitioned for testing 
conditional independence.( )87    
      There are two versions of loglinear modeling.  In the asymmetric version, also known as a 
logit analysis, a response variable is assumed or chosen, and the effects of the explanatory 
variables and their associations on the response variable are determined.  Specifically, the log of 
the odds of the expected frequencies of the response variable is modeled in terms of the variables 
and their associations.  In the symmetric version, a response variable is not assumed or chosen.  
Rather, patterns of mutual association among the categorical variables are explored.  In a 
symmetric loglinear model, the log of the expected cell frequency is modeled in terms f the 
variables and their associations.( , )88 89
3.5.1 Associations in Loglinear Models 
The reason for the use of loglinear modeling in this research is to assess the associations among 
the hazmat variables for development of an accurate network-based model.  There are various 
types of associations among categorical variables that can be determined or measured using 
loglinear modeling.  For example, one can test for either a marginal or partial association 
between two variables.  A marginal association between two variables is determined by 
summing or collapsing over all other variables in the model.  The other variables are in essence 
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 ignored, and the association in the two-way table is assessed exclusively.  A partial association 
between two variables is an association after removing the effects of other variables.  Based on 
this, it is a conservative test.  Partial association is related to the concept of conditional 
independence.  If variables X and Y are conditionally independent given a third variable Z, then a 
partial association does not exist between X and Y given Z.  This is depicted in the figure below. 
 
X
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Figure 3: Conditional Independence of X and Y. 
 
 
 
One will notice the absence of an arrow, or arc, from X to Y, indicating conditional 
independence, or lack of a direct association.( )90   The establishment of conditional independence 
between two variables simplifies an influence diagram or Bayesian network by reducing the 
number of needed arcs.( )91   If there are no associations among variables X, Y, and Z, then the 
model of mutual independence holds. 
3.5.2 Testing Significance of Associations 
Marginal and partial associations between variables are determined based on differences in the 
L2 statistics of the pertinent loglinear models.  This L2 difference is known as a component and 
also follows the chi square distribution.( )92   For example, suppose one wishes to test the 
significance of a marginal association between variables X and Y in a three-way table for X, Y,  
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 and Z.  The statistic for the model of mutual independence among X, Y, and Z ( ) is compared 
to the statistic for the model that that additionally contains an interaction term for X and Y ( ), 
thereby obtaining the component L
2
0L
2
iL
2.  Specifically,  
.220
2
iLLL −=  
In addition, the difference in their degrees of freedom is also calculated, as shown below. 
.0 idfdfdf −=  
If the component L2 is large relative to its component degrees of freedom (df), then the 
association between X and Y is significant.( )93   In this test of marginal association between X and 
Y, the variable Z was ignored, or summed over.( )94    
      The previous test and loglinear models in general are represented using a conventional 
notation.  For example, for variables X, Y, and Z, the model of mutual independence is 
represented as follows:  
[X] [Y] [Z]. 
A test of marginal association between X and Y is indicated by a comparison of the above model 
with the following model, which additionally contains an interaction term for X and Y: 
[X] [Y] [Z] [XY]. 
A test of partial association can also be represented using the conventional notation.  To test for a 
partial association between X and Y in the presence of Z, the following model containing all two-
way associations except [XY]: 
[X] [Y] [Z] [XZ] [YZ], 
is compared to the model additionally containing an association term for  X and Y  
 [X] [Y] [Z] [XZ] [YZ] [XY].  
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 If the component L2 is large enough, then a partial association between X and Y exists.( )  95 Note 
that the effect of Z was removed by the inclusion of all two-way associations involving Z in the 
former model.   
3.5.3 Assessing Associations in Large, Sparse Tables 
Significance testing is problematic in the case of a large, sparse contingency table as well as a 
large sample size.  However, a large, sparse table is often the type of table that investigators 
work with.( )96   Such tables contain many variables or categories and thus many cells with zeros 
or small cell counts less than five, despite a large sample size.  This is problematic for the use of 
chi-square statistics, such as L2.  These statistics are suspect under conditions of sparseness 
because L2does not follow the chi square distribution in this case.( )97   This is also known as 
Cochran’s Rule.( )98
      However, although significance testing is suspect with sparse tables, the existence of 
associations between variables can still be determined using the effects, or lambda (λ), 
parameters.( , )99 100   A lambda parameter indicates the strength of an effect, or its importance in 
explaining any deviation from a flat distribution of the cases among the categories, or cells.  
Thus, there is a lambda parameter for each combination of the categories of the variables, and a 
lambda parameter can be positive or negative, with the sign indicating the direction of influence 
of the effect.  For example, in a symmetric loglinear model, a lambda with a positive sign 
indicates that the effect is responsible for a relative increase in the number of cases in the 
cell.( )101   For an asymmetric model, which assumes a response variable, a lambda with a positive 
sign indicates increased odds that the response variable equals a given value.  In other words, 
there are a larger proportion of cases associated with the particular value of the response 
variable.( , )102 103   The lambda parameters are much more robust than a chi-square or standardized 
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 lambda test.  The lambdas are also insensitive to sample size if the sample size is not small.( )104   
In general, two variables are considered not directly associated if the maximum lambda for the 
variable pair is less than 0.20 in absolute value.  Hence, X and Y are not associated if max|λij| < 
0.20, where i and j represent any two categories of X and Y, respectively.( , )105 106    
     
3.6 MORE ON THREE STEP MODELS 
3.6.1 Disadvantages of a Three Step Approach 
The main disadvantage to the three step approach is the bias introduced in the structural model 
due to the classification errors of the latent variables.  The latent variables are treated as observed 
variables in the structural model, but they are actually predicted variables with some degree of 
prediction, or classification, error.  The use of latent variables in this manner leads to bias, which 
causes attenuation, or underestimation, of the strength of the relationship between latent and 
observed variables.( , , )107 108 109
      Two tactics can be used to mitigate the bias.  First, greater emphasis can be placed on the 
classification ability of the latent variable, although this may come at the expense of fit.( )110   
Second, a correction procedure developed by Bolck, Hagenaars, and Croon can be applied to the 
(biased) joint distribution of the observed and predicted latent variables to obtain the joint 
distribution of the observed and true latent variables.( )111   Both tactics were applied in this 
research.  The correction procedure adjusts, or corrects, the biased joint distribution using a 
transition matrix, which is constructed using characteristics of the latent variable determined 
during latent class analysis. 
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 3.6.2 Correction Procedures 
The correction procedures for three-step modeling developed by Bolck, Croon, and Hagenaars 
involve adjustment of the matrix containing the joint distribution of the observed and predicted 
latent variables.  This is done using one or more transition matrices, depending on the number of 
latent variables.  The result is a corrected matrix containing the joint distribution of the observed 
and true latent variables.( )112   In the case of one latent variable and one or more observed 
variables, the relationship between the uncorrected and corrected matrices is given as 
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Using matrix algebra, the corrected matrix A is determined as follows: 
 
 1−= EDA . Equation 10 
 
 
 
 
The corrected matrix A was used for the loglinear modeling versus the uncorrected, or original, 
table E.  The contents of corrected matrix A were rounded to the nearest integer prior to 
modeling.   
      The transition matrix D is calculated using the conditional and classification probabilities 
determined as part of the latent class analysis, as shown below.  
 
 ∑= ).|()|( ysptypD  Equation 11 
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The factor , in which t represents the true latent variable and y represents the response 
pattern, is calculated as the product of the conditional probabilities associated with response 
pattern y in latent class t.  The factor  corresponds to the classification of each response 
pattern.  Assuming modal classification, which was used in this research,  = 1 if response 
pattern y is assigned to predicted class s and 0 otherwise.
)|( typ
)|( ysp
)|( ysp
( )113
      In the case of a joint distribution involving two or more latent variables and one or more 
observed variables, a more general correction procedure is needed.  The previous correction 
formula (Equation 10) cannot be applied in these cases based on the matrix algebra.  Therefore, a 
more general procedure was developed by Dr. Marcel Croon in January 2005 in response to 
these more complex joint distributions, which are present in this research.( )114   The more general 
procedure was not part of the published correction procedures by Bolck et. al.  The general 
procedure involves concepts from advanced matrix algebra, such as the Kronecker Product.  
      In order to present this general correction procedure, the Kronecker Product will be defined 
for the case of two matrices, although it can be extended to more than two.  Assume Ais an n x m 
matrix and B be an r x s matrix.  Their Kronecker Product A⊗B is the nr x ms super matrix 
formed from all possible products of the elements of A with those of B.( )115   Also, the 
vectorization operation (vec) for a matrix consists of writing the elements of the matrix as a 
single vector by stacking the columns.  Using the case of three latent and two observed variables 
as an example, the relationship between uncorrected matrix Q and corrected matrix P is given as 
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The transition matrices A, B, and C are associated with the three latent variables and are 
determined as previously using Equation 11.( )116   The general procedure (Equation 12) can be 
extended to include additional latent and observed variables.  For each additional latent variable, 
there is an additional transition matrix.  Equation 12 is solved algebraically for the corrected 
matrix P, which is used within the loglinear modeling, as given by 
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3.7 LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS 
The second component of the modified LISREL approach is latent class analysis, which performs 
the measurement portion of the modeling.  Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a technique used to 
determine a categorical latent variable from an analysis of the relationships among cross-
classified categorical indicator variables.  A latent variable is an unobserved variable that cannot 
be measured directly.  An example of a latent variable is a person’s attitude as portrayed through 
a survey.  A latent variable can be measured only indirectly using observed or manifest variables, 
which are also referred to as indicator variables.  An example of an indicator variable is a survey 
question.( )117   The basic premise of a latent variable is that it explains or accounts for the 
relationships among the indicator variables.( )118    
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       Latent class analysis is often referred to as a categorical analog to factor analysis and was 
originally conceived as a method for survey analysis in the social sciences.( )119   Factor analysis 
and LCA are similar in that both methods explore the latent structures among a group of 
observed variables.  Within three step modeling, a latent variable enables the researcher to work 
with one simple “predicted variable” versus many indicator variables.( )120   Since a latent variable 
explains the associations among its indicator variables, the indicators are simplified to a more 
basic and general latent construct.( , , , )  121 122 123 124 In essence, various associated nominal 
variables are “combined.”  Thus, in this research, latent class analysis was used as a variable 
simplification and reduction tool.  The following sections describe the various latent class 
analysis fundamentals necessary used in applying this technique within this research. 
3.7.1 Model Building Strategy 
The outcome of a latent class analysis is a latent variable, which contains a number of categories, 
or latent classes.  The objective is to choose the simplest model, or the model with the fewest 
classes, that has acceptable fit and classification ability.( , )125 126   Thus, the model builder must 
attempt to balance simplicity with fit and  classification ability.  In choosing the number of 
classes for the latent variable, the first model that is tested is the model of independence, which 
has one class.  If this model is acceptable, the indicator variables are not associated, and a latent 
variable is not necessary.  However, if a one-class model is not acceptable, then models 
containing several class are evaluated, starting with two.( )127   To compare models containing a 
different number of classes, the best run for each model is used.( )128   Based on these best runs for 
different models, a final model is chosen based on a comparison of fit, classification ability, and 
parsimony. 
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 3.7.2 Output Parameters 
There are two types of parameters estimated as part of a latent class analysis.  Latent class 
probabilities describe the sizes, or distribution, of the classes of the latent variable and sum to 
one.  A conditional probability parameter is the probability of a particular category of an 
indicator variable given the latent class.  In other words, a conditional probability is the 
probability that an indicator variable has category i given the latent variable has class t.  It 
indicates the degree of the relationship between the category and the latent class.  The 
conditional probability parameters are used to interpret and name the latent classes.( ) 129  The 
conditional probabilities for an indicator variable within a latent class sum to one.( )130
3.7.3 Max Likelihood Estimation of Parameters  
The latent class and conditional probabilities are typically estimated using a max likelihood (ML) 
approach.( , , )131 132 133   However, there is no closed-form ML solution for these parameters, and 
most software packages use an iterative procedure known as the Expectation Maximization (EM) 
algorithm to estimate the parameters.( , )134 135   The EM Algorithm begins with trial values for the 
parameters and iterates until the change in the estimated parameters is less than a pre-defined 
tolerance or until the maximum number of iterations is reached.( )136   A caution with the use of 
the EM Algorithm is its tendency to converge to local maximums.  However, performing many 
runs of a model using different start values for the parameters allows a determination of the 
optimal solution with a high degree of certainty.( ) 137
3.7.4 Goodness of Fit 
One criterion used in choosing the best model is fit.  There are various statistics and measures 
used to assess goodness of fit.  These include the Pearson Chi Square statistic (Χ2) and 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Square statistic (L2), which are used for significance testing.  In addition, 
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 the Index of Dissimilarity (Id), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) are 
other measures that can be used to assess fit.  The statistics Χ2 and L2 have the drawback of being 
dependent on the sample size.  They tend to reject a model when the sample size is large, even 
though the model is reasonable.  If Χ2 or L2is used to assess the fit of a latent class model, then 
the model is accepted as fitting the data if the chi square statistic is small enough relative to the 
degrees of freedom.  This is opposite of the traditional goal or rejecting the null hypothesis of 
independence by obtaining a large test statistic.  In finding the best fitting model, we hope to 
accept the hypothesized model.( )138
      Therefore, other measures are used to assess fit when the sample size is large, as in this 
research.  For instance, the Index of Dissimilarity (Id) takes sample size N into account and is 
defined as follows: 
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As a general rule, values of Id less than 0.05 are considered small and indicate good fit.  Thus, Id 
≤ 0.05 provides a target range for good fit when the sample size is large.( )  139 In this research, the 
Id  is one of the primary measures for assessing fit. 
      The Normed Fit Index (NFI) is another measure that can be used to assess fit with large 
sample sizes.  This index is calculated by comparing the likelihood ratio chi square of the model 
being tested ( ) with that of a baseline model ( ), such as a one-class model, as shown in 2iL
2
0L
Equation 14.( )140   
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Equation 14 
 
 
 
When the NFI is between 80% and 90%, then goodness of fit is suggested.  In other words, when 
a model begins to account for 80-90% of residuum variation, then the model has good fit.( , )141 142
      The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a measure of model fit based on concepts from 
information theory.  The AIC accounts for the number of independent parameters and is a 
parsimony index because it favors models with fewer parameters.  However, a criticism of the 
AIC is that it does not take N into account.  There are no critical values or targets, but smaller is 
better.( )143   It is calculated as shown in Equation 15.( )144
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The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) takes both N and the number of independent 
parameters into account.  Relative to the AIC, it tends to select less complex models, since it 
heavily penalizes for the number of parameters when N is large.  Similarly, there are no critical  
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 values for BIC, but smaller is better.( )145   The Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) is 
similar to the BIC in that it penalizes for both sample size and number of parameters.( )146   The 
smaller the AIC, BIC, or CAIC, the better the model.  
3.7.5 Classification 
Each pattern of the indicator variables is assigned to a class of the latent variable.  Each pattern is 
assigned based on the modal conditional probability.  The modal conditional probability is the 
largest probability of membership in a class of the latent variable given the particular pattern.( , 
)
147
148    
      Since modal assignment is probabilistic, measures of classification performance are 
calculated.  These include the classification error (Pe) and Goodman and Kruskal’s Lambda 
(λ).( )149   Lambda is a proportional reduction in error (PRE) measure that determines the 
proportional decrease in the error rate when modal assignment is used versus assignment of all 
patterns to the largest latent class in the model.  Specifically, λ is calculated as given in Equation 
16.( , )150 151
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The closer λ is to one, the better the classification performance, or predictive ability, of the 
model.( )  152 An LCA model should be judged not only on its fit but also on its ability to classify 
the patterns.( , ) 153 154
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 3.7.6 Identifiability 
An LCA model must have the property of being identified.  When a model is identified, there is a 
unique set of parameters associated with a value of L2.( ) 155  Thus, when a model is not identified, 
more than one set of latent class or conditional probabilities exists for the same value of L2.  
Local identifiability applies to any given run of a model, while global identifiability applies to 
the optimal run, or the run with the minimum L2.  Local identifiability indicates whether there are 
additional parameter solutions for the same L2 in the same neighborhood.( )156   A necessary 
condition for identifiability is non-negative degrees of freedom. 
3.7.7 Local Maximum Solutions 
As indicated in section 3.7.3, a latent class model often converges to local maximum solutions, 
which have a larger L2 than that of the optimal model.( ) 157  A local maximum solution can differ 
substantially from the optimal solution in terms of the parameters.  Convergence to local max 
solutions is a noted problem in latent class analysis.  Therefore, it’s imperative to run a model 
many times using random parameter start values to arrive at the minimum L2 for the model, as 
was done for the latent variables in this research.( , )158 159   The automation of this process by 
software is advantageous and was necessary to build the latent class models in this research.  
Once two separate runs having the same minimum L2 are found, they are then verified to have 
the same parameters (latent class and conditional probabilities).  If their parameters are equal, the 
model is globally identified.   
3.7.8 LCA Software 
There are various software products available to perform latent class analysis.  Some are 
academically developed and/or freely-downloadable, such as LEM and MLLSA.  The product 
used in this dissertation was Latent Gold 3.0, a commercial product by Statistical Innovations.  
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 Latent Gold allows a model to be automatically run many times, each time using a random set of 
start values, to ensure the optimal run is found.  The best of these runs is reported as the resultant 
model.  The functionality within Latent Gold enabled easy and fast determination of the globally 
identified solution for a given number of latent classes. 
             
3.8 BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
The final topic on categorical data modeling to be introduced is the Bayesian network.  A 
Bayesian network is a graphical decision model consisting of variables, represented by nodes, as 
well as the direct dependencies or associations between the variables, which are represented by 
arcs.  It is a directed graph that does not contain cycles.  A Bayesian network is used for 
probabilistic inference, or querying the probabilities of certain variables when the values of other 
variables are known.  For example, one of the main applications of a Bayesian network is 
determining the most likely cause for a given effect, also known as diagnostic, or bottom-up, 
reasoning.  Top down reasoning can also be performed, in which the probability of effects given 
causes is computed.( , , )160 161 162   Within diagnostic reasoning, the explanatory variables can be 
ranked based on their value of information and the degree to which they reduce the uncertainty 
of the effect.( , )163 164   For the hazmat release model, this was used to identify the variables that 
should be the top priorities for policy change.  In general, the Bayesian network has become a 
popular means of modeling expert or decision support systems, such as for medical diagnosis or 
other trouble-shooting applications. 
      The dependency, or association, structure of a Bayesian network is one of its two major 
components.  Only two-way associations and conditional independencies are depicted in directed 
graphs.  The absence of an arc indicates conditional independence between two variables.  
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 Three-way and higher-order associations are represented only indirectly through multiple arcs.  
With a directed graph, if two variables are connected by an arc to a third variable, the three-
variable interaction is automatically represented in the graph by the connecting arcs.( )  165
Therefore, even if the exact form of the relationships among the variables is not known, it does 
not matter because the uncertainty is represented probabilistically. 
      A typical method of building the structure of a small to moderate sized Bayesian network is 
manually with the assistance of an expert.  Newer methods, which are often applied to larger 
networks or in the absence of a readily available expert, are machine learning or algorithmic 
approaches involving inductive inference or search for the most probable structure.( )166   Learning 
modules were implemented in academic Bayesian network software beginning in the early 
1990’s.( )167   A learning module was just implemented in GeNIe, the decision model software 
used in this research, in the summer of 2005.  An opportunity for future research is a comparison 
of the results of loglinear modeling with those of learning algorithms for building the structure of 
the network. 
      The second major component of a Bayesian network is the quantitative portion, and it 
represents the joint probability distribution among all the variables.  The joint probability 
distribution is calculated using the conditional probability distribution associated with each node 
in the network.  The conditional probability distribution of a node is the probability that the node 
takes on each of its possible values given every combination of values of its parent nodes.  The 
joint and conditional probabilities are related according to the chain rule.  The chain rule states 
that for a Bayesian network over the variables U={A1,…,Am}, the joint probability distribution 
P(U) is the product of all conditional probability distributions specified in the network.   
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 Specifically,  
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where pa(Ai) is the parent node set of node Ai.  When a variable has no parents, the probability 
distribution is the prior distribution.( )168   In order to determine the quantitative portion of the 
Bayesian network, the conditional probability distribution for each variable, or node, must be 
calculated.  The conditional probability distribution for a variable A given its parents B and C is 
calculated according to Equation 18.( )169
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This equation is easily extended to include additional parent variables by including them in the 
numerator and denominator in the same manner as B and C.  To calculate  for 
category combination A=i, B=j, and C=k, the number of records in which A=i and B=j and C=k 
is divided by the number of records in which B=j and C=k.
),|( CBAP
( )  170 The conditional probability 
distribution for A contains i x j x k probabilities, so there is a probability associated with each 
category combination i,j,k. 
      Conditional probabilities can be determined based on record counts from a database or 
subjective data or beliefs from an expert.  All probabilities calculated for the Bayesian network 
in this research were calculated using record counts, or frequency data, from the HMIRS 
database.  Frequency data can be used when dealing with repetitive events that have been 
recorded.  However, a database may not be available, or the event may not be repetitive, for 
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 instance a nuclear war.  In these cases, the conditional probabilities must be assessed subjectively 
by an expert.  The subjectivist view considers probability as a measure of personal belief.  
Hence, Bayesian networks are also known as belief networks.( )171
      The foundation of inference in Bayesian networks is Bayes Theorem, which enables 
inference in any direction in the network.  Using Bayes Theorem, some probabilities are updated 
based on new evidence, or specific values, of other probabilities.( )172   Several algorithms exist for 
performing inference in a Bayesian network.  The clustering algorithm, in which the directed 
graph is converted to a junction tree where the probabilities are then updated, is the fastest 
known exact algorithm.  The clustering algorithm is the default algorithm implemented in 
GeNIe, which is discussed next.( )173    
3.8.1 Bayesian Network Software 
The decision model software used in this research was GeNIe, a graphical decision-theoretic 
package developed at the Decision Systems Lab at the University of Pittsburgh.  GeNIe is a 
development environment for Bayesian networks and influence diagrams and is available to the 
community at no cost.  Using GeNIe, the modeler builds the network structure using circular 
nodes and arcs in an intuitive, graphical environment.  Conditional probability distributions can 
be copied into GeNIe for each node, making the construction of the network very efficient.  Once 
this is complete, the various forms of inference discussed previously can be performed.   
      Decision models can be studied in terms of value of information, which refers to the 
information value of a parent variable relative to the outcome variable.  The information value of 
a parent variable can also be viewed as its ability to influence or reduce uncertainty in the 
outcome variable.  An entropy-based value function is used in GeNIe to rank the parent variables 
based on their information content in relation to the outcome variable.  This function determines 
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 the decrease in entropy, or uncertainty, by observing a given parent variable.  Entropy is a 
concept from the field of information theory and is used to measure the information value of a 
variable, which represents the expected amount of information needed to classify a new instance 
involving the variable.( )174
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4.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
A methodology for determining a data-directed decision model from a categorical dataset is 
being proposed and demonstrated in this research.  The major components of this methodology 
include simplification, determination of associations, and construction of a Bayesian network 
model, as shown in Figure 4 by way of review.  
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Figure 4: Methodology for Building a Decision Model. 
 
 
The variable domain was simplified for purposes of model building.  The simplification was 
accomplished using Pareto analysis, data aggregation, discretization, and latent class analysis.  
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 Pareto analysis was used to eliminate infrequent categories and variables from consideration to 
decrease the sparseness of the contingency tables used for latent class analysis and loglinear 
modeling.  Data discretization was applied to the outcome variables release quantity and dollar 
loss, which were continuous variables.  These variables were made discrete based on their 
distribution as well as expert input.  This was done to simplify the data and to enable these 
variables to be used within loglinear and Bayesian network modeling.  After the Pareto analysis 
and data aggregation, latent class analysis was used to further simplify the variable domain by 
combining related variables to form latent variables.  Using latent class analysis, the number of 
variables in the decision model was reduced from 24 to 11.  The simplification strategy applied 
to the domain of variables is summarized below in Figure 5. 
 
Simplification of a 
highly-categorical 
database for categorical 
decision analysis 
Category 
Elimination Discretization
Variable 
Reduction
 
Figure 5: Simplification Strategy for a Highly-Categorical Database. 
 
The 11 simplified variables were used to construct a time-ordered, base network structure of a 
hazardous materials release.  In order to determine accurate relationships, or associations, 
between the variables, an exploratory loglinear modeling approach was taken, as part of a three-
step approach for the modeling of categorical latent variables.  In determining these associations, 
the downstream variables in the network served as response variables to the upstream variables, 
as the loglinear, or logit, modeling proceeded from left to right in the network.  An exploratory 
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 analysis was considered the best approach based on the gaps in the literature, the possibility for 
non-obvious relationships, and the large amount of available data.  Loglinear modeling has been 
used previously by social science researchers to build data-congruent path diagrams.( , ) 175 176
      The associations determined using loglinear modeling were used to construct the structural, or 
qualitative, portion of a Bayesian network decision model.  The joint probability distribution 
among the 11 variables, which forms the quantitative portion of the Bayesian network, was 
obtained from the database using incident counts.  The Bayesian network was used for making 
inferences on the variables, including ranking the explanatory variables and analyzing desirable 
changes for them.  Starting with the simplification techniques of Pareto analysis, data 
aggregation, and discretization, the overall methodology is demonstrated using the DoT’s 
hazardous materials release database as the worked example. 
 
4.1 WORKED EXAMPLE 
A general, high level methodology for development of a data-driven decision model based on 
categorical data was proposed in the previous section.  This methodology is demonstrated in the 
following sections using an engineering problem as the worked example.  The problem is the 
decision model of a hazardous materials release during transportation-related unloading of 
containers.  The decision model will be used for identification of critical variables and 
operational change analysis related to these types of hazmat releases.  In general, the decision 
model can be used to gain a better understanding of the hazmat release problem in order to 
decrease the severity of incidents.  In the following sections, the proposed methodology for  
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 decision model construction is carried out.  Specifically, the following sections describe the 
Pareto analyses, data aggregation, discretization, three-step modeling procedure, and Bayesian 
network construction, as applied to the large, categorical hazmat release database.      
4.1.1 Simplification 
The simplification of the variable domain for the hazmat release problem using the techniques 
described previously is demonstrated in the following sections.  The application of Pareto 
analysis, data aggregation, discretization, and latent class analysis to the hazmat release database 
is demonstrated. 
4.1.1.1 Data Sources and Incident Types  
The most complete source of data on hazardous materials releases is the HMIRS, the database 
maintained by the DoT’s Office of Hazardous Materials (OHM).  If hazardous materials are 
unintentionally released during commercial interstate or intrastate transport, a written report must 
be submitted for entry into the HMIRS.  The HMIRS is readily available on the internet in the 
form of downloadable datasets covering years 1993 to the present.  There are approximately 
149,000 records from January 1993 to July 2002, the time period being considered in this 
research. 
      The HMIRS was compared to a state database that also tracks hazmat releases.  The state of 
Ohio, which has the largest number of off-road highway incidents according to the HMIRS, 
maintains a database for commercial transport releases.  However, based on a comparison of 
Ohio’s database to the HMIRS, the federal reporting requirement indicates the desirability of 
using federal data for off-road incidents.  In Ohio, it is not mandatory for commercial carriers to 
report unintentional releases.  The entities that typically report include regulatory and local  
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 emergency response agencies.  As a result, only 30-50 releases were recorded annually between 
2000 and 2001 in Ohio’s database.( ) 177  This contrasts with an annual average of 1356 highway 
releases recorded for Ohio in the HMIRS between 2000 and 2001. 
      The majority of hazmat incidents in the United States are related to the highway mode of 
transport as opposed to air, water, and rail.  The highway mode is associated with 86% of 
incidents.  Highway-related incidents occur both on and off the road, but 88% occur off the road.  
Of these, 73% occur during the unloading of hazardous materials.  This compares to 22% during 
loading and 5% during storage operations.  Due to the prevalence of incidents that occur during 
unloading, the incident type considered is limited to unloading release incidents within the 
United States.  Based on an analysis of the HMIRS, there are approximately 80,000 incidents 
meeting these criteria in the HMIRS. However, after applying Pareto, approximately 40,000 
were used in constructing the association structure of the Bayesian network.  As shown in Table 
2, the percentage of unload incidents from 1993 to mid 2002 has remained fairly constant.  
However, one will notice a relative increase in 2001.  This may be the result of a requirement 
beginning in October 1998 to report intrastate as well as interstate incidents.( )178   Therefore, this 
research does not consider a trend in incidents over this time period.   
 
Table 2: Unload Incidents by Year. 
 YEAR 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Unload 
Incidents 7394 8701 8145 7200 7174 7613 9241 9225 10451 4834 
Total 
Highway 
Incidents 
11074 13984 12762 11909 11852 12995 14963 15012 14921 6852 
Unload 
Percentage 0.668 0.622 0.638 0.605 0.605 0.586 0.618 0.615 0.7 0.706 
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 4.1.1.2 Pareto Analysis and Data Aggregation   
The need to simplify the variable domain was apparent at the outset of the data analysis.  The 
variables were multi-valued, ranging from two to thirty-six categories.  Despite the large sample 
size, the large number of categories created sparse contingency tables containing many zeros or 
small cell counts of less than five.  Unfortunately, the use of chi square statistics for significance 
testing in sparse tables is suspect.  Therefore, various categories were eliminated from 
consideration.
      Another important reason for reducing the categories considered was an increased chance of 
convergence of the loglinear models.  Loglinear models often do not converge when the 
contingency table contains many zeros, which is driven by a large number of categories.( )179   For 
example, an early model involving 13 container types did not converge.   
      In order to determine the categories to retain for modeling, a frequency analysis of each 
variable based on involvement in incidents was done.  In general, the categories associated with 
80% of the incidents were included.  Thus, the 80/20, or Pareto Principle, was applied when 
possible.  This principle focuses on the top 20% of the factors or categories that are associated 
with 80% of the outcome.( )180   For example, material type approximately follows the Pareto 
Principle since two of the nine material types, corrosives and flammable liquids, are associated 
with 80% of the unloading incidents.  The Pareto analysis of each variable and the categories 
retained for latent class modeling and loglinear analysis are described in the following sections.     
      In addition, there were several variables that were natural candidates for data aggregation, or 
generalization, as a means of simplification.  These variables included date, time, and U.S. state.  
Data aggregation or generalization was desirable and possible with these variables because they 
included natural groupings.  
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       A note on the selection of categories and variables as part of the simplification is in order.  
Although Pareto was applied to most of the variables and sets of binary variables, it was not 
applied to all of them due to modeling constraints.  The variables and sets to which Pareto was 
not applied were container type, failure item, and failure area, as will be discussed.  This resulted 
in the dataset of unloading incidents being reduced by 50% from approximately 80,000 records 
to 40,000 records.  The issues of model testing and convergence, which are affected by the size 
and sparseness of the contingency table, became the overriding factors for determining the 
categories and variables retained for container type as well as the failure item and area binary 
sets.  In addition, the binary variables in these two sets were combined to form one latent 
variable versus a latent variable for each set.  This was done so that the largest loglinear model 
would have a maximum of ten variables, due to an SPSS limitation.  Also, the ability to interpret 
latent class models is enhanced when the number of indicator variables and categories is kept 
small.  A summary of the approach used in this research for category elimination is provided in 
Figure 6. 
      Based on this, the infusion of subject matter knowledge can contribute to the methodology by 
removing some of the arbitrariness in selecting categories and variables and in general adding 
“art” to the science.  The modeler in this case would likely have better or additional reasons for 
retaining or eliminating certain categories or variables. 
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Figure 6: Strategy for Category Elimination. 
 
 
The non-simplified variables to be discussed in the following sections are summarized below. 
 
Table 3: Non-Simplified Variables in the Hazmat Release Network. 
Variable Data Type Number of Categories Range 
Area Type nominal 3   
Container 
Type nominal 36   
Dollar Loss continuous   $0-$43,760 
Geographic 
Division 
(State) nominal 9   
Land Use nominal 5   
Material 
Type nominal 9   
0-2000 gal. Release 
Quantity continuous   0-200 lb. 
Season 
(Date) nominal 4   
Shift (Time) nominal 3   
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Table 3 (continued). 
Variable 
Set 
Data 
Type 
Number 
of 
Variables 
Range 
Causing 
Object binary 9   
Contributing 
Action binary 18   
Failure 
Area binary 8   
Failure Item binary 8   
Failure 
Mode binary 8   
 
 
 
Area Type  Area type describes the location of the incident in terms of a suburban, urban, or 
rural setting.  Suburban incidents occurred most frequently, with urban incidents following 
closely behind, as shown in Table 4.  If an area type was not reported, as in 2% of the incidents, 
the record was excluded from the analysis.  Since suburban and urban accounted for over 80% of 
the incidents, the rural area type was not included in the analysis.   
 
Table 4: Unload Incident Count by Area Type. 
  Area Type 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Suburban 34,809 0.44 0.44 
2 Urban 32,591 0.41 0.84 
3 Rural 11,043 0.14 0.98 
4 
Not 
Reported 1,535 0.02 1.00 
 
 
 
Land Use  Land use is another location-related variable that describes the scene of the incident 
in terms of a commercial, industrial, residential, agricultural, or undeveloped setting.  
Commercial and industrial incidents were about equally prevalent and accounted for the great 
majority of incidents at 96%, as shown in .  Residential settings were associated with 
only 2% of incidents, while agricultural and undeveloped accounted for less than 1% each.  
Table 5
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 Approximately 2% of incidents had a non-reported land use and were not included.  Based on the 
large percentage of commercial and industrial incidents, the remaining categories were 
eliminated.  
 
Table 5: Unload Incident Count by Land Use. 
  Land Use 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Commercial 39,561 0.49 0.49 
2 Industrial 37,224 0.47 0.96 
3 Residential 1,626 0.02 0.98 
4 Not Reported 1,237 0.02 1.00 
5 Agricultural 187 0.00 1.00 
6 Undeveloped 143 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
State/Geographic Division  The third variable that describes the location of the incident is the 
U.S. state.  However, for simplification purposes, state was generalized to geographic division, 
which is based on the nine U.S. Census Bureau divisions.( )181   These nine divisions and their 
constituent states are shown in Table 6.  The East North Central division, which consists of 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, accounted for the largest number of incidents 
with 21%.  Next, the South Atlantic and Middle Atlantic divisions were associated with 16% and 
15%, respectively.  All nine divisions were included in this research. 
 
Table 6: Unload Incident Count by Geographic Division. 
  Division States 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 East North Central IL, IN, MI, OH, WI 17,145 0.21 0.21 
2 South Atlantic 
DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, 
NC, SC, VA, WV 12,536 0.16 0.37 
3 Middle Atlantic NJ, NY, PA 12,058 0.15 0.52 
4 Pacific AK, CA, HI, OR, WA 8,704 0.11 0.63 
5 West South Central AR, LA, OK, TX 8,080 0.10 0.73 
6 West North Central 
IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, 
NE, SD 6,721 0.08 0.82 
7 East South Central AL, KY, MS, TN 5,686 0.07 0.89 
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 Table 6 (continued). 
8 Mountain 
AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, 
NV, UT, WY 5,473 0.07 0.96 
9 Northeast 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, 
VT 3,575 0.04 1.00 
 
 
 
Date/Season  In order to create a simplified and discrete variable for modeling, incident dates 
were aggregated based on the season, using the ranges shown in Table 7.  Incidents occurred 
most frequently during the summer season (29%) but were nearly as prevalent in the spring 
(28%).  The fall and winter seasons ere associated with 22% and 21% of incidents, respectively.  
All four seasons were analyzed in this research due the proximity of their percentages.   
 
Table 7: Unload Incident Count by Season. 
  Season Begin Date 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Summer 21-Jun 23,189 0.29 0.29 
2 Spring 20-Mar 22,567 0.28 0.57 
3 Fall 22-Sep 17,513 0.22 0.79 
4 Winter 21-Dec 16,709 0.21 1.00 
 
 
 
Time/ Shift  The occurrence times of unloading incidents were also aggregated, as shown in 
Table 8, by the work shift.  The largest number of incidents occurred during the daytime shift, 
followed by the midnight and twilight shifts.  All three shifts were considered in this research 
due to the high prevalence of each.  If the time was invalid or not reported, the incident was 
excluded. 
 
Table 8: Unload Incident Count by Shift. 
  Shift Times 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Day 7 AM – 2:59 PM 33,851 0.42 0.42 
2 Midnight 
11 PM - 6:59 
AM  23,872 0.30 0.72 
3 Twilight 
3 PM - 10:59 
PM  20,339 0.25 0.98 
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 Table 8 (continued). 
4 
Not 
Reported 
or Invalid   1,919 0.02 1.00 
 
 
 
Material Type  There are nine hazmat classes that group materials based on their dangerous 
characteristics, as shown in Table 9.  Hazmat classes 8 and 3 (corrosives and flammable liquids, 
respectively) were associated with 80% of the incidents and therefore followed the Pareto 
Principle.  Applying the 80/20 Principle, only classes 8 and 3 were included in this research.  
Since a given incident may involve more than one material type, an incident may be represented 
more than once in Table 9.   
 
Table 9: Unload Incident Count by Hazardous Material Class. 
Hazard 
Class Description 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
8 Corrosives  32954 0.41 0.41 
3  Flammable Liquids 31530 0.39 0.80 
6 
Toxic and Infectious 
materials  6140 0.08 0.88 
2 
 Gases (Flammable, 
Non-Flammable and 
Toxic) 3851 0.05 0.92 
5 
Oxidizers and Organic 
Peroxides  3142 0.04 0.96 
9  Miscellaneous 2250 0.03 0.99 
4 
 Flammable Solids, 
Spontaneously 
Combustibles, 
Dangerous When Wet 786 0.01 1.00 
1  Explosives 25 0.00 1.00 
7 Radioactive Materials  18 0.00 1.00 
Not 
Reported    1 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Container Type  There were 36 container types associated with unloading incidents, as shown 
in Table 10.  The top two container types, fiber box and bottle, were considered in this research.  
Although they represent only 45% of the incidents, the other types were eliminated to reduce the 
sparseness of the stage one contingency table.  Container types were not combined for 
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 simplification since this could be done based on either structure or material.  For example, 
should all drums be combined, or should all plastic containers be combined?  The desirability of 
one criterion versus the other was unknown.  An incident can involve more than container type, 
and so an incident may be represented more than once in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Unload Incident Count by Container Type. 
  Container Type 
Incident 
Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 BOX FIBER 42,735 0.34 0.34 
2 BOTTLE 13,764 0.11 0.45 
3 DRUM METAL 12,887 0.10 0.55 
4 TANK 11,953 0.09 0.64 
5 JUG 11,432 0.09 0.73 
6 
DRUM NON-
METAL 8,465 0.07 0.80 
7 INSIDE CONTAIN 6,888 0.05 0.85 
8 CAN 5,246 0.04 0.90 
9 CONTAINER 2,804 0.02 0.92 
10 BAG PAPER 1,708 0.01 0.93 
11 DRUM 1,392 0.01 0.94 
12 PAIL 1,292 0.01 0.95 
13 JAR 1,156 0.01 0.96 
14 CYLINDER 1,000 0.01 0.97 
15 BAG PLASTIC 940 0.01 0.98 
16 BOX 820 0.01 0.98 
17 BAG 747 0.01 0.99 
18 JERRICAN 617 0.00 0.99 
19 COMPOSITE 253 0.00 1.00 
20 TUBE 99 0.00 1.00 
21 IBC 92 0.00 1.00 
22 OTHER 68 0.00 1.00 
23 BAG CLOTH 58 0.00 1.00 
24 BOX WOOD 37 0.00 1.00 
25 BOX PLASTIC 28 0.00 1.00 
26 CARBOY 25 0.00 1.00 
27 HOPPER 23 0.00 1.00 
28 BATTERY 21 0.00 1.00 
29 CYLINDER BULK 9 0.00 1.00 
30 BOX METAL 7 0.00 1.00 
31 KEG METAL 7 0.00 1.00 
32 
TANK 
INTERMODAL 6 0.00 1.00 
33 RAM CONTAINER 4 0.00 1.00 
34 TANK CRYO 4 0.00 1.00 
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 Table 10 (continued). 
35 
BARREL/KEG 
WOOD 1 0.00 1.00 
36 TANK CAR 1 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Container Failure Variables  There are several sets of binary variables that describe the failure 
of the container and subsequent release of hazmat.  Each set contains between eight and eighteen 
binary variables, which represent yes/no responses, such as the container was punctured (yes), or 
the container was not dropped (no).  Each set consists of several binary variables that are 
grouped on the incident reporting form.  For example, there is a section on the form for “Action 
Contributing to Packaging Failure,” and it includes yes/no variables such as dropped, improper 
loading, and loose fitting.  Any number of variables within a set may have a “yes” response, 
allowing for the joint action of various factors. 
      In order to simplify the variable domain, two general actions were taken relative to the binary 
container failure variables.  First, only the top binary variables in each set were included in the 
analysis.  Second, these top variables were used as indicator variables for a latent variable 
characterizing the set.  For example, using the top variables in the section “Action Contributing 
to Packaging Failure,” a latent variable named Contributing Action was developed.  The 
following sections discuss the various sets of binary variables that describe the failure of the 
container of hazardous materials. 
Contributing Action  There are 18 binary variables in the set called Contributing Action, as 
shown in Table 11.  These variables describe the factors and actions that contributed to the 
failure of the container, such as loose fitting or improper loading.  Based on their grouping on the 
incident form, the variables were used to create a latent variable called Contributing Action.  
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       To simplify the analysis and reduce sparseness, the top four contributing actions, which 
represent almost 80% of the incidents, were utilized.  Thus, the following variables in the set 
served as indicator variables for the latent variable: other, loose fitting/valve, improper loading, 
and dropped.  Despite its lack of information, the variable “other” was included due to its large 
association with monetary and human consequences.  Based on an analysis of the HMIRS, 
“other” was associated with 39% of monetary damages, 41% of fatalities, 38% of injuries, and 
50% of evacuees, relative to total amounts.  However, elimination of the “other” variable related 
to contributing action and the container failure variables in general, is an item for future research, 
as will be discussed in section 5.3. 
 
Table 11: Unload Incident Count by Container Failure Contributing Action. 
  
Contributing Action Incident Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Other 44276 0.32 0.32 
2 Loose Fittings/Valves 25068 0.18 0.51 
3 Improper Loading 20979 0.15 0.66 
4 Dropped 17041 0.12 0.78 
5 Struck/Rammed 12925 0.09 0.88 
6 Improper Blocking 5148 0.04 0.92 
7 Defective 
Fittings/Valves 4310 0.03 0.95 
8 Overload/Overfill 2563 0.02 0.97 
9 Metal Fatigue 1335 0.01 0.98 
10 Friction 1293 0.01 0.99 
11 Corrosion 715 0.01 0.99 
12 Venting 537 0.00 0.99 
13 Incompatible Materials 351 0.00 1.00 
14 Freezing 185 0.00 1.00 
15 Fire/Heat 90 0.00 1.00 
16 Vehicle Overturn 63 0.00 1.00 
17 Vehicle Collision 57 0.00 1.00 
18 Vandalism 25 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Causing Object  Objects that caused the container to fail are represented by the binary variables 
in Table 12.  For example, a combination of the ground and water may have caused the container 
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 to fail.  The top four variables, which are associated with 78% of incidents, were used to create a 
latent variable for causing object.  Thus, the indicator variables consisted of the following: none, 
other, floor/ground, and water/liquid.  The relationship of “none” and “other,” the top two 
variables, to consequences was large.  Based on this, these variables were not excluded from the 
analysis, despite the limited information they provide.  Relative to total fatalities, evacuees, 
damages, and injuries, respectively, “other” was associated with 53% of fatalities, 50% of 
evacuees, 40% of monetary damages, and 43% of injuries.  “None” was associated with 47% of 
fatalities, 32% of evacuees, 29% of monetary damages, and 31% of injuries.  However, as 
discussed previously, “none” and “other” should be removed as part of future research. 
 
Table 12: Unload Incident Count by Container Failure Causing Object. 
  
Causing Object Incident Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 None 33521 0.26 0.26 
2 Other 29550 0.23 0.49 
3 Floor/Ground/Roadway 18441 0.14 0.64 
4 Water/Other Liquid 18236 0.14 0.78 
5 Other Freight 17802 0.14 0.92 
6 Forklift 7933 0.06 0.98 
7 Nail/Protrusion 2249 0.02 1.00 
8 Roadside Obstacle 225 0.00 1.00 
9 Other Transport Vehicle 157 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Failure Mode  A set of variables describes the manner in which the container failed, as shown in 
Table 13.  For example, a container may have been crushed, punctured, and/or cracked.  The 
variables other, punctured, and crushed were associated with 82% of the incidents.  
Consequently, these three variables were used as indicators for a latent variable called Failure 
Mode.  The remaining variables were eliminated from consideration.  The “other” failure mode  
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 variable was analyzed for possible exclusion from the analysis.  However, despite its lack of 
information, it will remain in the analysis, as it was related to 68% of monetary damages, 88% of 
fatalities, 62% of injuries, and 73% of evacuees relative to the totals.   
 
Table 13: Unload Incident Count by Container Failure Mode. 
  Failure Mode Incident Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Other 76093 0.59 0.59 
2 Punctured 16591 0.13 0.72 
3 Crushed 12719 0.10 0.82 
4 Cracked 5937 0.05 0.86 
5 Burst/Internal Pressure 5920 0.05 0.91 
6 Ripped 5677 0.04 0.95 
7 Ruptured 4880 0.04 0.99 
8 Rubbed/Abraded 1272 0.01 1.00 
 
 
 
Failure Item  The item or items on the container that failed are described by the set of binary 
variables in Table 14.  For example, the basic package material itself and/or a closure may have 
failed.  For simplification purposes, the failure item variables were combined with a second 
group of variables related to the physical aspect of the container to form a latent variable.  This 
second group, the failure area, will be discussed in the next section.  The top two indicator 
variables from each of these two sets of variables were used to develop a latent variable called 
Failure Item-Area.  Thus, in the failure item set, basic package material and closure, which 
represent 67% of the incidents, were included in the analysis.  In the failure area set, the binary 
variables top and bottom, which represent 63% of the incidents, were used in the analysis.  
Pareto was not applied to these two sets of variables due to the need to create one latent variable 
versus two latent variables based on an SPSS limitation of 10 total variables.  In addition, by 
limiting the number of indicator variables, the number of classes for the latent variable was also 
minimized for convergence of the largest loglinear model.  
64 
  
Table 14: Unload Incident Count by Container Failure Item. 
  Failure Item Incident Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Basic Package Material 55438 0.43 0.43 
2 Closure 30963 0.24 0.67 
3 Other 29199 0.23 0.89 
4 Fitting/Valve 7224 0.06 0.95 
5 Weld/Seam 4005 0.03 0.98 
6 Inner Liner 1065 0.01 0.99 
7 Hose/Piping 966 0.01 1.00 
8 Chime 357 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Failure Area  The eight areas of the container that may fail are given by the set of variables 
shown in Table 15.  For example, the most frequent area that failed was the top of the container, 
while the forward, or front, of the container failed the least.  The top and bottom areas of the 
container were used to develop the latent variable Failure Item-Area discussed previously.  The 
“other” failure area was not analyzed due to simplification needs.  
 
Table 15: Unload Incident Count by Container Failure Area. 
  
Failure 
Area Incident Count 
Incident 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 Top 49907 0.37 0.37 
2 Bottom 34916 0.26 0.63 
3 Other 29666 0.22 0.86 
4 Right 7148 0.05 0.91 
5 Left 7124 0.05 0.96 
6 Center 3043 0.02 0.98 
7 Rear 1090 0.01 0.99 
8 Forward 973 0.01 1.00 
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 4.1.1.3 Discretization   
The two outcome variables release quantity and dollar loss are continuous variables, as reported 
on the incident form.  In order to use them within loglinear and Bayesian network modeling, they 
were transformed to discrete variables based on both the distribution of the data and expert input.  
In discretizing these variables, the number of categories was minimized so the ten-variable 
models in stages four and five, which contain release quantity and dollar loss, would converge.  
The method and rationale for discretizing these variables is described in the following two 
sections.
Release Quantity  Unlike the variables previously discussed, the quantity of hazmat released is 
a continuous variable.  It was captured on the incident form in a free-form fashion as numeric, 
non-categorical data.  A unit of measure was provided by the user, including gallons and pounds.  
For simplification as well as for usage within categorical analyses such as loglinear modeling, 
release quantity was converted to a discrete variable.  Simplification was necessary because the 
range of the data was very large.  For corrosives, the release amount ranged from 0 to 2000 
gallons or 0 to 200 pounds, depending on the unit.  For flammable liquids, the range was 0 to 
4,827.74 gallons.  The unit of gallons was much more prevalent than pounds, being associated 
with more than 39,000 corrosives and flammable liquids incidents. Since only 273 incidents 
involved pounds as the unit of measure, these records were discarded from the analysis.   
      A discrete version of release quantity was created based on the data itself as well as expert 
input.  The distributions of the incidents were wide, skewed, and multi-modal, as shown in 
Figure 7.  As an indication of the skewed nature of the data, 91% of the corrosives incidents 
involved 1 gallon or less, and 99% involved a maximum of 5 gallons, although the maximum 
amount recorded was 2,000 gallons.  For flammable liquids, 90% of the incidents were 1 gallon 
or less, and over 99% involved 5 gallons or less, compared to a maximum amount of 4,827.74 
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 gallons.  The use of discretization techniques such as equal interval or equal frequency binning is 
problematic with such distributions.  When applied to the data given the need to keep the number 
of bins small, the equal interval technique led to gradations that were too coarse.  The incidents 
were also unevenly distributed among the bins due to being heavily skewed to the left.  Equal 
frequency binning led to the placement of incidents with the same release quantity in different 
bins due to the skewed nature of the data. 
 
 
67 
  
Figure 7: Incidents vs. Release Quantity for Classes 8 and 3. 
 
 
 
Despite the large ranges for corrosives and flammable liquids incidents, there were very few 
releases greater than 100 gallons.  Specifically, there were only five releases involving more than 
100 gallons in the HMIRS.  Therefore, for further simplification, the non-zero range considered 
by this research was narrowed to 0.01 to 100 gallons.  Applying the log (base 10) transform to 
this range, the range was further narrowed to -2 to 2.  As evident, there were two approximately- 
equal interval bins based on the logarithm, or exponent, as shown below: 
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 • 10-2 to 100 
• 10.005 to 102, 
 
 
 
which are equivalent to the following:  
 
• 0.01 to 1 gallon 
• 1.01 to 100 gallons. 
 
 
 
These equal interval bins very closely coincided with input provided by Doug Reeves of the 
OHM on appropriate categories for release quantity.  Reeves felt that a category for zero was 
desirable, since an incident may involve no release of material.  For example, an incident must 
be reported if a road closure results, regardless of the amount released.  Reeves also felt that 
carriers tend to report a zero quantity when the amount is too minor to quantify.  For a “small” 
release, Reeves felt that a 1 gallon upper limit was appropriate based on a new policy initiated in 
January 2005.  This policy maintains that a carrier is not required to report a release if it involves 
fewer than 5 gallons.  Finally, since the OHM identifies a “large” or bulk release as 119 gallons 
or more, Reeves felt that an upper limit of 100 gallons was appropriate for a “medium” 
release.( )182   Based on the small number of releases greater than 100 gallons, a category for 
“large” was not considered in this study.  In summary, the following categories were defined for 
release quantity for this research: 
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 • 0 gallons 
• 0.01 to 1 gallon (small) 
• 1.01 to 100 gallons (medium). 
 
 
 
Dollar Loss  Dollar Loss, which is also a continuous variable as captured on the incident form, 
was analyzed in a similar fashion to release quantity.  Dollar loss is one of several types of 
consequences associated with a hazardous materials release, and for this research, the total dollar 
loss associated with the incident was used.  The range for dollar loss was large at $0 - $43,760, 
and the distribution was multimodal and skewed.  For example, there were concentrations of 
incidents at the values $0, $50, $100, $125, and $525, as shown in Figure 8.  In addition, 90% of 
all incidents involved $470 or less, and 99% involved $550 or less.  As discussed above, the 
equal frequency and equal interval binning techniques are difficult to apply when the distribution 
is wide and skewed.   
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Figure 8: Incidents vs. Dollar Loss. 
 
 
 
Expert opinion provided by Doug Reeves was primarily used to identify the categories for dollar 
loss.  Reeves recommended the following categories for zero, small, and medium dollar loss: 
 
• $ 0  
• $1 to $500 (small) 
• $501 to $25,000 (medium). 
 
 
 
As with release quantity, Reeves recommended a separate category for $0.  In fact, 17% of the 
incidents were associated with a zero dollar loss.  The “small” category consisting of losses of 
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 $500 or less corresponds to a new DoT guideline as of January 2004.  This guideline states that 
the dollar loss must be reported only if it exceeds $500.( )183   Reeves recommended an upper limit 
of $25,000 for a “medium” loss because any incident above this amount would likely receive a 
great deal of attention and be considered “large” by the OHM.( )184   There were only two 
incidents in the HMIRS that exceed $25,000.  Since very few “large” releases occurred 
(0.005%), a category for them was not considered by this research. 
      In an effort to apply the binning techniques, the dollar loss range was narrowed using the 
logarithmic function, and equal-interval bins based on the logarithm were identified.  However, 
the results did not coincide well with the categories suggested by Reeves.  Therefore, the 
decision was made to place greater weight on the expert’s recommendations versus the data-
driven categories, since they were in part based on DoT guidelines.   
      Since the release incidents considered occurred from 1993 to 2002, the dollar loss values 
were discounted to 2002 dollars for standardization prior to categorizing the incidents based on 
dollar loss.  This was done using annual inflation rates for 1993 through 2002.  Dollar loss 
categorizations were thus based on the 2002-equivalent amounts. 
      The approach taken in this research for discretizing release quantity and dollar loss, which 
includes a combination of expert input and data-driven analysis, is summarized in flowchart form 
in Figure 9.  
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 Consider any 
modeling constraints, 
such as a maximum 
number of categories 
for discretized
variable.
Subject 
matter 
expert 
available?
Apply data-driven 
discretization
technique, given 
modeling constraints.  
Use smoothing 
function if needed.
eg. equal interval 
binning.
Expert assists in 
identifying categories, 
given modeling 
constraints.
Yes
No
Start
Also apply data-
driven discretization
technique, given 
modeling constraints.  
Use smoothing 
function if needed.
eg. equal interval 
binning.
Done
Consider results of 
both expert-based 
and data-based 
discretization to 
identify final 
categories.
Done
 
Figure 9: Strategy for Discretization. 
 
 
4.1.1.4 Latent Variable Development   
The last step in the simplification of the variable domain was the development of latent class 
variables.  Five latent class models were developed using the simplified variables and variable 
sets discussed previously.  Several of the variables and sets that were simplified using Pareto 
analysis and data generalization were used as indicator variables to build simplifying latent 
variables.  In developing the latent variables, an affinity diagramming approach was taken to 
group the variables believed to be related.  For example, geographic division (based on the state), 
land use, and area type were used as indicators for a latent variable describing the location of the 
hazmat incident.  This approach of building manageable, autonomous models in the form of 
latent class models is advocated in the literature.( )185          
      In the case of the container failure variables, the use of latent variables served to simplify the 
network by replacing many binary variables with a fewer number of latent variables.  The latent 
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 variables also served to summarize the failure events.  For example, a latent variable called 
contributing action replaced the top four binary variables that describe the actions that 
contributed to the failure of the container.  The failure item-area latent variable was developed 
using variables related to both the physical item and area of the container that failed.  The four 
latent variables that were developed to describe the failure of the container served to simplify the 
network, which otherwise would contain 15 binary variables.  The strategy taken for reducing the 
number of variables in order to simplify the domain that was modeled is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Group variables 
into sets based 
on relationship 
or similarity.
No
Yes
Start
Necessary 
or desirable 
to eliminate 
some 
variables in 
set ?
Are 
(remaining) 
variables 
related?
Can Pareto 
Principle 
(80/20) be 
applied?
Apply Pareto to 
reduce variables 
to top 20% in 
set.
Eliminate variables 
as necessary given 
modeling 
constraints 
(testing, 
convergence, 
interpretation)
Apply latent 
class analysis to 
combine 
variables to form 
a latent variable.
A
A
Yes
No
Done
Done
Yes
No
 
Figure 10: Strategy for Variable Reduction. 
 
In addition to simplifying the domain, the latent variables also resolved cyclic relationships 
among the indicator variables.  This is necessary when developing influence diagrams or 
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 Bayesian networks.  For example, when constructing a Bayesian network, any mutual, or two-
way, associations among the variables must be converted to one-way relationships.  This process 
can be subjective, especially in cases where there is no clear temporal ordering among the 
variables.( )186   For example, there are mutual associations among the binary indicator variables 
for contributing action.  Since these variables are not ordered in time, determining the direction 
of influence between them would be subjective. 
      Due to the availability of data, a large sample size was used to develop each of the latent 
class models.( )187   Measures and indices for determining goodness of fit for large sample sizes 
were employed, since significance testing typically results in rejection of models with large N.  
These indices include the Index of Dissimilarity (Id), the Normed Fit Index (NFI), and the 
information criterion measures Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), and the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC). 
Location  A latent class model describing the location of the incident in terms of its area type, 
land use, and geographic division was developed.  These three variables served as the indicator 
variables for the latent variable and have the categories shown in Table 16.  
 
Table 16: Categories for Geographic Division, Land Use, and Area Type. 
Geographic 
Division Land Use Area Type 
Northeast Industrial Urban 
Middle Atlantic Commercial Suburban 
East North Central   
West North Central   
South Atlantic   
East South Central   
West South Central   
Mountain   
Pacific   
 
 
 
The latent class analysis for location using these three variables as indicators resulted in a two-
class model.  This model was chosen based on considering its fit and predictive ability relative to 
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 stable, optimal models with one and three classes.  This information is provided in Table 17.  As 
classes were added, the L2, Id, BIC, AIC, and CAIC decreased, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
increased, as shown in the table.  The stability of a given model, which contains a certain number 
of classes, is determined by comparing parameters in two different runs that have the same 
minimum (optimal) L2.  
 
Table 17: Measures for Location Models. 
Classes Id L2 BIC AIC CAIC 
NFI 
(%) 
Classification 
Error PRE DF 
Run
s 
1 0.111 6,255.02 5,977.65 6,205.02 5,952.65 0 0.00 1.00 25 6000 
2 0.072 1,999.24 1,843.92 1,971.24 1,829.92 68 0.0009 0.9981 14 6000 
3 0.037 809.23 775.95 803.23 772.95 87 0.2315 0.5868 3 6000 
 
 
 
Since the sample size was large, L2 was not used to test goodness of fit.  Rather, the Id, NFI, and 
information criterion values were used to assess the fit of the models.  The Id for the two-class 
model was close to the target value of 0.05, and its information criterion indices (BIC, AIC, 
CAIC) were smaller relative to the one-class model, indicating the desirability of more than one 
class.  In addition, the predictive ability of the two-class model was very good relative to the 
three-class model, as shown by the classification error.  Since the latent variables were to be used 
as part of a 3-step modeling approach, considerable weight was placed on a model’s 
classification performance so as to minimize bias in the structural model.  Although the Id of the 
two-class model was slightly above the target value, this model was chosen based on its lower 
classification error of 0.0009 versus 0.2315 for the three-class model.  Thus, based on its fit, 
classification ability, and parsimony, the two-class model was chosen. 
      The parameters of the two class model are given in Table 18.  These include the latent class 
probabilities of 51% and 49%, which indicate the sizes of the classes.  The conditional 
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 probabilities are also given in Table 18.  For example, the conditional probability that the area 
type is suburban in the first latent class is 99.9%, indicating a strong association of the first latent 
class with a suburban area type.  
 
Table 18: Parameters of Location Model. 
Class 1 2 
Class Size 0.51 0.49 
Manifest 
Variables     
AREA TYPE     
Urban 0.0010 0.9991 
Suburban 0.9990 0.0009 
LAND USE     
Industrial 0.3754 0.5404 
Commercial 0.6246 0.4596 
DIVISION     
New England 0.0590 0.0280 
Middle Atlantic 0.1574 0.0941 
East North 
Central 0.2691 0.1937 
West North 
Central 0.0795 0.0960 
South Atlantic 0.1462 0.1488 
East South 
Central 0.0487 0.0924 
West South 
Central 0.0847 0.1277 
Mountain 0.0592 0.0818 
Pacific 0.0963 0.1376 
 
 
 
A class is interpreted by examining its conditional probabilities.  There are no standards for 
naming latent classes, and the process is subjective on the part of the model builder.  However, 
naming or interpreting the latent classes should reflect how the classes differ from one another.  
In addition, names should be based on the conditional probabilities that provide the greatest 
differentiation of the classes.( )188   The first class represents suburban locations, the majority of 
which are commercial.  It favors the eastern portion of the U.S., including both central and 
coastal states.  Specifically, the East North Central, Middle Atlantic and South Atlantic divisions 
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 are most prevalent.  An example of a likely class one location is Monroeville, PA.  In contrast, 
class two represents urban settings that can be either industrial or commercial.  Class two differs 
from class one in that both eastern and western divisions are prevalent.  Specifically, the East 
North Central, South Atlantic, Pacific, and West South Central divisions are most prevalent.  
Two likely examples are Norfolk, VA or Detroit, MI.  This interpretation of the location variable 
is summarized in Table 19. 
 
Table 19: Interpretation of Location Model. 
Class 1 2 
Class Size 0.51 0.49 
Area Type Suburban Urban 
Land Use 
Commercial 
favor 
Industrial or 
Commercial 
Geographic 
Division 
Eastern 
favor  
 
(ENC, MA 
& SA) 
Eastern or 
Western 
  
(ENC, SA, 
PAC & 
WSC) 
 
 
 
Contributing Action  The binary variables that comprise the set contributing action describe the 
actions that contributed to the failure of the container, such as improper loading or dropped.  The 
binary variables in this set, which are grouped in a specific section on the incident form, were 
used to create a latent variable for contributing action.  The indicator variables were as follows: 
 
• Other 
• Loose Fitting or Valve 
• Improper Loading 
• Dropped. 
 
 
 
The latent class analysis of these indicator variables resulted in a three-class model for 
contributing action, with class sizes 46%, 35%, and 19%, as shown in Table 20.  Based on the 
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 conditional probabilities, class two represents some “other” contributing action not listed on the 
incident form.  The third latent class corresponds to loose fitting or valve.  The first class differs 
from the others in that it represents a combination of improper loading and dropped, which work 
in combination to define a type of contributing action.   
 
Table 20: Parameters of Contributing Action Model. 
Class 1 2 3 
Class Size 0.46 0.35 0.19 
Manifest 
Variables       
LOOSE 
FITTING OR 
VALVE       
Y 0.0012 0.0177 0.9999 
N 0.9988 0.9823 0.0001 
DROPPED       
Y 0.2827 0.0117 0.0029 
N 0.7173 0.9883 0.9971 
IMPROPER 
LOADING       
Y 0.3519 0.0096 0.0084 
N 0.6481 0.9904 0.9916 
OTHER       
Y 0.0026 1.0000 0.0008 
N 0.9974 0.0000 0.9992 
 
 
 
A summary of the interpretation of the contributing action latent variable is given below in Table 
21. 
 
Table 21: Interpretation of Contributing Action Model. 
  Class 
  1 2 3 
Class  Size 0.46 0.35 0.19 
  
Improper 
Loading 
and 
Dropped 
Other 
Loose 
Fitting or 
Valve 
 
The three-class model was chosen based on its fit and excellent classification error (Pe=0.0018), 
as shown in Table 22.  Its Id was close to the target value of 0.05, its NFI was above the 80% 
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 threshold, and its information criterion values were lower than those of the one and two class 
models.  The measures for competing models with one and two classes are given in Table 22.  A 
four-class model was not feasible due to negative degrees of freedom.   
 
Table 22: Measures for Contributing Action Models. 
Classes Id L2 BIC AIC CAIC 
NFI 
(%) 
Classification 
Error PRE DF runs 
1 0.380 84,201.60 84,072.68 84,179.60 84,061.68 0.00 0.0000 1.0000 11 6000 
2 0.199 39,805.04 39,734.72 39,793.04 39,728.72 52.73 0.0010 0.9970 6 6000 
3 0.086 13,705.21 13,693.49 13,703.21 13,692.49 83.72 0.0018 0.9966 1 6000 
 
 
 
Causing Object  A latent variable for causing object, which describes the objects that caused the 
failure of the container, was developed using four binary variables found in the section “Object 
Causing the Failure” on the incident form.  By way of review, these binary variables are as 
follows: 
 
• None 
• Other 
• Floor/Ground 
• Water/Liquid. 
 
 
 
The model chosen for causing object was a three-class model.  The three-class model was chosen 
based on its Id, which is close to the target value of 0.05, as well as the NFI of 83.6%.  Its 
information criteria values were also less than those of the one and two-class models.  In 
addition, it had excellent predictive ability, with a classification error Pe = 0.0006 and  
proportional reduction of error PRE = 0.9987.  The four-class model, which had slightly better 
fit, was not feasible due to its negative degrees of freedom.  The measures of competing models 
for causing object with various classes are shown below in Table 23.   
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 Table 23: Measures for Causing Object Models. 
Classes Id L2 BIC AIC CAIC NFI(%) 
Classification 
Error PRE DF runs 
1 0.361 81,896.78 81,767.86 81,874.78 81,756.86 0.00 0 1 11 6000 
2 0.206 41,482.02 41,411.70 41,470.02 41,405.70 49.35 0.0005 0.9981 6 6000 
3 0.079 13,451.70 13,439.98 13,449.70 13,438.98 83.57 0.0006 0.9987 1 6000 
 
 
 
The parameters for the three-class model are shown in Table 24.  These include the latent class 
probabilities of 50%, 26%, and 24% as well as the various conditional probabilities indicating 
the association of the indicator variables to each latent class.  For example, class two is heavily 
associated with “none,” or no causing object.  
 
Table 24: Parameters of Causing Object Model. 
Class 1 2 3 
Class Size 0.50 0.26 0.24 
Manifest 
Variables       
WATER/ 
LIQUID       
Y 0.2736 0.0019 0.0029 
N 0.7264 0.9981 0.9971 
FLOOR / 
GROUND       
Y 0.2890 0.0000 0.0051 
N 0.7110 1.0000 0.9949 
NONE       
Y 0.0010 0.9999 0.0079 
N 0.9990 0.0001 0.9921 
OTHER       
Y 0.0003 0.0005 0.9999 
N 0.9997 0.9995 0.0001 
 
 
 
The first class or type of causing object is a combination of the floor and water (or other liquid).  
Classes two and three differ in nature from class one.  They are characterized as “none” and  
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 “other,” respectively, as opposed to a combination of variables.  Unfortunately, classes two and 
three provide limited information on the causing object yet together account for 50% of the 
cases. 
 
Table 25: Interpretation of Causing Object Model. 
  Class 
  1 2 3 
Class Size 0.50 0.26 0.24 
Class 
Description 
Floor and 
Water/ 
Liquid 
None Other 
 
 
 
Failure Mode  Three indicator variables related to the manner of container failure were used to 
create a latent variable for Failure Mode.  These indicator variables are as follows: 
 
• Other 
• Punctured 
• Crushed. 
 
 
 
The model chosen for failure mode was a two class model, and its parameters are shown in Table 
26.  The first class, having a probability of 59.5%, corresponds to a failure mode of “other.”  
However, the interpretation of the second class differs from the first in that it corresponds to a 
combination of punctured and crushed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 Table 26: Parameters of Failure Mode Model. 
Class 1 2 
Class Size 0.595 0.405 
Manifest 
Variables     
OTHER     
Y 1.0000 0.0020 
N 0.0000 0.9980 
PUNTURED     
Y 0.0024 0.3264 
N 0.9976 0.6736 
CRUSHED     
Y 0.0024 0.2467 
N 0.9976 0.7533 
 
 
 
The interpretation for failure mode is summarized in Table 27.   
 
Table 27: Interpretation of Failure Mode Model. 
  Class 
  1 2 
Class Size 0.595 0.405 
Class 
Description Other 
Punctured 
and 
Crushed 
 
 
 
The two-class model for failure mode was chosen based on its fit and classification performance 
relative to a one-class model, as shown in Table 28.  Its Id was close to the target value of 0.05, 
and its NFI exceeded 80%.  Its classification ability was excellent (Pe=0.0007, λ=0.9982).  A 
model with three classes was not possible due to negative degrees of freedom, as apparent from 
Table 28. 
 
Table 28: Measures for Failure Mode Models. 
Classes Id L2 BIC AIC CAIC NFI(%) 
Classification 
Error PRE DF runs 
1 0.270 61,915.58 61,868.70 61,907.58 61,864.70 0.00 0.0000 1.0000 4 6000 
2 0.059 8,462.42 8,462.42 8,462.42 8,462.42 86.33 0.0007 0.9982 0 6000 
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Failure Item-Area  Two sets of binary variables pertaining to the physical aspects of the 
container were combined to develop a latent variable to describe the failed item and area of the 
container.  The indicators for this latent variable, which include the failed item and area, are as 
follows: 
 
• Basic Package Material 
• Closure 
• Top 
• Bottom. 
 
 
 
The model chosen for failure item-area was a three-class model, having the parameters shown in 
Table 29.  The largest latent class, which has a probability of 49%, can be characterized as the 
top of the basic package material.  The second latent class, with a size of 27%, corresponds to the 
bottom of the basic package material.  The third class identifies closures on the top of the 
container as a possible item-area of failure.  These interpretations are summarized in Table 30. 
 
Table 29: Parameters of Failure Item-Area Model. 
Class 1 2 3 
Class Size 0.49 0.27 0.24 
Manifest 
Variables       
BASIC 
PACKAGE 
MATERIAL       
Y 0.4187 0.8355 0.0160 
N 0.5813 0.1645 0.9840 
CLOSURE       
Y 0.0008 0.0161 0.9999 
N 0.9992 0.9839 0.0001 
TOP       
Y 0.3230 0.0334 0.9445 
N 0.6770 0.9666 0.0555 
BOTTOM       
Y 0.0012 0.9999 0.0027 
N 0.9988 0.0001 0.9973 
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Table 30: Interpretation of Failure Item Model. 
  Class 
  1 2 3 
Class Size 0.49 0.27 0.24 
Class 
Description 
Basic 
Package 
Material on 
Top of 
Container 
Basic 
Package 
Material on 
Bottom of 
Container 
Closure on 
Top of 
Container 
 
 
 
As in previous models, the three-class model was chosen based on its Id and NFI, both of which 
exceeded their target values, and its excellent classification performance (Pe=0.0012).   
 
Table 31: Measures for Failure Item-Area Models. 
Classes Id L2 BIC AIC CAIC NFI(%) 
Classification 
Error PRE DF runs 
1 0.366 137,362.93 137,234.01 137,340.93 137,223.01 0.00  0.0000 1.0000 11 6000 
2 0.191 28,939.01 28,868.70 28,927.01 28,862.70 78.93 0.0354 0.8770 2 6000 
3 0.041 2,954.08 2,942.36 2,952.08 2,941.36 97.85 0.0012 0.9976 1 6000 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Associations 
The next task in construction of the decision model was a determination of the associations 
among the variables, which were unknown.  There was no previous exploratory analysis in the 
literature, and the possibility for non-obvious relationships was a concern.  For example, could 
shift and material type be associated?  Therefore, to create a network model depicting accurate 
associations among the variables, an exploratory analysis was pursued.  Using the large amount 
of available data, the direct associations between the variables were measured using a series of 
loglinear models, which proceeded from left to right in the network.  The following discussion 
begins with the establishment of the base structure of the network, which takes the temporal 
ordering among the variables into account.  Based on this, five distinct stages of a release event 
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 were identified.  Next, taking an overall perspective, the systematic analysis of the network is 
described.  Finally, the methodology and results of the modeling of each stage are presented, 
including the direct associations identified. 
4.1.2.1 Temporal Layout of Network 
After simplifying the variable domain through Pareto analysis, data aggregation and 
discretization, and latent class analysis, a network containing these simplified variables was 
constructed.  By way of review, these simplified variables are shown in : Table 32
 
Table 32: Simplified Variables in the Hazmat Release Network. 
Variable Number of 
Categories
Causing Object 3 
Container Type 2 
Contributing Action 3 
Dollar Loss 3 
Failure Item-Area 3 
Failure Mode 2 
Location 2 
Material Type 2 
Release Quantity 3 
Season 4 
Shift 3 
 
 
 
As a first step, the temporal ordering among the variables was considered.  Therefore, the 
variables were positioned left to right according to their time of occurrence or determination.  
This technique for network construction is suggested in the literature.( , )189 190   As a result of 
positioning the variables, five distinct stages of a hazardous materials release emerged.  
Specifically, these five stages and their constituent variables are given in Table 33. 
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Table 33: Stages of a Hazmat Release. 
Stage Name of Stage Constituent Variables 
1 Pre container-failure initiation Container Type, Material Type, 
Location, Season, Shift 
2 Container failure initiation Contributing Action, Causing Object 
3 Container failure Failure Item-Area, Failure Mode 
4 Hazmat release Release Quantity 
5 Consequences Dollar Loss 
 
 
 
These stages approximately coincide with Elisabeth Pate-Cornell’s System-Action-Management 
(SAM) framework for catastrophic accidents.  In the SAM Framework, there are time-ordered 
stages leading up to an accident.  Specifically, management and organizational factors influence 
human decisions and actions, which influence the failure or accident events.( )191   Roughly 
speaking, hazmat stage one corresponds to management and organizational factors, such as shift 
and container type.  Stages two and three correspond to human decisions and actions, including 
the contributing action and failure mode.  Stages four and five, which contain the release 
quantity and dollar loss, correspond to an accident event.  The base structure of the network 
containing these time-ordered stages is shown below in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Timed-Ordered Stages of a Hazardous Materials Release. 
 
 
4.1.2.2    Systematic Analysis of Network 
The loglinear analyses for assessing associations and independencies proceeded from left to right 
in the network, starting with a symmetrical analysis of the variables in stage one, the pre-failure 
initiation stage.  These variables consist of container type, location, material type, season, and 
shift and are known or determined prior to unloading of containers or the initiation of failure.  A 
symmetric loglinear analysis was performed for this stage since a direction of influence among 
the variables was not known or assumed.  When the stage one analysis was completed, a 
temporal order was then applied to the pairs of variables found to be associated.  In this way, the  
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 mutual, or bi-directional, associations were converted to unidirectional associations, which are 
necessary for influence diagrams or Bayesian networks.  The following direct associations were 
uncovered among the stage one variables: 
 
• Material Type and Container Type 
• Season and Material Type 
• Shift and Location. 
 
 
A panel of engineers and scientists at the Office of Hazardous Materials provided some 
interpretations of these associations.  Material type and container type are likely directly 
associated because regulations dictate the type of container for transporting a particular type of 
material.  The seasonal usage of materials is an explanation for the direct association between 
season and material.( )192
      Given these three direct associations, a temporal order was applied to each pair, as discussed 
above.  Season, which is based on the incident date, can be considered a predetermined or 
general variable of a fundamental nature.  Several authors of loglinear modeling texts, including 
Knoke, Burke, and Hagenaars, identify the concept of a predetermined or fundamental variable 
and recommend its use as the preceding variable in a causal chain.( , )193 194   Based on this, season 
was assumed to precede material type.  It was then determined that material type influences and 
therefore should precede the container type, based on input from the OHM.( )195   Finally, shift, 
which is based on the incident time, was assumed to be more fundamental than the location.  
Therefore, shift was assumed to precede location in the model. 
      Proceeding to stage two, container failure initiation is characterized by the latent variables 
contributing action and causing object.  In this stage, failure is initiated by a combination of 
actions and objects that contribute to or cause the failure.  The indicator variables for 
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 contributing action are as follows: dropped, loose fitting/valve, improper loading, and other. For 
causing object, they are floor/ground, water/liquid, none, and other.  It was assumed that 
contributing action precedes causing object, based on these indicator variables.  For example, an 
improperly loaded container may drop and impact the ground and encounter water or other 
liquid.   
      Since stage two is downstream in the network relative to stage one, the stage two variables 
served as response, or logit, variables.( )196   Therefore, an asymmetric loglinear analysis was 
performed, with the stage one variables serving as explanatory variables.  A loglinear analysis 
was first performed between contributing action, the first variable in stage two, and the variables 
in stage one.  Then, a second loglinear analysis was performed between causing object, the 
second variable in stage two, and its explanatory variables.  These explanatory variables consist 
of contributing action and the stage one variables.  This forward analysis of the network, each 
time utilizing a new logit variable further downstream in the chain, is suggested by Agresti, and 
Knoke and Burke.( , )197 198   Thus, the associations and conditional independencies among the 
variables are determined using a forward series of loglinear models. 
      Within stage three, where container failure occurs, the failure mode was assumed to precede 
the item-area of failure on the container.  For example, the container might be punctured, leading 
to a failure of the bottom of the basic package material.  The indicators for failure mode are 
punctured, crushed, and other.  For failure item-area, they are as follows: basic package material, 
closure, top, and bottom.  The variables in stages one and two served as explanatory variables for 
the variables in stage three.  An asymmetric loglinear analysis was first performed between  
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 failure mode and the variables in stages one and two.  Moving forward, an analysis was then 
performed between item-area and its explanatory variables, failure mode and the variables in 
stages one and two.   
      At the next stage, the release of hazardous material to the surrounding area occurs.  The 
quantity of material released is represented by a discrete variable with categories zero, small, and 
medium, which have upper limits of 0, 1, and 100 gallons, respectively.  An asymmetric 
loglinear analysis was performed between release quantity and the variables of the preceding 
stages.  In this way, the associations and conditional independencies between release quantity 
and each of its explanatory variables were determined. 
      Finally, in stage five, the ultimate consequences of a release are realized.  The consequence 
considered in this study was the total dollar loss, which is represented by a discrete variable with 
categories zero, small, and medium with upper limits of $0, $500, and $25,000, respectively.  
Dollar loss served as the ultimate logit variable for the network.  Therefore, in this final loglinear 
analysis, the variables in the first four stages served as explanatory variables.   
      The high-level approach described in the previous sections for measuring the associations as 
part of step two of the methodology is summarized in Figure 12.  This methodology is 
demonstrated in the following sections, and the results for each stage are presented in detail.   
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Figure 12: High Level Approach to the Measurement of Associations. 
 
 
Stage One  The exploratory analysis in stage one consisted of a symmetric loglinear analysis of 
the variables given in Table 34.  These variables were determined or known prior to unloading of 
the containers and before any initiation of failure.  The abbreviation used in the loglinear 
notation and number of categories for each variable are also provided below.  
 
Table 34: Stage One Variables. 
Stage 1 Variable Variable 
Abbreviation
Number of 
Categories
Container Type C 2 
Location L 2 
Material Type M 2 
Season SE 4 
Shift SH 3 
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 The contingency table for these five variables consisted of 96 cells, and the sample size was 
primarily determined by examining the number of cells with zeros and small counts of less than 
five.  The zeros and small cell counts associated with N=1500 and N=2500 based on five 
random samples are given below. 
 
N Sampling Zeroes Small cell count
1500 0% 13.75% 
2500 0% 2.92% 
 
 
 
The sample size of N=2500 was chosen based on the low percentage of cells having a small 
count.  Due to the availability of data, five random samples of N=2500 each were used for the 
significance testing.  Therefore, conclusions about the associations among the stage one variables 
were based on results from five different samples.  
      Prior to beginning this analysis, an additional preparatory step was taken.  This consisted of 
applying the correction procedure developed by Bolck et. al., as discussed previously in section 
3.6.2.  In stage one, the correction procedure for a table with one latent variable was applied 
using Equation 10.  However, since the classification error associated with the latent variable 
location was small (Pe=0.0009), the correction procedure had a very small effect, resulting in no 
differences between the uncorrected and the corrected table for each sample.( , )199 200   Despite its 
lack of impact in this case, the correction procedure was nonetheless applied for purposes of 
demonstration.  For, future application of the methodology may entail variables with higher 
classification error.  Sample transition, uncorrected, and corrected matrices based on a sample in 
stage one are given in Table 79 in Appendix A.  Each row of the uncorrected and corrected 
matrices represents a different combination of the categories of the observed variables.  Each 
column represents a different class of the latent variable.  The source code written to calculate 
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 the transition matrix for location is provided in Figure 24 in Appendix E.  In addition, the Excel 
spreadsheets used as input to this source code are provided in Table 91 and Table 92 in 
Appendix E.  As a note for future application of the correction procedure, an error was made 
within this research in calculating the elements of the transition matrices for the various latent 
variables.  However, this error had a very small, if not negligible, impact on the corrected 
contingency tables.  The error was made in the choice of the particular classification probabilities 
to use to calculate the elements of the transition matrix.  Only two possible values for the 
classification probability should have been used, namely 1 or 0.  These probabilities indicate 
whether or not a response pattern was classified into a particular latent class.  The classification 
probabilities that were erroneously used were the actual calculated values.  However, most of the 
actual calculated classification probabilities were close to 0 or 1 anyway, as evidenced in the low 
classification errors associated with the latent variables.  Thus, the impact of this error was very 
small on both the correction procedure and the overall loglinear analyses.  
      After the correction procedure was applied, loglinear models using each of the five corrected 
tables were built.  A test of marginal association was used to determine the presence of a 
significant association between a given pair of variables.( )201   In this test, the model of mutual 
independence of the five variables in stage one is compared to a model that differs by the 
presence of a two-way term.  In stage one, ten different variable pairs were evaluated using ten 
marginal association tests.  Each pair and the p-value associated with each marginal test are 
given in Table 35.  For further reference, the values of the residual and component L2 for each 
test are given in Table 78 in Appendix A.  Three pairs were assessed using two additional 
samples due to borderline values for the component L2 and associated p-values.  The additional 
samples are reported in columns S6 and S7 in Table 35. 
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 Table 35: P-values for Marginal Associations in Stage One. 
Variable Pair S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 AVG 
[SH L] 0.0241 0.0064 0.0225 0.0790 0.0003   0.0265 
[L SE] 0.5707 0.4588 0.5709 0.6120 0.1044   0.4634 
[L M] 0.5999 0.4934 0.0186 0.3286 0.0049 0.1287 0.6244 0.3141 
[SH SE] 0.1734 0.2886 0.0247 0.0766 0.8431 0.5096 0.8295 0.3922 
[SH M] 0.1135 0.5860 0.3460 0.8797 0.1236 0.0966 0.5368 0.3832 
[SE M] 0.0040 0.0219 0.0040 0.0006 0.0177   0.0096 
[L C] 0.3527 0.5167 0.5486 0.5906 0.7989   0.5615 
[SH C] 0.9176 0.9112 0.9731 0.8782 0.9559   0.9272 
[SE C] 0.3472 0.2962 0.8836 0.3044 0.2619   0.4187 
[M C] 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001   0.0003 
 
 
 
Based on these results, [M C], [SE M], and [SH L] were the significant associations at α=0.05.  
The association of material type and container type, [M C], was characterized by consistently 
small p-values.  In four samples, p = 0.0001, and for one sample, p = 0.0009.  The association 
between season and material type, [SE M], was also consistently strong, with p-values between 
0.0006 and 0.0219.  The final significant association was between shift and location, [SH L], as 
indicated by p-values between 0.0003 and 0.0790. 
      Three of the pairs had borderline values for the component L2 and associated p-values, based 
on five samples.  These associations were [L M], [SH SE], and [SH M].  Therefore, two 
additional random samples were used to draw a conclusion about them.  Based on these 
additional samples, however, these three associations were determined to be non-significant, as 
shown in Table 35 in columns S6 and S7.  Therefore, material type and container type [M C], 
season and material type [SE M], and shift and location [SH L] were identified as the only direct 
associations in stage one.  Since the associations were to be used to build a directed graph, only 
two-way, as opposed to three or four-way, associations were considered.   
      The lambda (λ), or effect, parameters provided similar evidence that [M C], [SE M], and [SH 
L] were directly associated.  A direct association between a pair of variables is present when any 
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 of its lambda values exceeds 0.20 in absolute value, as discussed previously in section 3.5.3.  
The lambda of maximum absolute value for each variable pair, which represents the largest or 
strongest effect associated with the pair, is given in Table 36, along with the sign.  The sign 
indicates the direction of influence of the effect, as discussed in 3.5.3.  In many cases, there were 
equally-strong effects in opposite directions for a variable pair, as indicated by the 
positive/negative (±) signs in this table.  The lambdas were based on the full first-order model, 
which contained all two-variable associations.( )202   For the three associations, [M C], [SE M], 
and [SH L], which were consistently significant, the maximum lambda for the variable pair was 
also consistently above 0.20 in absolute value.  For the associations [L SE], [SE C], [SH M], and 
[SH SE], several of the maximum lambdas exceeded 0.20 in absolute value.  However, since the 
significance tests for these associations were inconsistent and sometimes notably in favor of a 
non-significant relationship, these variable pairs were determined not to be directly associated.  
For example, for the association between shift and season [SH SE], the p-values in Table 35 for 
samples S5-S7 were very large. 
 
Table 36: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value in Stage One. 
Variable 
Pair S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
[M C] ± 0.4070 ± 0.4330 ± 0.3713 ± 0.3123 ± 0.4805         
[SE M] ± 0.2413 ± 0.5101 ± 0.6271 ± 0.2380 ± 0.5243         
[SH L] ± 0.3029 ± 0.3543 ± 0.3781 ± 0.3868 ± 0.6940         
[L C] ± 0.0955 ± 0.0542 ± 0.0422 ± 0.0546 ± 0.0568         
[L M] ± 0.0573 ± 0.0487 ± 0.1858 ± 0.0817 ± 0.2394 ± 0.1269 ± 0.0389 
[L SE] ± 0.3749 ± 0.1516 ± 0.1808 ± 0.3175 ± 0.6517         
[SE C] ± 0.1125 ± 0.4527 ± 0.0531 ± 0.2258 ± 0.2586         
[SH C] ± 0.1016 ± 0.0864 ± 0.0431 ± 0.0410 ± 0.0702         
[SH M] ± 0.3598 ± 0.0704 ± 0.0840 ± 0.0706 ± 0.3619 ± 0.2886 ± 0.1614 
[SH SE] + 0.3765 - 0.6808 - 2.1407 - 0.9240 + 0.7006 - 0.3484 - 0.1723 
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 The lambda parameters provide insight into the categories that were responsible for the largest 
effects.  The categories associated with the largest positive and negative effects, or lambdas, for 
[M C], [SE M], and [SH L] are provided in Table 37.  These category combinations had the 
largest influence on incident counts for the three variables pairs.  As shown in Table 37, the 
combination of flammable liquids in an (outer) fiber box as well as corrosives in a bottle had the 
(equally) strongest positive effects for material type and container type [M C].  Thus, these two 
combinations were associated with relatively more incidents.  For season and material type [SE 
M], there were relatively more incidents involving flammable liquids during the winter based on 
3/5 samples.  Conversely, there were relatively fewer corrosives incidents during the winter 
months based on 3/5 samples.  Also, based on the maximum positive lambda for shift and 
location [SH L] in 5/5 samples, there were relatively more incidents that occurred during the 
twilight shift in suburban/commercial/eastern locations in the United States. 
 
Table 37: Interpretation of Largest Effects in Stage One. 
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples Largest Negative Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples 
[M C] - Flammable liquids in fiber box - Corrosives in bottle 5/5 
- Flammable liquids in bottle 
- Corrosives in fiber box 5/5 
[SE M] Flammable liquids during winter 3/5 Corrosives in winter 3/5 
[SH L] Twilight and suburban/ commercial/ eastern 5/5 
Twilight and urban/ industrial or 
commercial/ eastern or western 5/5 
 
 
 
The three direct associations uncovered in stage one, which consist of season to material type, 
material type to container type, and shift to location, are summarized graphically in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Graphical Results of Stage One Analysis. 
 
 
As apparent, season directly influences material type, which directly influences container type.  
Shift directly influences location. 
Stage Two  Moving downstream in the network, the associations between stages one and two 
were investigated next.  Stage two consists of catalyst-type variables that describe the initiation 
of container failure, specifically the contributing action and causing object.  Contributing action 
was assumed to precede causing object based on their categories, as shown in Table 38.  For 
example, a container was improperly loaded and therefore dropped and impacted the floor.  
Thus, contributing action was a response variable relative to the stage one variables.  In turn, 
causing object was a response variable relative to contributing action and the stage one variables.   
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 Table 38: Stage Two Variables. 
Stage 2 Variable Abbreviation Categories
Contributing Action CA 1) Improper Loading and Dropped 
2) Other 
3) Loose Fitting or Valve 
Causing Object CO 1) Floor and Water/Liquid 
2) None 
3) Other 
 
 
 
The first logit analysis in stage two had contributing action as the response variable.  In addition, 
there were two groups of explanatory variables for contributing action based on their 
independence.  The first group consisted of season, material type, and container type, and the 
second group consisted of shift and location.  The variables in the first group were independent 
of those in the second group, based on the direct associations uncovered in stage one, as shown 
previously in Figure 13.  Based on their independence, the first group of variables was analyzed 
separately from the second group relative to contributing action, as given by the Collapsibility 
Theorem.( )203   Thus, two separate logit analyses for contributing action were done.  Application 
of the Collapsibility Theorem was relevant because it permitted the use of smaller tables and 
sample sizes, which enabled significance testing. 
First Logit Analysis for Contributing Action  To perform significance testing in the first logit 
analysis, the sample size had to be chosen appropriately.  Based on the zero and small cell counts 
associated with various sample sizes as shown below, a sample size of N=4000 was chosen. 
 
N Sampling Zeroes Small cell count
3000 0% 5.02% 
3500 0% 4.58% 
4000 0% 1.66% 
 
 
 
Five samples containing 4000 records each were used to investigate the presence of significant 
associations among the variables season, material type, container type, and contributing action.   
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       Prior to beginning the analysis, the correction procedure was applied to the table for these 
four variables.  However, since the latent variable (contributing action) had low classification 
error, the correction procedure did not have a large impact.  Specifically, across the five samples, 
the maximum difference between the counts in the uncorrected and corrected tables was six, with 
a maximum cell difference of one.   
      Nonetheless, the corrected matrix was used to perform the loglinear, or logit, analysis, the 
results of which are shown in Table 39.  The marginal component L2 associated with [C CA] had 
a consistently small p-value (< 0.0001), indicating a significant association between container 
type and contributing action.  The partial component associated with [M CA] was significant at 
α=0.05 in three out of five samples, as demonstrated by its component L2 values.  As discussed 
previously in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, the partial association [M CA] is the association after 
adjustment for the effects of container type C.  Since the partial component was significant at 
α=0.05 in 3/5 samples and at α=0.10 in 4/5 samples, material type M and contributing action CA 
were determined to be directly associated.   In other words, M and CA were not conditionally 
independent given C.  The partial association between season SE and contributing action CA as 
measured by its component L2 was not significant at α=0.05 in four out of five samples.  Based 
on this, season did not appear to be directly associated with contributing action given container 
and material type.  However, as will be discussed, the lambdas (λ) suggested a different result for 
SE and CA. 
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 Table 39: Significance Tests for Logit CA.   (SE, M, C) 
    RESIDUAL COMPONENT 
Sample Model L2 Df p L2 df p 
Significant 
Component 
1 [SE M C][CA]   (null logit) 1463.5744 30 2.00E-289         
  [SE M C][CA][C CA] 31.3128 28 0.3034 1432.2616 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA] 23.9555 26 0.5785 7.3573 2 0.0253 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA][SE CA] 20.8198 20 0.4078 3.1357 6 0.7916   
                  
2 [SE M C][CA]   (null logit) 1338.4577 30 1.00E-262         
  [SE M C][CA][C CA] 37.7725 28 0.1028 1300.6852 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA] 26.9944 26 0.4096 10.7781 2 0.0046 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA][SE CA] 18.6818 20 0.5426 8.3126 6 0.2161   
                  
3 [SE M C][CA]   (null logit) 1461.7462 30 6.00E-289         
  [SE M C][CA][C CA] 31.6474 28 0.2891 1430.0988 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA] 30.2672 26 0.2567 1.3802 2 0.5015   
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA][SE CA] 16.4394 20 0.689 13.8278 6 0.0316 Y 
                  
4 [SE M C][CA]   (null logit) 1403.7126 30 1.00E-276         
  [SE M C][CA][C CA] 33.9977 28 0.2009 1369.7149 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA] 25.9030 26 0.4684 8.0947 2 0.0175 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA][SE CA] 18.7515 20 0.5380 7.1515 6 0.3071   
                  
5 [SE M C][CA]   (null logit) 1543.7182 30 2.00E-306         
  [SE M C][CA][C CA] 24.7975 28 0.6388 1518.9207 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA] 19.5840 26 0.8108 5.2135 2 0.0738   
  [SE M C][CA][C CA][M CA][SE CA] 10.4514 20 0.9592 9.1326 6 0.1663   
 
 
 
In addition to significance testing, the lambdas, or effect parameters, were also examined.  The 
lambdas were based on the full first-order model containing the main effects of C, M, and SE on 
the logit variable CA, as were the lambdas in all subsequent stages in this analysis.( , )204 205   The 
lambdas were therefore (conservative) partial effects, serving as measures of association after 
adjusting for all other variables.  For [C CA], the lambda of maximum absolute value for each 
sample was consistently large, as shown in Table 40.  This coincided with the consistently small 
p-values (< 0.0001) for this association.  The lambdas for [M CA] were greater than 0.20 in 5/5 
samples.  This generally coincided with the significant association between material type and 
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 contributing action at α=0.05 in 3/5 samples and at α=0.10 in 4/5 samples.  Regarding the third 
and final association, the maximum lambdas for [SE CA] were similar in magnitude to those for 
[M CA] and were greater than 0.20 in absolute value in 5/5 samples.  Although season SE and 
contributing action CA were not directly associated based on significance testing, the decision 
was made to assume a direct association between them based on the values of their maximum 
lambdas and their proximity to the maximum lambdas for [M CA].   
 
Table 40: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value for Logit CA.   (SE, M, C) 
Variable 
Pair S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
[SE CA] + 0.3768 + 0.3488 + 0.4806 + 0.3592 - 2.1656 
[M CA] ± 0.5287 ± 0.3668 ± 0.2636 ± 0.6953 ± 0.3813 
[C CA] ± 7.2263 ± 6.9781 ± 7.4654 ± 7.4152 ± 7.6799 
 
 
 
Interpretations of the strongest effects based on the maximum lambdas for each variable pair are 
given in Table 41.  For example, based on five out of five samples, a higher proportion of 
corrosives were released as the result of a loose fitting or valve.  In conjunction with this, there 
were proportionally more incidents of loose fittings or valves on bottles based on 5/5 samples. 
 
Table 41: Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit CA.  (SE, M, C) 
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples Largest Negative Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples 
[SE CA] Winter and other contributing action 2/5 
- Winter and loose fitting or valve 
- Fall and loose fitting or valve 
2/5 
2/5 
[M CA] Corrosives and loose fitting or valve 5/5 
Flammable liquids and loose 
fitting or valve 5/5 
[C CA] Bottle and loose fitting or valve 5/5 Fiber box and loose fitting or valve 5/5 
 
 
 
The logit analysis of the first group of explanatory variables for contributing action is 
summarized graphically in Figure 15 and consists of three direct associations to the response. 
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Figure 14: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for CA.   (SE, M, C) 
 
 
Second Logit Analysis for Contributing Action  The second logit analysis for contributing 
action had shift and location as the explanatory variables, which were independent of the 
explanatory variables in the first logit analysis.  A sample size of 1200 was chosen based on the 
absence of zeros or small cell counts in five different samples.          
      Prior to the loglinear modeling, the correction procedure was not applied because the 
literature did not address the case of a joint distribution involving two or more latent variables.  I 
contacted the developers of the correction procedure concerning this gap.  Dr. Marcel Croon 
provided a more generally-applicable correction procedure later in time, which will be 
demonstrated in stage four.  Since the classification errors associated with location and 
contributing action were low (Pe=0.0009 and Pe=0.0018, respectively), the inability to apply a 
correction at this point in time was not a concern. 
      Significance testing and evaluation of lambdas were again used to assess the presence of 
direct associations.  The marginal association between location and contributing action [L CA] 
was consistently significant at α=0.05 across the five samples, as indicated by the significant  
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 values of the component L2 in Table 42.  The partial association between shift and contributing 
action [SH CA], which was obtained after correcting for the main effect of location, was 
significant in 2/5 samples, as demonstrated by its component L2 in Table 42. 
 
Table 42: Significance Tests for Logit CA.   (SH, L) 
    RESIDUAL COMPONENT 
Sample Model L2 df P L2 df P 
Significant 
Component 
1 [L SH][CA]   (null logit) 36.5235 10 7.00E-05         
  [L SH][CA][L CA] 9.6272 8 0.2922 26.8963 2 <0.0001 Y 
  [L SH][CA][L CA][SH CA] 4.6614 4 0.3238 4.9658 4 0.2908   
                  
2 [L SH][CA]   (null logit) 32.1485 10 4.00E-04         
  [L SH][CA][L CA] 16.5212 8 0.0355 15.6273 2 0.0004 Y 
  [L SH][CA][L CA][SH CA] 2.4770 4 0.6488 14.0442 4 0.0072 Y 
                  
3 [L SH][CA]   (null logit) 21.5129 10 1.78E-02         
  [L SH][CA][L CA] 15.4588 8 0.0508 6.0541 2 0.0485 Y 
  [L SH][CA][L CA][SH CA] 1.3828 4 0.8472 14.0760 4 0.0071 Y 
                  
4 [L SH][CA]   (null logit) 26.2131 10 3.50E-03         
  [L SH][CA][L CA] 14.0863 8 0.0795 12.1268 2 0.0023 Y 
  [L SH][CA][L CA][SH CA] 8.6398 4 0.0708 5.4465 4 0.2445   
                  
5 [L SH][CA]   (null logit) 16.9713 10 7.50E-02         
  [L SH][CA][L CA] 7.9825 8 0.4352 8.9888 2 0.0112 Y 
  [L SH][CA][L CA][SH CA] 1.5442 4 0.8188 6.4383 4 0.1687   
   
 
 
The significant association between location L and contributing action CA coincided with the 
maximum lambdas for [L CA], as shown in Table 43, which were all above 0.20 in absolute 
value.  Although the [SH CA] partial association was significant at α=0.05 in just two out of five 
samples, the largest lambdas for [SH CA] ranged from 0.6088 to 1.5114 in absolute value.  
Based on this, the decision was made to assume a direct association between shift and 
contributing action. 
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 Table 43: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value for Logit CA.   (SH, L) 
Variable 
Pair S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
[SH CA] + 0.7421 - 0.8297 - 0.6088 + 1.5114 - 0.7967 
[L CA] ± 0.8838 ± 0.5530 ± 0.6852 ± 0.3235 ± 0.3775 
 
 
 
As explanations of the largest effects, a greater proportion of incidents on the twilight shift 
involved loose fittings or valves, based on two of five samples, as shown in Table 44.  For the [L 
CA] direct association, proportionally more incidents of loose fittings or valves occurred in 
urban/industrial or commercial areas, based on 3/5 samples. 
 
Table 44: Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit CA.  (SH, L) 
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples Largest Negative Effect 
Based 
on 
Samples 
[SH CA] Twilight and loose fitting or valve 2/5 Midnight and loose fitting or valve 3/5 
[L CA] 
Urban/ industrial or commercial/ 
eastern or western and loose 
fitting or valve 
3/5 Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and loose fitting or valve 3/5 
 
 
 
The results of the logit analysis for contributing action involving the second group of explanatory 
variables are graphically shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for CA.   (SH, L) 
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 Logit Analysis for Causing Object  The second variable in stage two and the next response 
variable to analyze was causing object, which describes the physical objects, such as the floor 
and water, leading to failure of the container. Therefore, the explanatory variables for this 
analysis consisted of contributing action, also in stage two, and the variables in stage one.  The 
Collapsibility Theorem no longer applied to this model for causing object or others downstream, 
due to the associations among the preceding variables.  Thus, for this model involving causing 
object, all variables had to be analyzed as part of one model or table.  The logit model for 
causing object involved seven variables and 864 cells.  Due to the sample size needed to create a 
non-sparse contingency table, significance testing was not feasible.  Rather, for this model and 
those downstream in the network, associations had to be assessed using the lambda, or effect, 
parameters only, which are insensitive to large sample size and sparseness.( )206   The total sample 
of 40,474 records was used to build the model.  The table had 1.4% sampling zeros and 23.1% 
small cell counts. 
      The largest lambda parameters in absolute value for this seven-variable model are shown in 
Table 45, along with interpretations of these largest effects.  Contributing action had the largest 
effect on causing object, with λ = 4.5500, followed by location (λ = ± 0.9462) and container type 
(λ = ± 0.8962).  Several of the largest effects on causing object involved the “other” category and 
therefore provide limited insight at this time into the exact influence on causing object. 
 
Table 45: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value and Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit CO. 
Variable 
Pair S1 
[CA CO] + 4.5500 
[C CO] ± 0.8962 
[M CO] ± 0.3036 
[L CO] ± 0.9462 
[SE CO] - 0.2111 
[SH CO] + 0.6801  
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 Table 45 (continued). 
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect Largest Negative Effect 
[CA CO] Loose fitting or valve and no causing object 
Loose fitting or valve and floor and 
water 
[C CO] Bottle and no causing object Fiber box and no causing object 
[M CO] Flammable liquids and other causing object 
Corrosives and other causing 
object 
[L CO] 
Urban/ industrial or commercial/ 
eastern or western and other 
causing object 
Suburban/ commercial/ eastern 
and other causing object 
[SE CO] Winter and other causing object Summer and other causing object 
[SH CO] Twilight and other causing object Day and other causing object 
 
 
 
The direct associations and conditional independencies are graphically summarized in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for CO. 
 
 
Stage Three  Continuing downstream in the network, actual failure of the container occurs in 
stage three.  Stage three is similar to stage two in that it contains two variables and hence two 
separate logit models.  The failure mode describes the manner of failure, and the failure item-
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 area defines the physical point of failure on the container.  Failure mode was assumed to 
temporally precede the item-area, based on their categories.  For example, perhaps the container 
was punctured, causing the bottom side of the basic package material (e.g. cardboard) to fail.  
The stage three variables are summarized below. 
 
Table 46: Stage Three Variables. 
Stage 3 Variable Abbreviation Categories
Failure Mode FM 1) Other 
2) Punctured and Crushed 
Failure Item-Area FIA 1) Basic Package Material on Top 
2) Basic Package Material on Bottom 
3) Closure on Top 
 
 
 
The logit analysis for failure mode consisted of seven preceding, explanatory variables.  With a 
total of 1728 cells, the contingency table had 13.1% zeros and 51.7% small cell counts, using the 
total sample size of 40,474.  Evaluation of the lambda parameters was the method used to 
determine the direct associations of the explanatory variables with failure mode.   
      Based on the lambda parameters shown in Table 47, contributing action was again the 
variable with the strongest effect on the logit variable, with λ = ± 4.3000.  The positive lambda 
parameter indicates that a larger proportion of loose fittings or valves were associated with some 
“other” failure mode not listed on the incident form, as shown in Table 47.  Conversely, a 
smaller proportion of loose fittings or valves led to puncture and crush of the container (λ = -
4.3000).  Causing object and container type had the next largest effects on failure mode, with λ = 
± 1.3657 and λ = ± 1.3598, respectively.  Location and season were also directly associated with 
failure mode albeit to lesser extents (λ = ± 0.2589 and λ = ± 0.2548, respectively).  However, 
shift and material type were not directly associated with failure mode, since their lambdas were  
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 below 0.20 in absolute value.  Material type was the explanatory variable least associated with 
failure mode with λ = ± 0.0103.  Thus, arcs were not drawn from shift and material type to 
failure mode in the network. 
 
Table 47: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value and Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit FM. 
Variable 
Pair S1 
[CO FM] ± 1.3657 
[CA FM] ± 4.3000 
[C FM] ± 1.3598 
[M FM] ± 0.0103 
[SE FM] ± 0.2548 
[L FM] ± 0.2589 
[SH FM] ± 0.1490    
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect Largest Negative Effect 
[CO FM] Floor and water and punctured and crushed Floor and water and other failure mode 
[CA FM] Loose fitting or valve and other failure mode 
Loose fitting or valve and punctured and 
crushed 
[C FM] - Fiber box and other failure mode - Bottle and punctured and crushed 
- Bottle and other failure mode 
- Fiber box and punctured and crushed 
[M FM]  Not directly associated  Not directly associated 
[SE FM] Winter and other failure mode Winter and punctured and crushed 
[L FM] 
- Urban/ industrial or commercial/ eastern 
or western and other failure mode 
- Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and 
punctured and crushed 
- Urban/ industrial or commercial/ eastern 
or western and punctured and crushed 
- Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and 
other failure mode 
[SH FM]  Not directly associated  Not directly associated 
 
 
 
The results are summarized graphically in Figure 17 and show that four of the seven explanatory 
variables are directly associated with the response variable failure mode in stage three of a 
release. 
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Figure 17: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for FM. 
 
 
Direct associations to the failure item-area were analyzed next and involved eight explanatory 
variables, which consisted of failure mode and the variables of stages one and two.  There were 
5,184 cells in this table, which was sparsely populated with 41.8% zeros and 80.8% small cell 
counts.   
     As with causing object and failure mode, contributing action also had the largest effect on 
failure item-area with λ = 7.4955, followed by container type (λ = ± 6.2782), as shown in Table 
48.  Based on this, there were proportionally more loose fittings or valves that led to the failure 
of a closure on the top of the container (λ = 7.4955) as well as more bottles in which the closure 
on the top failed (λ = 6.2782).  Causing object exerted a strong influence with λ = 3.1437, as it 
did in the previous logit model.  Based on this, some “other” causing object, for example as 
opposed to the floor and water, led to proportionally more failures of the basic package material 
on top of the container.  Failure mode was also directly related to failure item-area with λ = ± 
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 1.2031.  This lambda indicated that a higher proportion of incidents involved some “other” 
failure mode of closures on top of the container, as opposed to puncture and crush, for example.   
 
Table 48: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value and Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit FIA. 
Variable 
Pair S1 
[FM FIA] ± 1.2031 
[CO FIA] + 3.1437 
[CA FIA] + 7.4955 
[C FIA] ± 6.2782 
[M FIA] ± 0.3367 
[SE FIA] - 0.5586 
[L FIA] ± 0.2222 
[SH FIA] + 0.3389  
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect Largest Negative Effect 
[FM FIA] Other failure mode and closure on top Punctured and crushed and closure on top 
[CO FIA] Other causing object and basic package material on top 
Other causing object and basic package 
material on bottom 
[CA FIA] Loose fitting or valve and closure on top Other contributing action and closure on top 
[C FIA] Bottle and closure on top Fiber box and closure on top 
[M FIA] Corrosives and closure on top Flammable liquids and closure on top 
[SE FIA] Winter and basic package material on bottom Winter and closure on top 
[L FIA] Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and closure on top 
Urban/ industrial or commercial/ eastern 
or western and closure on top 
[SH FIA] Twilight and closure on top Twilight and basic package material on bottom 
 
 
 
A visual summary of this logit analysis, in which five out of eight variables were directly 
associated to failure item-area as the response variable in stage three, is presented in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for FIA. 
 
 
Stage Four  Stage four of a release event involves the actual release of hazardous material to the 
environment, as quantified by a three-category variable for a zero, small, or medium-amount 
release, as described in Table 49. 
 
Table 49: Stage Four Variables. 
Stage 4 Variable Abbreviation Categories
Release Quantity RQ 1) Zero 
2) Small (≤1 gal) 
3) Medium (≤100 gal) 
   
 
 
The stage one variables and the container failure variables in stages two and three served as 
explanatory variables to release quantity.  With nine explanatory variables, the table was large 
and sparse, with a total of 15,552 cells. 
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       At stage four, the general correction procedure described in section 3.6.2 for a table with two 
or more latent variables and one or more observed variables was applied based on its availability 
at the time of the stage four analysis.  This procedure corrected for the bias introduced by the 
five latent variables, which consisted of location, contributing action, causing object, failure 
mode, and failure item-area.  Due to their low classification errors, the correction procedure had 
a small effect. However, the procedure was nonetheless applied to demonstrate its application as 
part of three-step model building.  As discussed previously in section 3.6.2, this procedure 
involved calculations involving the Kronecker product of the transition matrices for the five 
latent variables.  The Kronecker product of the transition matrices was large (108 X 108) and 
exceeded the limits of Microsoft Excel 2002.  As such, source code was written to determine the 
corrected matrix, using text files for output.  The individual transition matrices for the five latent 
variables are shown in Table 80 in Appendix B.  Due to space considerations, the Kronecker 
product and the uncorrected and corrected matrices are not shown.  This correction procedure 
had a limited effect, as expected, due to the low classification errors of the latent variables.  The 
difference between the total counts in the uncorrected and corrected contingency tables was 97, 
which represented 0.24% of the total count in the uncorrected table.  The maximum difference in 
any cell was 4.  Nonetheless, the corrected table was used for the stage four loglinear analysis. 
      Based on this analysis, the direct effects on release quantity tended to be smaller than the 
direct effects on previous logit variables.  The container failure variables continued to exert the 
largest influences.  Causing object had the largest effect on release quantity with λ = - 1.1925.  
Based on this lambda parameter, a smaller proportion of incidents with some “other” causing 
object were associated with a medium release quantity.  This “other” causing object is opposed 
to the floor and water, for example.  Causing object was followed by failure mode, container 
113 
 type, and item-area, with λ = ± 0.9578, ± 0.7952, and 0.7260, respectively.  Contributing action, 
the most influential variable in several prior models, was much less influential on release 
quantity (λ = 0.5785).  This lambda indicates that proportionally more improperly loaded and 
dropped containers led to a medium release amount.  Material type was not directly related to 
release quantity, based on λ = ± 0.1730. 
 
Table 50: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value and Interpretation of Largest Effects for Logit RQ. 
Variable 
Pair S1 
[FIA RQ] + 0.7260 
[FM RQ] ± 0.9578 
[CO RQ] - 1.1925 
[CA RQ] + 0.5785 
[C RQ] ± 0.7952 
[M RQ] ± 0.1730 
[SE RQ] - 0.2208 
[L RQ] ± 0.4004 
[SH RQ] + 0.2784  
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect Largest Negative Effect 
[FIA RQ] Closure on top and small release quantity Closure on top and medium release quantity 
[FM RQ] Punctured and crushed and medium release quantity Other failure mode and medium 
[CO RQ] Other causing object and zero release quantity Other causing object and medium 
[CA RQ] Improper loading and dropped and medium release quantity 
Other contributing action and medium 
release quantity 
[C RQ] Fiber box and medium release quantity Bottle and medium release quantity 
[M RQ]  Not directly associated  Not directly associated 
[SE RQ] Summer and medium release quantity Spring and medium release quantity 
[L RQ] Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and medium release quantity 
Urban/ industrial or commercial/ eastern 
or western and medium release quantity 
[SH RQ] Twilight and medium release quantity Twilight and zero release quantity 
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 The network for release quantity, which consists of six direct associations with the explanatory 
variables in stages one through three of a release, is presented graphically in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for RQ. 
 
 
Stage Five  The final, or ultimate, logit variable in the network was dollar loss, one possible 
consequence of a hazmat release and a measure for risk identified in the literature.  Dollar loss 
has the following categories: zero, small, and medium, as summarized in Table 51 . 
 
Table 51: Stage 5 Variables. 
Stage 5 Variable Abbreviation Categories
Dollar Loss D 1) Zero 
2) Small (≤$500) 
3) Medium (≤$25K) 
 
 
 
There were ten variables that preceded dollar loss in the network.  However, SPSS 11.0 has a 
limitation of nine explanatory variables.  To address this limitation, the contingency table 
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 containing all 11 variables (which included dollar loss) was collapsed over one of the 
explanatory variables that had a small impact in previous stages, as suggested by Hagenaars.( )207   
Consequently, the table was collapsed over shift.  This led to a model containing nine 
explanatory variables, in which shift was not modeled.  This table had 15,552 cells and a sample 
size of 40,282, after the general correction procedure was applied.  The correction procedure 
again had a small effect, with a difference in total count between uncorrected and corrected 
tables of 91, which represented 0.23% of the uncorrected total count.  There was a maximum cell 
difference of 8.  In order to investigate possible effects of shift on dollar loss, a second model 
was run.  In this model, the contingency table was collapsed over season, another variable that 
had a small impact on previous response variables.  This table was also corrected, resulting in a 
total difference of 70 (0.17%) between the uncorrected and corrected tables and a maximum cell 
difference of 10.       
      The lambda values for the two models were very similar, as shown in Table 52.  In this table, 
the model on the left was collapsed over shift, and the model on the right was collapsed over 
season.  In addition, interpretations of the lambda parameters are given in Table 53.  Causing 
object had the largest influence on dollar loss (λ ≅ - 4.3), as it did on release quantity.  Based on 
this as shown in Table 53, a lesser proportion of some “other” causing object was associated with 
medium dollar loss.  This is in contrast to the largest positive effect by causing object, in which a 
greater proportion of floor and water incidents that led to medium dollar loss (λ ≅ 3.2).  
Contributing action had the next largest effect (λ ≅ 3.6), followed by release quantity (λ ≅ 3.4) 
and failure item-area (λ ≅ -2.3).  The largest positive effect by the contributing action indicated 
that a greater proportion of loose fittings or valves were associated with medium dollar loss.  The 
largest positive effect by release quantity led to proportionally more incidents in which a medium 
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 release quantity was associated with medium dollar loss, as might be expected.  In summary, the 
container failure variables and release quantity had strong effects on the ultimate logit variable.  
The only variable which was not directly associated with dollar loss was container type (λ ≅ ± 
0.11).  Both shift and season showed direct effects on dollar loss (λ = 0.4749 and λ = 0.5654), 
which points to the value of having run both models. 
 
Table 52: Lambdas of Max Absolute Value for Logit D.   
Collapsed over Shift (left) and Season (right). 
Variable 
Pair S1  
Variable 
Pair S1 
[RQ D] + 3.4386  [RQ D] + 3.3845 
[FIA D] - 2.2529  [FIA D] - 2.2660 
[FM D] ± 0.5156  [FM D] ± 0.5262 
[CO D] - 4.4261  [CO D] - 4.2793 
[CA D] + 3.5947  [CA D] + 3.6344 
[C D] ± 0.1130  [C D] ± 0.1113 
[M D] ± 0.5511  [M D] ± 0.5160 
[SE D] + 0.5654  [L D] ± 1.3434 
[L D] ± 1.3196  [SH D] + 0.4749 
 
 
The interpretations of the strongest effects on dollar loss are presented below in Table 53. 
 
Table 53: Interpretation of the Largest Effects for Logit D. 
Variable 
Pair Largest Positive Effect Largest Negative Effect 
[RQ D] 
Medium release quantity and medium 
dollar loss 
Zero release quantity and medium dollar 
loss 
[FIA D] 
Closure on top and medium dollar loss Basic packaging material on top and medium dollar loss 
[FM D] 
Punctured and crushed and medium 
dollar loss 
Other failure mode and medium dollar 
loss 
[CO D] 
Floor and water and medium dollar loss Other causing object and medium dollar loss 
[CA D] 
Loose fitting or valve and medium dollar 
loss Loose fitting or valve and zero dollar loss 
[C D]  Not directly associated  Not directly associated 
[M D] Corrosives and medium dollar loss 
Flammable liquids and medium dollar 
loss 
[SE D] Fall and medium dollar loss Summer and medium dollar loss 
[L D] 
Suburban/ commercial/ eastern and 
medium dollar loss 
Urban/ industrial or commercial/ eastern 
or western and medium dollar loss 
[SH D] Day and medium dollar loss Twilight and medium dollar loss 
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As presented in Figure 20, there are direct associations between dollar loss and all the 
explanatory variables in stages one through four except for container type, as shown by the 
absence of an arc from this variable. 
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Figure 20: Graphical Results of Logit Analysis for D. 
 
 
Summary of Stages 1-5  A flowchart that summarizes the method used for constructing and 
using the individual loglinear models to analyze each stage of a hazmat release is provided in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Approach to Constructing and Using a Loglinear Model. 
 
 
A complete structure showing all the direct associations determined among the variables in 
stages one through five is given in Figure 22.  In this diagram, the stage one variables are 
positioned on the outer ring of the circle, while dollar loss is in the center.  This diagram shows 
the high degree of interconnectedness of the network.  This structure served as the association 
structure for the Bayesian network decision model of the hazmat release variables, to be 
constructed next in the methodology. 
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Figure 22: Bayesian Network for Stages 1-5. 
 
 
4.1.3 Three Step Modeling Assumptions 
An assumption of the three step modeling approach, which was just used to develop the 
association structure, is that an observed variable does not have a direct effect on an indicator 
variable of a latent variable.  This assumption is stated in various publications by the authors of 
the correction procedure, namely Bolck, Croon, and Hagenaars.( , , , )208 209 210 211   For example, this 
assumption holds that container type, an observed variable, should not have a direct effect on 
improper loading, an indicator variable for the contributing action latent variable.  If there is a 
direct relationship, as measured by a significant L2 or |λij| ≥ 0.20, then the indicator variable 
should be converted to an observed variable.( )212    
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      Efforts at the beginning of the loglinear modeling to investigate these direct effects among the 
hazmat variables in order to comply with the assumption were not met with success.  Early 
efforts were not successful because the contingency tables for the required loglinear models were 
sparse.  At this time, significance testing was the method being used to determine the presence of 
associations, or direct effects.  The ability to use lambda parameters to assess associations in 
sparse tables was not known until later in time.  In addition, in the literature, violation of this 
assumption was described as leading to issues with interpretation of the final model versus issues 
of model accuracy or estimation of lambda parameters.( , )213 214   Based on this and the inability to 
perform significance testing, the loglinear modeling proceeded without an investigation of the 
possible direct effects. 
      After completion of the loglinear modeling, I learned through personal communication with 
Dr. Jacques Hagenaars that a “large” direct effect of an observed variable on an indicator can be 
influential on the estimation of the lambda parameters in the model.( )215   However, the value of a 
“large” direct effect is uncertain.  Dr. Hagenaars believed that a value of λ=0.75 may not be a 
large direct effect, especially if latent variables are involved.( )216   At this point, I ran the 
necessary loglinear models to investigate the direct effects of the observed variables on the 
indicator variables based on the lambda parameters.  This was done for each indicator variable 
influenced by an observed variable in the hazmat network.  The presence of a direct effect was 
determined through a three-variable loglinear model consisting of the observed, indicator, and 
latent variable.   
      Of the four observed variables that may directly influence the indicator variables, container 
type had the largest direct effects.  The direct effects of container type ranged from λ=0.01 to 
λ=5.75, with an average of λ=1.07.  Shift in general had smaller direct effects, which ranged 
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 from λ=0.0002 to λ=10.21, with an average of λ=0.74.  Finally, the direct effects of season and 
material type were smaller than those of container type and shift, as presented below in Table 54. 
 
Table 54: Direct Effects of Observed Variables on Indicator Variables. 
Observed Variable Range Average 
Container Type 0.0100 5.75 1.07 
Shift 0.0002 10.21 0.74 
Season 0.0093 8.06 0.51 
Material Type 0.0100 6.79 0.45 
 
 
 
The indicator variables upon which the largest direct effects occurred were “other” and “none.”  
For example, shift had a direct effect of λ =10.21 on the indicator variable “other” of the latent 
variable contributing action. 
      Since the value of a “large” direct effect is not known, the impact of the direct effects of the 
observed variables on the indicator variables in this research is not known.  Since the “other” and 
“none” indicators were in general associated with the largest direct effects, an opportunity for 
future research is elimination of these indicator variables from the analysis.  Although “other” 
and “none” were associated with many incidents and consequences, they provide limited 
information and contribute to violation of the three-step modeling assumption.  As a 
consideration for future research, if a threshold for “large” had been chosen and the three step 
assumption followed by converting indicators to observed variables based on large λ’s, then the 
same degree of simplification using latent class analysis would not have been possible.  For, 
many of the indicator variables would have been included as observed variables and would not 
have been combined as indicators to form the latent variables.  In addition, not all of the latent 
variables that were developed in this research would have been possible.  Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between the ability to simplify and the three-step modeling assumption. 
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 4.1.4 Bayesian Network Construction 
Using the association structure determined from the three step modeling approach, a Bayesian 
network decision model of a hazardous materials release was developed as the final step of the 
methodology.  A Bayesian network was chosen as the type of decision model since only random 
variables are considered in this research.  In addition, a Bayesian network was a natural fit due to 
its ability to perform inference on the variables, including ranking the explanatory variables 
based on their influence on the outcome variable.  Also, changes in the distribution of the 
outcome variable could be determined based on changes in the categories of the explanatory 
variables, suggesting desirable operational or policy changes.  Dollar loss, the ultimate response 
variable, and release quantity, the stage-four response variable of potential concern to 
environmentalists, were analyzed as network outcome variables.  The following sections 
describe the training, testing, and inferential results. The most influential variables and 
recommended policy changes for each outcome variable are discussed in detail. 
4.1.4.1 Bayesian Network Training   
The second component of a Bayesian network, the conditional probability distribution of each 
node or variable, was determined using incident counts from the HMIRS database.  Calculation 
of these conditional probability distributions constitutes the training of the network, or learning, 
at which point inference can be performed. 
      Some of the conditional probabilities were zero due to the large number of parent, or 
explanatory, variables, such as those of dollar loss and release quantity.  Conditional 
probabilities of zero were replaced by a small constant equal to 0.0001, as suggested in the  
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 literature as well as by an expert.( , )217 218   The rationale for this was that the zeros were probably 
not structural zeros but sampling zeros.  And, using Bayes Theorem, a zero probability can never 
be updated to another value.( )219
      There were also instances in which the probability in the denominator of the conditional 
probability calculation was zero, thereby preventing calculation of the conditional probability.  In 
these cases, the uniform distribution was applied to the conditional probabilities that make use of 
this particular probability in the denominator.( )220   Using the uniform distribution, each of these 
conditional probabilities was assigned an equal value such that the values summed to one.  For 
example, for a three-category variable, the values 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 were assigned. 
      A total of 40,191 records were available for network training and testing.  These records 
were divided into five non-overlapping sets of equal size so that five-fold cross validation, or 
testing, could be done.  Cross validation involves comparing model predictions with actual 
values using a set of test records in order to assess model accuracy.  Although there is no general 
or gold standard for assessing the accuracy of Bayesian networks, cross validation was 
performed on the hazmat release networks to document their accuracy.( )221   Thus, five Bayesian 
networks were trained and tested using the available data.  The method for doing this is 
described in Table 55, where the five sets of records are represented by T1 through T5.  For 
example, for the first Bayesian network, sets T2-T5 were used for training, and T1 was used for 
testing, or cross validating.  For the second network, sets T1 and T3-T5 were used for training, 
and T2 was used for testing.  The plan described in this table resulted in five sets of testing and 
inference results, which will be described in the following sections.   
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 Table 55: Bayesian Network Training and Test Plan. 
Network 
Training 
Sets 
Test 
Set 
1 T2,T3,T4,T5 T1 
2 T1,T3,T4,T5 T2 
3 T1,T2,T4,T5 T3 
4 T1,T2,T3,T5 T4 
5 T1,T2,T3,T4 T5 
 
 
 
4.1.4.2 Dollar Loss Outcome – Testing and Quality   
Cross-validation is commonly done after training to evaluate the resulting network by comparing 
model predictions to actual values using an independent set of test records.  For example, to 
evaluate the ability of the network to predict the correct category for dollar loss, the values for 
season, material type, and the other explanatory variables were set as evidence based on their test 
record values.  The probability for dollar loss was then updated using the network, leading to a 
most likely category for this outcome variable.  The most likely category was then compared to 
the actual category per the test record to identify the existence of a match.  This procedure was 
done for all records in the test set, leading to a calculation of the accuracy.  Specifically, a count 
of the records in which the actual category matched the most likely category was made, along 
with a count of matches on the next most likely category.  These two counts gave an indication 
of the accuracy of the network, as described in Onisko et. al.(222)  In predicting dollar loss, the 
accuracies of the five networks are given in Table 56.  The most likely category matched the 
actual category approximately 70% of the time, ranging from 68.9% to 70.8% across the five 
networks.  Thus, the accuracies associated with the five test sets were close in value, likely due 
to the large training and testing datasets of approximately 32,000 and 8,000, respectively.  When 
there was not a match on the most likely category, the next most likely category matched the 
actual approximately 23% of the time, ranging from 22.5% to 24.2% across the test sets.  
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 Although the networks did not make perfect predictions for dollar loss, the accuracy appears to 
be reasonable.  The inability to make perfect predictions reflects the difficulty of the problem and 
may be the result of other factors or variables that are not part of the model.  ( )223   
 
Table 56: Prediction Accuracies for Dollar Loss. 
  Network 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Most Likely = Actual 69.6% 68.9% 69.4% 70.8% 70.2% 
Next Most Likely = Actual 23.3% 24.2% 23.8% 22.5% 22.8% 
 
 
Tests were also performed in the reverse direction to assess the ability to predict values of the 
explanatory variables based on the category of dollar loss.  To do this, the value for dollar loss 
was set as evidence based on the test record value.  The probabilities for all the explanatory 
variables were then updated using the network, and counts of the most likely and next most 
likely matches for each parent variable were determined, as shown in Table 57.  For example, for 
season, the percentage of records in which the actual category matched the most likely category 
was approximately 31%, ranging from 30.2% to 32.2% across the five test sets.  The accuracies 
for each explanatory variable given in Table 57 were always better than random based on the 
number of categories of the variable.  In addition, for several of the variables, the predictions 
were notably better than random, such as those for container (C), contributing action (CA), 
causing object (CO), failure mode (FM), failure item-area (FIA), and release quantity (RQ).  
Note the excellent prediction of RQ at approximately 88%. 
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 Table 57: Prediction Accuracies for Dollar Loss Explanatory Variables. 
    Matches for Dollar Loss by Network 
    T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Explanatory 
Variable Cat. 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Season 4 31.4% 27.5% 30.2% 27.3% 31.2% 27.5% 31.1% 26.9% 32.2% 27.0% 
Material 
Type 2 60.5%   59.3%   59.9%   58.7%   58.6%   
Container 
Type 2 75.5%   76.0%   75.7%   75.0%   75.4%   
Shift 3 37.3% 34.6% 37.6% 33.9% 36.3% 34.8% 36.9% 34.7% 36.3% 35.0% 
Location 2 54.4%   54.3%   54.6%   53.3%   54.6%   
Contributing 
Action 3 53.4% 33.6% 54.7% 32.5% 54.0% 33.5% 53.8% 33.2% 54.8% 32.2% 
Causing 
Object 3 63.3% 20.8% 63.9% 20.8% 62.7% 20.8% 63.6% 20.4% 63.6% 20.6% 
Failure 
Mode 2 69.5%   70.2%   69.7%   70.1%   70.8%   
Failure Item-
Area 3 51.2% 32.5% 51.6% 32.5% 51.1% 32.8% 50.6% 33.2% 51.1% 33.0% 
Release 
Quantity 3 87.6% 9.5% 88.1% 9.1% 87.7% 9.8% 88.0% 9.3% 88.3% 9.1% 
Note: 'Next Most Likely' percentage not listed for binary variables. 
 
 
 
Another means of testing the quality of a network is through a MAP, or maximum aposteriori 
probability.( )224   A MAP is the probability of the most likely joint state of the explanatory 
variables given the outcome variable and is a feature available in GeNIe.  A MAP can be 
compared to the conditional probability as determined using record counts from a database.  The 
proximity of these probabilities is an indication of the quality of the network.  The MAP of the 
variables in stages two through four, which were highly influential to medium dollar loss, was 
compared to the conditional probability based on record counts from the database.  This 
comparison was made for each of the five networks and shows good agreement between these 
two probabilities, as shown in Table 58.   
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 Table 58: MAP for Medium Dollar Loss vs. Database Probability Calculation. 
  Network 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
MAP - Medium Dollar Loss 16.1% 16.0% 16.5% 16.4% 16.6% 
Database Probability Calculation 16.5% 16.5% 16.9% 17.0% 17.0% 
 
 
 
4.1.4.3 Release Quantity Outcome – Testing and Quality   
The prediction accuracy for the other outcome variable, release quantity, was determined in the 
same fashion as that for dollar loss.  The accuracy for release quantity was actually better than 
the accuracy for dollar loss and is given in Table 59.  The most likely category matched the 
actual value approximately 87% of the time, versus approximately 70% in the case of dollar loss.  
When there was not a match on the most likely category, the next most likely category matched 
approximately 10% of the time, ranging from 10.0% to 10.9% in the test sets.  For each of the 
two types of accuracies, the percentages were very close in value across the five networks, likely 
due to the size of the training and test sets. 
 
Table 59: Prediction Accuracies for Release Quantity.
  Network 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Most Likely = Actual 86.7% 86.8% 86.4% 86.9% 87.1% 
Next Most Likely = Actual 10.3% 10.3% 10.9% 10.1% 10.0% 
 
 
A test was likewise performed in the reverse direction to determine the ability to predict the 
parent variables of release quantity based on the category of this outcome variable.  Percentages 
for the most likely and next most likely category matches for each explanatory variable are given 
in .  Again, the accuracy was always better than random and notably better for some of 
the container-related variables, which included container type, contributing action, causing 
object and failure mode.
Table 60
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Table 60: Prediction Accuracies for Release Quantity Explanatory Variables. 
    Matches for Release Quantity by Network 
    T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Explanatory 
Variable Cat. 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Most 
Likely 
Next 
Most 
Likely 
Season 4 31.2% 27.4% 30.2% 27.1% 30.8% 27.5% 31.6% 26.5% 31.9% 26.9% 
Material 
Type 2 60.5%   59.3%   59.9%   58.7%   58.6%   
Container 
Type 2 75.5%   76.0%   75.7%   75.0%   75.4%   
3 36.8% 35.1% 35.0% 36.4% 36.0% 35.2% 36.1% Shift 35.6% 36.2% 35.1% 
Location 2 51.4%   51.4%   51.7%   51.2%   51.9%   
Contributing 
Action 52.6% 34.3% 53.8% 33.5% 3 53.9% 33.6% 54.0% 33.0% 54.4% 32.6% 
Causing 
Object 3 60.6% 22.1% 60.9% 22.1% 59.8% 22.8% 60.3% 22.1% 59.9% 23.2% 
Failure 
Mode 2 69.5%   70.2%   69.7%   70.1%   70.8%   
Failure Item-
Area 3 43.1% 40.6% 43.2% 41.0% 43.3% 41.2% 42.5% 41.3% 43.4% 40.7% 
 
 
 
As another test of the quality of the network, a MAP of the variables in stages two and three, 
which were most influential on medium release quantity, was compared to the conditional 
probability as determined using record counts from the database.  This comparison for each of 
the five networks is given in Table 61 and indicates good agreement. 
 
Table 61: MAP for Medium Release Quantity vs. Database Probability Calculation. 
  Network 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
MAP - Medium Release Quantity 20.3% 20.4% 20.5% 19.2% 20.4% 
Database Probability Calculation 20.4% 20.3% 20.5% 19.2% 20.5% 
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 4.2 RESULTS AND INFERENCES OF THE BAYESIAN NETWORK FOR THE 
WORKED EXAMPLE 
Bayesian networks can be used in both a strategic and tactical manner.  Thus, they can be used to 
make long-range plans as well as to answer queries of a more reactive, short-term nature.  An 
overarching goal of this research was identification of the key variables in a large categorical 
database, which represented a strategic use of the Bayesian network.  The next two sub-sections 
discuss the strategic results related to dollar loss and release quantity and focus on the key 
variables and desirable changes identified for them.  The final sub-section discusses potential 
tactical uses of the Bayesian network by the Office of Hazardous Materials, such as “what-if” 
analyses surrounding exemption approvals and occurrence spikes.
4.2.1 Dollar Loss Outcome – Strategic Results and Inferences 
One of the most valuable types of information that can be determined from a Bayesian network 
developed using GeNIe is a ranking of the explanatory variables based on their information value 
relative to the outcome variable.  This can also be viewed as a measure of their influence on or 
the degree to which they reduce the uncertainty in the outcome variable.   The concept of 
value of information is one method of handling or studying decision models.  The explanatory 
variables were ranked according to their degree of influence on, or information value relative to, 
each category of dollar loss for each of the five networks.  Thus, five sets of inferences are 
presented and summarized in the following sections.  The five sets of ranking results for zero, 
small, and medium dollar loss are presented in  through 
( , )225 226
Table 62 Table 64, respectively.  In 
summary, causing object was the leading diagnostic variable for dollar loss, regardless of the loss 
category, followed by the failure item-area.  Thus, these two variables were found to be the most 
influential or informative variables relative to dollar loss.  In Table 62, which presents the 
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 ranking results specific to zero dollar loss, causing object was the leading variable in 3/5 
networks and nearly tied as the leading variable in a fourth network (T5).  For zero loss, failure 
item-area was clearly the second leading variable, based on the results from 3/5 networks. 
 
Table 62: Ranking of ‘Zero’ Dollar Loss Parent Variables. 
  Zero Dollar Loss Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CO 0.0972 CO 0.0957 CO 0.0968 FIA 0.0966 FIA 0.0936 
2 FIA 0.0939 FIA 0.0927 FIA 0.0956 CO 0.0951 CO 0.0935 
3 L 0.0084 L 0.0080 L 0.0083 L 0.0096 L 0.0083 
4 RQ 0.0062 RQ 0.0072 RQ 0.0064 RQ 0.0073 RQ 0.0067 
5 M 0.0035 CA 0.0033 CA 0.0031 M 0.0036 CA 0.0030 
6 CA 0.0029 M 0.0030 M 0.0030 CA 0.0031 M 0.0029 
7 FM 0.0015 FM 0.0017 FM 0.0017 FM 0.0017 FM 0.0010 
8 C 0.0006 C 0.0008 C 0.0009 C 0.0010 C 0.0008 
9 SH 0.0003 SH 0.0001 SH 0.0003 SE 0.0004 SH 0.0003 
10 SE 0.0002 SE 0.0001 SE 0.0002 SH 0.0002 SE 0.0003 
 
 
 
For both small and medium dollar loss, which are shown in Table 63 and Table 64, causing 
object was clearly the leading variable, followed by failure item-area, both based on 5/5 
networks. 
  
Table 63: Ranking of ‘Small’ Dollar Loss Parent Variables. 
  Small Dollar Loss Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CO 0.0186 CO 0.0183 CO 0.0192 CO 0.0173 CO 0.0179 
2 FIA 0.0161 FIA 0.0158 FIA 0.0167 FIA 0.0164 FIA 0.0158 
3 RQ 0.0051 RQ 0.0057 RQ 0.0054 RQ 0.0065 RQ 0.0057 
4 CA 0.0030 CA 0.0030 CA 0.0027 CA 0.0028 CA 0.0031 
5 FM 0.0021 FM 0.0020 FM 0.0020 FM 0.0023 FM 0.0026 
6 SE 0.0021 SE 0.0014 SE 0.0016 SE 0.0020 SE 0.0017 
7 SH 0.0007 SH 0.0005 SH 0.0005 SH 0.0008 SH 0.0005 
8 M 0.0005 M 0.0003 M 0.0004 M 0.0004 M 0.0002 
9 C 0.0001 C <0.0001 C 0.0001 C <0.0001 C 0.0001 
10 L <0.0001 L <0.0001 L <0.0001 L <0.0001 L <0.0001 
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 Table 64: Ranking of ‘Medium’ Dollar Loss Parent Variables. 
  Medium Dollar Loss Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CO 0.0393 CO 0.0385 CO 0.0413 CO 0.0390 CO 0.0375 
2 FIA 0.0307 FIA 0.0306 FIA 0.0330 FIA 0.0306 FIA 0.0314 
3 CA 0.0186 CA 0.0175 CA 0.0195 CA 0.0190 CA 0.0186 
4 FM 0.0172 FM 0.0172 FM 0.0176 FM 0.0182 FM 0.0171 
5 L 0.0153 L 0.0151 L 0.0152 L 0.0142 L 0.0155 
6 RQ 0.0049 RQ 0.0061 RQ 0.0050 RQ 0.0061 RQ 0.0062 
7 SE 0.0045 SE 0.0050 SE 0.0046 SE 0.0053 SE 0.0043 
8 SH 0.0029 SH 0.0028 C 0.0037 SH 0.0039 SH 0.0032 
9 C 0.0028 C 0.0027 SH 0.0033 C 0.0028 C 0.0029 
10 M  0.0013 M 0.0017 M 0.0014 M 0.0020 M 0.0018 
 
 
 
Therefore, based on these results, causing object and item-area should be the top focuses of 
policy or operational change initiatives.  In general, the container failure variables occupied 
upper positions in the rankings for dollar loss, indicating the value of this type of information.   
      In addition, GeNIe can be used to determine desirable changes in an explanatory variable in 
order to best impact an outcome variable.  For example, using GeNIe, it was determined that a 
reduction in incidents involving the floor and water/liquid as the causing object should be 
targeted, based on all five networks.  This was determined based on changes in the probability 
distribution of dollar loss given the particular category of causing object.  For example, using the 
first network (T1) to illustrate this method, setting the floor and water category of causing object 
as evidence led to an increase in the occurrence of both small and medium dollar loss and a 
decrease in zero loss relative to no evidence, as shown in Table 65.  Thus, the floor and water 
causing object had an undesirable effect on dollar loss and should be the target of reduction 
efforts to best impact dollar loss.  The “none” and “other” categories of causing object generally 
produced the opposite effect on dollar loss.   
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 Table 65: Effects of Causing Object on Dollar Loss. (T1 network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
       
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.083 0.770 0.147 
None 0.199 0.682 0.119 
Other 0.364 0.607 0.029 
 
 
 
This method of examining the probabilities to select the preferred alternative is based on the 
concept of stochastic dominance.  Using stochastic dominance, the dominating alternative is the 
one more likely to lead to a particular outcome or consequence.  It is in effect the better gamble.  
Stochastic dominance is a means to formally screen various alternatives and eliminate choices 
based on the pattern of the probabilities.( )227   Based on the T1 network as shown in Table 65, the 
best option or policy for a reduction in dollar loss was the floor and water/liquid combination 
because it increased the probability for a medium loss the most relative to no evidence (from 
0.116 to 0.147).  In addition, it also increased the probability for a small loss from 0.718 to 
0.770, while the other categories decreased this probability.  Although this analysis for causing 
object was fairly straightforward, more than one policy change initiative may be desirable for a 
variable, depending on the category of dollar loss targeted for reduction.  For, although the 
medium category has a higher dollar amount associated with it, it occurs less frequently than the 
small category (12% versus 72%, respectively).  Thus, targeting the small category may impact 
more incidents.   
      A summary of recommended policy changes for each variable based on all five networks 
using this same type of analysis is given in Table 66.  A few of the recommendations are based 
on “best of five” network outcomes where necessary.  For example, this table shows that 
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 incidents involving the floor and water category should be the focus of reduction efforts in order 
to best impact dollar loss.  For failure item-area, there are two courses of action, depending on 
the category of dollar loss targeted.  Specifically, if small loss is to be reduced, the best category 
to target is basic packaging material on the bottom of the container.  However, to best impact 
medium dollar loss, either basic packaging material on the bottom or closures on top should be 
targeted.  When evaluated from an overall perspective, the best category of failure item-area to 
target for reduction is basic packaging material on the bottom since it increases the probability of 
both a small and medium dollar loss and (undesirably) decreases the probability of zero loss the 
most.  The five sets of probability distributions for dollar loss on which these recommended 
policy changes are based are provided in Table 81 through Table 85 in Appendix C.   
 
Table 66: Recommended Policy Changes for Impacting Dollar Loss. 
Explanatory 
Variable Targeted Categories 
Causing Object To best impact small and medium loss, target floor and water/liquid. Overall best choice is floor and water/liquid since it also decreases the probability of zero loss. 
Failure Item-Area 
To best impact small loss, target basic package material on bottom. 
To best impact medium loss, target closure on top or basic package material on bottom. 
Overall best choice is basic package material on bottom since it increases probability of small 
and medium loss and decreases probability of zero loss the most.    
Contributing 
Action 
To best impact small loss, target loose fitting or valve or other. 
To best impact medium loss, target improper loading and dropped. 
Overall best choice is loose fitting or valve since it increases probability of small and medium loss 
and decreases probability of zero loss the most. 
Failure Mode To best impact small loss, target other. To best impact medium loss, target punctured and crushed. 
Location To best impact medium loss, target suburban/ commercial/ eastern. There is limited information for small loss. 
Release Quantity To best impact small loss, target small release quantity. To best impact medium loss, target medium release quantity. 
Season To best impact small loss, target summer.   To best impact medium loss, target fall. 
134 
 Table 66 (continued). 
Container Type 
To best impact medium loss, target bottle. 
There is limited information for small loss. 
There is limited information provided by fiber box. 
Overall best choice is bottle since it also decreases the probability of zero loss. 
Shift To best impact small loss, target twilight. To best impact medium loss, target day.   
Material Type To best impact small and medium loss, target corrosives. Overall best choice is corrosives since it also decreases the probability of zero loss. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Release Quantity Outcome – Strategic Results and Inferences 
As with the dollar loss outcome, the container failure variables were the most influential 
variables relative to release quantity based on the entropy-based ranking procedure in GeNIe.  
However, for release quantity, the leading container failure variable varied by category of release 
quantity.  For example, as shown in , causing object (CO) was the most influential 
variable relative to zero release quantity, followed by failure item-area (FIA), both based on 5/5 
networks.  
Table 67
 
Table 67: Ranking of ‘Zero’ Release Quantity Parent Variables. 
  Zero Release Quantity Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CO 0.0250 CO 0.0256 CO 0.0277 CO 0.0259 CO 0.0276 
2 FIA 0.0112 FIA 0.0120 FIA 0.0132 FIA 0.0110 FIA 0.0123 
3 CA 0.0042 CA 0.0065 CA 0.0050 CA 0.0053 CA 0.0071 
4 FM 0.0030 FM 0.0039 FM 0.0039 FM 0.0043 FM 0.0044 
5 SE 0.0020 SE 0.0024 SE 0.0027 L 0.0015 SE 0.0021 
6 L 0.0016 L 0.0013 L 0.0013 SE 0.0009 L 0.0017 
7 C 0.0009 C 0.0006 C 0.0005 M 0.0001 SH 0.0003 
8 SH <0.0001 SH <0.0001 SH 0.0005 SH <0.0001 C 0.0002 
9 M <0.0001 M <0.0001 M 0.0001 C <0.0001 M <0.0001 
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 However, as shown in Table 68, failure mode (FM) was the leading variable in 3/5 networks and 
tied as the leading variable in another network (T1) for small release quantity.  Contributing 
action (CA) was a close second to failure mode based on 3/5 networks. 
 
Table 68: Ranking of ‘Small’ Release Quantity Parent Variables. 
  Small Release Quantity Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CA 0.0093 FM 0.0092 FM 0.0090 FIA 0.0083 FM 0.0085 
2 FM 0.0093 CA 0.0089 CA 0.0083 FM 0.0081 CA 0.0080 
3 FIA 0.0077 FIA 0.0084 FIA 0.0078 CA 0.0081 FIA 0.0070 
4 CO 0.0015 CO 0.0016 CO 0.0021 CO 0.0017 CO 0.0016 
5 C 0.0010 C 0.0010 C 0.0008 C 0.0013 C 0.0010 
6 L 0.0009 L 0.0009 L 0.0007 L 0.0008 L 0.0006 
7 M 0.0002 SH 0.0003 SH 0.0002 M 0.0003 SE 0.0003 
8 SH 0.0002 SE 0.0002 M 0.0002 SH 0.0002 M 0.0002 
9 SE 0.0002 M 0.0002 SE 0.0002 SE <0.0001 SH 0.0002 
 
 
 
Finally, for medium release quantity, contributing action (CA) was the most influential, 
informative variable, based on 4 of the 5 networks.  Failure mode (FM) was the second most 
influential variable for medium release quantity based on 4/5 networks, as shown in Table 69.  
Thus, based on the results in Table 68 and Table 69, contributing action and failure mode took 
on more influential roles for small and medium release quantity versus small and medium dollar 
loss.  In contrast, causing object and failure item-area were more influential to dollar loss than to 
release quantity.  
 
Table 69: Ranking of ‘Medium’ Release Quantity Parent Variables. 
  Medium Release Quantity Category 
Rank T1 
Ranking 
Value T2 
Ranking 
Value T3 
Ranking 
Value T4 
Ranking 
Value T5 
Ranking 
Value 
1 CA 0.0194 CA 0.0202 FM 0.0188 CA 0.0176 CA 0.0188 
2 FM 0.0182 FM 0.0185 CA 0.0186 FM 0.0171 FM 0.0179 
3 FIA 0.0068 FIA 0.0075 FIA 0.0064 FIA 0.0068 FIA 0.0060 
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 Table 69 (continued). 
4 CO 0.0051 CO 0.0058 CO 0.0058 CO 0.0050 CO 0.0059 
5 L 0.0027 L 0.0025 L 0.0021 L 0.0024 L 0.0021 
6 C 0.0025 C 0.0024 C 0.0020 C 0.0022 C 0.0018 
7 SE 0.0002 SH 0.0003 SE 0.0002 M 0.0003 M 0.0002 
8 M 0.0002 M 0.0002 M 0.0002 SH 0.0002 SE 0.0002 
9 SH 0.0001 SE 0.0002 SH 0.0001 SE 0.0001 SH 0.0001 
 
 
 
In order to demonstrate the analysis of the recommended policy changes for release quantity, 
contributing action will be used as an example.  Based on the ranking procedure, this variable 
should be targeted in order to best impact medium release quantity.  However, the category of 
contributing action to pursue depends on the particular category of release quantity targeted for 
reduction.  For, although a medium release involves a greater quantity of material, it occurs less 
frequently than a small release (9.4% versus 87.9%, respectively).  Since the improper loading 
and dropped category increases the probability of a medium release, as shown in Table 70, it 
should be the target of reduction efforts.  However, since a loose fitting or valve increases the 
probability of a small release the most (0.911 versus 0.895 for “other”), it should be pursued if 
the goal is to best impact a small release quantity. 
 
Table 70: Effects of Contributing Action on Release Quantity. (T1 network) 
Contributing Action Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
       
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.020 0.841 0.139 
Other 0.031 0.895 0.075 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.033 0.911 0.056 
 
 
 
The recommended policy changes for each parent variable of release quantity based on this same 
type of analysis and all five networks are summarized in Table 72.  Note that for material type, 
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 shift, and season, there are no recommended policy changes due to the limited information these 
variables provide.  This is due to the small changes in the probability distribution of release 
quantity when evidence is introduced on these variables.  Refer to Table 71 for an illustration of 
this using the midnight shift as an example.  The distribution of release quantity given the 
midnight shift is nearly the same as the distribution given “no evidence,” as seen by comparing 
these two rows in Table 71.  The same is true given the day and twilight shifts. 
 
Table 71: Effects of Shift on Release Quantity. (T1 network) 
.Shift Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
       
Midnight 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Day 0.027 0.883 0.091 
Twilight 0.028 0.874 0.098 
 
 
 
The supporting probability distributions for the recommended policy changes in Table 72 are 
located in Table 86 through Table 90 in Appendix C.   
 
Table 72: Recommended Policy Changes for Impacting Release Quantity. 
Explanatory 
Variable Targeted Categories 
Contributing 
Action 
To best impact small quantity, target loose fitting or valve.   
To best impact medium quantity, target improper loading and dropped. 
Failure Item-Area To best impact small quantity, target closure on top. To best impact medium quantity, target basic package material on top.   
Failure Mode To best impact small quantity, target other. To best impact medium quantity, target punctured and crushed.   
Causing Object To best impact small quantity, target none.   To best impact medium quantity, target floor and water/liquid.   
Container Type To best impact small quantity, target bottle. There is limited information provided by fiber box. 
Location There is limited information for small quantity. To best impact medium quantity, target suburban/ commercial/ eastern. 
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 Table 72 (continued). 
Material Type There is limited information provided by material type. 
Shift There is limited information provided by shift. 
Season There is limited information provided by season. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Potential Tactical Uses of the Bayesian Network for Decision Making 
An important use of a Bayesian network is tactical, or operational, decision making based on 
either predictive or diagnostic inference.  Predictive inference can take the form of various 
“what-if” analyses, in which the effects of one or more explanatory variables on the conditional 
probability distributions of the outcome variables are determined.  A potential use of predictive 
“what-if” analysis at the Office of Hazardous Materials (OHM) is for exemption, or special 
permit, approvals.  In this decision process, the OHM must evaluate individual requests for 
exemptions from the hazardous materials transportation regulations.  Conversely, diagnostic 
inference may involve “what-if” analysis in the opposite direction from effects to explanations, 
for potential use in risk reduction analysis or investigation of occurrence spikes.  In addition, 
MAP’s, or maximum aposteriori probabilities, may be used diagnostically to gain a basic 
understanding of an occurrence spike or accident scenario.  A MAP characterizes an accident 
scenario by identifying the most likely joint state or combination of the explanatory variables 
given the outcome variable.  These tactical uses of the Bayesian network by the OHM will be 
discussed further in the next sections. 
4.2.3.1 What If Analysis 
As a first step in starting a tactical analysis program, the Office of Hazardous Materials can use 
the Bayesian network developed in this research to obtain an understanding of the relationships 
between the variables in a hazardous materials unloading release, based on their top categories.  
Based on the face validation study, the OHM does not have a complete understanding of the 
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 relationships between the dependent and independent variables in an unloading release.  A basic 
understanding of the relationships can be obtained by performing various “what-if” analyses in 
both a predictive and diagnostic manner.  Predictive analysis involves setting the value of one or 
more known, or observed, explanatory variables as evidence in the network.  The effects on the 
conditional probability distributions of the remaining, or unknown, downstream variables are 
determined by updating, or evaluating, the network.  For example, the OHM may wish to 
investigate the impact of time of day on hazmat releases during unloading.  Specifically, if the 
time of day for unloading flammable liquids is changed from the midnight to the daytime shift, a 
predictive “what-if” analysis can identify the impact on the quantity released and the monetary 
damages.       
      Using diagnostic “what if” analysis, a Bayesian network can be used to determine the 
distributions of the explanatory variables to identify the categories that are most or least likely 
given the outcome.  For example, as part of a risk reduction study, the OHM may wish to 
analyze the ideal situation of zero quantity released and compare it to a medium-quantity release 
to understand the factors involved.  Specifically, the OHM may wish to evaluate a zero-release 
versus medium-release situation in which the bottom of the basic packaging material failed, in 
order to identify possible risk reduction alternatives.  To do this, the known variables, namely 
zero release quantity and the bottom of basic packaging material, are set as evidence, and the 
values of the remaining variables are updated as the explanations.  This can be compared to a 
medium-quantity release to understand the differences.  To make this comparison, evidence is set 
of a medium-quantity release to determine any changes in the distribution of the explanatory 
factors. 
140 
 Exemption/Special Permit Analysis  The use of the Bayesian network model to analyze 
exemptions, or special permits, at the OHM is a potential application of predictive “what-if” 
analysis.  For example, suppose an exemption is being considered for the relocation of a lab with 
infectious substances from Rockville, MD to Fairfax, VA, which are suburban, commercial 
locations in the greater Washington, DC area.  An exemption is likely necessary in this case due 
to the nature of the material being transported.  Within an exemption, certain variables may be 
fixed, such as material type or location.  In this scenario, the material type and locations are 
fixed.  However, there are certain variables that may be set or prescribed by the OHM as part of 
the exemption granting process in order to minimize the possibility of an undesirable outcome.  
For example, in the previous scenario, the time of day or the season of the year for the relocation 
could be prescribed by the OHM in the exemption that is granted.  Also, the type of container or 
packaging may be a point of negotiation or additional control for the OHM.( )228   Given these 
non-fixed variables, the OHM can use the Bayesian network and “what if” analysis to prescribe 
such variables to minimize the probability of the consequences.  For example, if the lab were 
relocated during the midnight shift in the summer months versus the daytime shift in the winter 
months, how would the consequences be impacted?  Also, what is the impact on the 
consequences of various containers for transporting infectious substances?  These questions can 
be answered by setting the fixed as well as the prescribed variables as evidence and updating the 
probabilities of the unknown variables, including the consequences.  
      However, in its present form, the Bayesian network model is specific to unloading incidents 
and the top material and container types.  These include corrosives and flammable liquids, and 
fiber boxes and bottles, respectively.  In addition, people-related outcomes are not considered by 
the present model, although this is the biggest concern when granting exemptions.  Thus, 
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 considering the lab relocation scenario above, the present model could not be made specific to 
infectious substances or the types of containers often used to transport infectious substances, 
such as plastic bags.  Exemptions can get very specific in terms of the factors involved.  Given 
this constraint, the existing Bayesian network model could still be used during the exemption 
approval process to gain very general insight into the occurrence of hazmat incidents.  For 
example, how do daytime, suburban incidents impact the monetary damages in unloading 
accidents and possibly other scenarios?  Additionally, assume the OHM has a concern about 
potential inadequate handling of containers.  Using the existing model, the impact of dropping an 
improperly-loaded container on monetary loss can be determined and applied in a general sense 
to other situations.  However, taking a different approach, the present model could be expanded, 
or new models developed, in order to provide a decision tool that specifically considers certain 
variables or categories, such as the infectious material type, infectious-material containers, or 
human-related consequences.  
Analysis of Occurrence Spikes  In addition to performing risk reduction analysis, diagnostic 
“what-if” analysis of a Bayesian network can be used to investigate occurrence spikes reported to 
the OHM.  Increases in the occurrence of particular hazmat releases are often reported to the 
OHM from the field.  An example of an occurrence spike might be many loose closures on 
bottles during flight.  The OHM currently investigates such reports by using the HMIRS to 
determine similar reported incidents and the associated shippers for direct communication with 
them.( )229   To illustrate the use of “what-if” analysis for occurrence spikes, assume there is a 
sharp increase in the occurrence of medium-quantity releases in which the bottom of the basic 
package material failed.  The OHM can begin its investigation by getting a basic understanding 
of the distributions of the unknown factors associated with the occurrence spike using “what-if” 
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 analysis.  Specifically, the known variables, namely medium release quantity and bottom of the 
packaging material, are set as evidence to obtain the distributions of the unknown variables.  The 
degree of prevalence of various categories of the unknown variables provides insight into the 
accident situation.  These results may be compared to those for a zero-quantity release for 
possible additional insight.  If additional information or explanation becomes known about the 
occurrence spike, it can be set as evidence to determine the impact on the remaining variables.  
It’s possible that additional information may make certain other explanatory variables more or 
less likely if the common outcome variable is known.  Thus, known explanatory variables may 
“explain away” certain unknown explanatory variables, thereby making them more or less likely, 
given knowledge on a common outcome.  In the example of loose closures during flight, the 
OHM may find it useful to know most likely categories for variables such as time of day, season 
of the year, or material type, which can be obtained using diagnostic style “what-if” analysis. 
      The OHM may wish to obtain an overall characterization of an occurrence spike by running a 
MAP.  Using a MAP, the OHM can determine the most likely combination of variables 
surrounding the occurrence spike.  For example, which combination of unknown variables is 
most likely given failure of the bottom of the basic packaging material and a medium release of 
material?  A MAP serves to tell a story of the events surrounding an accident.  It characterizes an 
accident and answers the question, “What does the accident look like?”  As a demonstrated 
example of a MAP, a MAP of the container failure variables in stages two through four, which 
were most influential to medium dollar loss, was run.  A MAP can be run using a subset of the 
explanatory variables, thereby increasing the combination likelihood and potential usefulness 
relative to using many explanatory variables.( )230   In the case of a release in which medium dollar 
loss occurred, it’s most likely that the container and its contents were improperly loaded and 
143 
 dropped, thereby impacting the ground and encountering water or other liquid.  In addition, the 
container was consequently punctured and crushed, leading to failure of the basic package 
material on the bottom of the container and the release of a small amount of material to the 
environment.  This most likely scenario seems plausible.  In the same way, MAPs can be used to 
gain insight into occurrence spikes.  The MAPs for the variables in stages two through four given 
medium dollar loss across the five networks are summarized in Table 73.  Each MAP had an 
occurrence probability of approximately 16.5%, and the categories of the MAPs were the same 
across the five networks.   
 
Table 73: MAP of Most Influential Variables on Medium Dollar Loss. 
  MAP by Network 
Explanatory 
Variable T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
CO 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
CA 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
FIA 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
FM 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed 
RQ Small Small Small Small Small 
 
 
 
MAPs for medium release quantity were also run to characterize the worst case in terms of 
quantity released.  The results are similar to those for dollar loss and are given in Table 74.  
Based on 4/5 of the networks, a medium-quantity release is most likely characterized by an 
improperly-loaded and dropped container and contents that impact the ground and encounter 
water.  However, while the container is most likely punctured and crushed, it’s the basic package  
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 material on top of the container that fails in the case of medium release quantity.  The Office of 
Hazardous Materials may find it useful to compare MAPs for insight into various events or 
problems, as was done here for dollar loss versus release quantity. 
 
Table 74: MAP of Most Influential Variables on Medium Release Quantity. 
  MAP by Network 
Explanatory 
Variable T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
CO 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
Floor and 
water/liquid 
CA 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
Improper loading 
and dropped other 
Improper loading 
and dropped 
FIA 
Basic package 
material on top 
Basic package 
material on top 
Basic package 
material on top 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
Basic package 
material on top 
FM 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed 
Punctured and 
crushed other 
Punctured and 
crushed 
 
 
 
Another decision support query useful for occurrence spikes is the determination of the most 
influential variables given the occurrence of another variable.  For example, suppose a risk 
assessment engineer is focusing on incidents involving the “floor and water/liquid” combination, 
perhaps because there has been a recent increase in this particular causing object.  Given that an 
incident has the “floor and water” combination as its causing object, what variable should the 
engineer next pursue to best impact medium dollar loss?  This can be determined in GeNIe by 
setting the “floor and water” combination as evidence in the Diagnostics module and then 
updating the rankings of the remaining variables.  In this example, the engineer should focus on 
the contributing action that led to the failure, based on its being the next most influential variable 
in 5/5 networks.  This query involved a conditional analysis between two variables.  Using 
GeNIe, it is also possible to determine the optimal joint combination of two or more parent  
145 
 variables for the occurrence of a particular category of dollar loss.  This can be done in GeNIe by 
converting the Bayesian network to an influence diagram and assigning utilities to the categories 
of dollar loss.( )231
 
4.3 VALIDATION 
Models can be validated in various ways to assess their accuracy and quality.  Two forms of 
validation were performed to assess the hazardous materials release models developed in this 
research.  First, five-fold cross validation was performed on the Bayesian network models, as 
discussed previously in section 4.1.4.1, yielding very similar accuracies across the five networks 
for predicting dollar loss and release quantity.  In cross validating, a portion of the available data 
was retained for testing, and results predicted by the model were compared to actual values on 
the test records.  Tests were conducted in both a forward and reverse direction, meaning that 
accuracy was assessed relative to both the outcome and explanatory variables.  For the network 
in which dollar loss was the outcome variable, the accuracies associated with predicting the most 
likely and next most likely categories of dollar loss were approximately 70% and 23%, 
respectively, across the five networks, as discussed in 4.1.4.2.  For the network in which release 
quantity was the outcome variable, the respective accuracies were approximately 87% and 10% 
across the five networks.  Although there is not a standard for assessing prediction accuracies, 
these results appear reasonable given the possibility that other important variables were not part 
of the model. 
      Face validation is another method for assessing a model.  With face validation, the 
reasonableness of the model is determined, along with the presence of any obvious flaws.  In 
addition, inputs and outputs are also evaluated.  A face validation study of the base structure of 
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 the Bayesian network and its results was conducted with five engineers and scientists at the 
DoT’s Office of Hazardous Materials in August 2005.  The base structure included the temporal 
layout of the simplified variables and the five stages of a hazmat release.  Each of the five 
members of the panel, who were familiar with hazmat transportation and the HMIRS, assessed 
the base structure as “reasonable.”  The entire association structure of the hazmat release 
network could not be assessed by this group due to its size.  As a possible caution concerning the 
face validation, the panelists did not have an in depth knowledge of the HMIRS consistent with 
performing exploratory analyses of the data.  Rather, the panelists’ experiences with the data 
have been limited to reactive use in support of day-to-day operations and investigation of 
specific problems and issues.   
      A series of questions was posed to this panel to compare their knowledge with various results 
of the model.  Although not all associations could be evaluated, the panelists were asked to 
identify the direct associations in stage one.  Their predictions versus the model results for stage 
one were encouraging.  All five panelists identified the material type to container type direct 
association, based on regulations surrounding usage of certain containers for certain materials.  
Three of the five panelists identified the season to material type association, based on their belief 
of seasonal usage of various materials.  None of the panelists identified the shift to location 
association but were subsequently able to offer plausible explanations for this association. 
      The panelists were also asked to rank the explanatory variables based on their influence on 
both release quantity and dollar loss.  Their predictions were compared to the results of the 
entropy-based ranking procedure in GeNIe as a means of face validating the results.  A grid of 
the results showing the amount of agreement between the panelists’ ranking and the model’s 
ranking of each explanatory variable was compiled, as shown in Table 75 and Table 76.  The 
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 model’s ranking was determined by considering the ranking results of each of the five networks, 
using “best of five” where necessary.  In Table 75, the explanatory variables for release quantity 
are listed on the left side, in descending order of information value as ranked by GeNIe.  The 
numbers across the top are used to record the panelists’ ranking of a variable.  Each cell contains 
the number of panelists having the particular response.  For example, if two panelists ranked CA 
as third in terms of influence, a “2” would be entered in column 3 in the row for CA.  Agreement 
between the panelists and the model is indicated by a large number of responses in the shaded 
area.  This area was arbitrarily defined as each cell on the diagonal, which represents an exact 
match between panelist and model, plus one cell to the left and to the right.  For medium release 
quantity, the number of total responses that fell within the shaded area was 19/45, or 42.2%, as 
illustrated in Table 75.  
 
Table 75: Model vs. DoT Panelist Ranking of Variables for Medium Release Quantity.
Number of Responses 
      DoT Ranking 
Model Ranking  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CA     1 1 2   1       
2 FM   2   2   1         
3 FIA     1 2     2       
4 CO         2 2 1       
5 L               5     
6 C   3 1   1           
7 SE           1   1 1 2 
8 M     2     1 1   1   
9 SH               1 2 2 
 
 
 
For medium dollar loss, the agreement between the model and the panelists was less, with 13 out 
of 50 (26%) responses in the shaded area, as shown in Table 76.  In examining this table, the 
panelists’ predictions for dollar loss tended to be opposite the model’s predictions, as evidenced 
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 in the large number of responses in the top right and bottom left corners of the grid in Table 76.  
Thus, the validation results for release quantity were more encouraging than those for dollar loss. 
 
Table 76: Model vs. DoT Panelist Ranking of Variables for Medium Dollar Loss. 
   Number of Responses 
      DoT Ranking 
Model Ranking   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CO             3   1 1   
2 FIA         1     3 1     
3 CA       1 1 1       1 1 
4 FM       4   1           
5 L             1 2 2     
6 RQ   3 2                 
7 SE             1   1 1 2 
8 SH         1         3 1 
9 C     1   2 2           
10 M   2 2     1           
    
 
 
In the face validation study, the panelists predicted different leading variables for dollar loss 
versus release quantity.  For example, although the model ranked the container failure variables 
as most influential to both release quantity and dollar loss, the panelists ranked the container 
failure variables as more influential to release quantity than to dollar loss.  This is shown by the 
greater number of entries in the upper left portion of Table 75 versus Table 76.  Based on this, 
the panelists thought the events associated with container’s failure were more important to the 
release quantity than to the monetary loss.  In addition, GeNIe ranked material type M as one of 
the least influential variables to both release quantity and dollar loss.  However, the panelists 
ranked material type as more influential to dollar loss than to release quantity.  This is shown by 
the additional number of #1 and #2 panelist rankings for material type in Table 76 versus Table 
75.  In terms of the most influential variables, the panelists thought that release quantity and 
material type were most influential to medium dollar loss, as shown by the number of entries in 
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 columns 1 and 2 in Table 76.  This appears reasonable given that their frame of reference likely 
begins with the particular hazardous “material.”  However, the panelists thought that container 
type was most influential to medium release quantity, as given by the four entries in columns 1 
and 2 in Table 75. 
      In addition to face validating the results of the ranking procedure, the panelists were asked to 
face validate MAP results for the two most influential explanatory variables for release quantity 
and dollar loss, as shown in Table 77.  For medium dollar loss, the panelists were asked to 
identify the most likely combination of causing object CO and failure item-area FIA.  Three of 
the five panelists predicted the combination identified by 5/5 networks of floor and water and 
basic package material on the bottom of the container.  Likewise, for medium release quantity, 
four of the five panelists predicted 1) improperly loaded and dropped and 2) punctured and 
crushed as the most likely combination of its top variables contributing action CA and failure 
mode FM, as identified by 5/5 networks.  Thus, the majority of panelists predicted the most 
likely combinations of the top variables for dollar loss and release quantity.  The survey 
questionnaire used for the face validation is shown in Figure 23 in Appendix D. 
 
Table 77: Model vs. DoT Panelist MAP Results. 
  Most Influential   
Outcome 
Explanatory 
Variables Categories 
Panelists 
Predicted 
1. CO Floor and water Medium 
Dollar 
Loss 
2. FIA 
Basic package 
material on 
bottom 
3/5 
1. CA 
Improperly 
loaded and 
dropped 
Medium 
Release 
Quantity 
2. FM 
Punctured and 
crushed 
4/5 
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 As an overall indication of face validity, the panelists felt this research should be considered for 
application at the DoT.  They felt the graphical aspect of the model was helpful in problem 
visualization. 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a methodology for categorical variables involving simplification, measurement of 
associations, and construction of a Bayesian network, a large database was analyzed to build a 
data-congruent decision model of an engineering policy problem.  The methodology employs a 
combination of existing categorical data analysis techniques to develop the qualitative structure 
of the decision model.  Specifically, new, simplifying variables were developed using latent class 
analysis, and measurement of associations was accomplished through loglinear modeling, 
together forming a three step modeling approach.   
 
5.1 CONTRIBUTION - METHODOLOGY 
This methodology for analyzing a large categorical database was developed as part of an initial 
data modeling effort using a database within an unexplored area (hazardous materials releases).  
It is a methodology that can be used to “get one’s hands around” a complex database for which 
few or no modeling efforts have taken place in the past.  With this methodology, data-driven 
analysis techniques can be combined with subject matter knowledge to enhance the usual 
decision modeling process.  The first stage of the methodology focuses the modeler on the top 
categories and variables as well as generalized versions of the variables, which is necessary for 
developing an initial, or first-generation, data model of an event or system.  In addition, after 
choosing top categories and variables by way of Pareto-style analysis and generalizing variables 
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 where possible, new simplifying variables are created using the data modeling technique of latent 
class analysis.  Thus, the simplification consists of a combination of category elimination, which 
may be somewhat-subjective and benefit from subject matter expertise, and data modeling, 
which is very conducive to a first time analysis of the variables.   
      Similarly, the second stage of the methodology is also very conducive to an initial modeling 
effort within a subject area.  It represents an enhancement to more-traditional methods for 
building the relationship structure of a decision model.  It allows relationships to be determined 
based on data-driven associations as well as expert opinion where available.  It supports the 
modeling effort in the absence of prior theory or empirical analysis of the database or subject 
area.  The third stage of the methodology entails the construction of a traditional decision model 
consisting of only random variables.  The decision model, or Bayesian network, allows the 
combination of probability theory and information theory in identifying the most influential 
variables and desirable changes for them relative to a chosen outcome variable.  In addition to 
such strategic diagnostic analysis, more tactical-style analyses can also be made using the 
decision model, including “what-if” and sensitivity analysis.  Sensitivity analysis is useful in 
cases where the conditional probabilities are based on expert opinion or perhaps a smaller 
amount of data.  The tactical analysis can be either predictive or diagnostic, including “what-if” 
analysis for decisions such as exemption approvals.  Tactical analysis may also include the 
creation of MAPs, or maximum aposteriori probabilities, for a basic understanding of accident 
scenarios and situations, such as spikes in the occurrence of certain events.   
      This methodology may be a good candidate for application within an area such as Homeland 
Security given its relative newness.  It’s possible to envision that certain categorical variables, 
such as gender or country of origin, may influence a suspicion or threat level, which eventually 
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 may impact human health or life and agriculture.  In addition, another area conducive to the 
development of system or network models based on a large amount of categorical data is the 
health arena.  For example, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) collects interrelated 
data such as gender, parts of the body, health conditions, and reasons for avoiding medical care 
or testing, which influence a person’s health.  Although the NCHS conducts a large amount of 
empirical research, network or systems-style models are not commonly or formally used there 
currently.  Data-driven Bayesian networks have not penetrated their approach to proactive 
decision analysis, although there is interest in them. 
      In conclusion, the methodology developed as part of this dissertation is a general, flexible 
approach that can be applied to areas having large amounts of categorical data.  It is focused on 
data-driven development and therefore may be particularly useful for less-explored areas.  It can 
be supported and enhanced by the amount of subject matter knowledge desired. 
 
5.2 CONTRIBUTION - HAZMAT RELEASE LITERATURE 
Using the decision model, the most influential variables relative to dollar loss and release 
quantity were determined for a hazmat unloading accident.  For both of these outcome variables, 
the most influential variables were the container failure variables.  Specifically, for a small and 
medium release quantity, the top three influential variables were the action contributing to the 
failure of the container (CA), the item-area that failed (FIA), and the mode of failure (FM).  For a 
medium dollar loss, the leading variables in order of influence were as follows: object causing 
the failure (CO), the item-area (FIA), and the action contributing to the failure (CA).  For small 
dollar loss, release quantity (RQ) was third in terms of influence, versus contributing action (CA) 
for medium dollar loss.  In addition, the recommended operational or policy changes for each 
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 explanatory variable to decrease the probability of release quantity and dollar loss were 
determined.  They were determined based on the effects of each category of the explanatory 
variable on the probability distributions of the outcome variable using the decision model.  For 
example, for causing object, the best change to pursue to decrease the probability for dollar loss 
is a reduction in incidents involving a combination of the floor and water/liquid as the causing 
object.  For contributing action, a top variable for release quantity, the best changes are 
reductions in incidents involving a loose fitting or valve as well as improperly loaded and 
dropped containers, depending on whether a small or medium release quantity is targeted, 
respectively.  Five Bayesian networks were built so that five-fold cross validation could be done.  
The five sets of cross validation results closely agreed and were reasonable, with approximately 
70% accuracy in predicting dollar loss and 87% accuracy in predicting release quantity.  Thus, 
the results regarding the influential variables were based on five separate networks.  The results 
of the face validation study indicate an opportunity for use of a Bayesian network model at the 
OHM for providing insight to both strategic and tactical decisions. 
      The hazmat release database had not previously been analyzed in this manner by the DoT, 
due in part to the lack of penetration of categorical analysis methods into the engineering arena.  
In addition, the hazardous materials transportation literature has been focused on minimum risk 
routing and calculation of risk in quantitative risk assessment studies.  There has been a lack of 
focus on post-accident, exploratory use of the incident data, in particular to identify critical 
variables and policy changes for them.  There has also been a lack of focus in the literature on 
transportation support activities, such as container unloading, despite the fact that the majority of 
incidents occur at this point.  Thus, this research also contributes to the literature in terms of 
exploring hazmat unloading activity.   
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5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Opportunities for future study exist both in terms of the hazardous materials release problem as 
well as other areas in which the methodology can be applied.  Within the hazardous materials 
problem, additional types of consequences should be studied, especially the non-material 
consequences, such as injuries, deaths, and evacuations.  The Office of Hazardous Materials 
tends to focus more on human-related versus material consequences.  In addition to studying 
other types of consequences, additional phases of the transportation process should be studied, 
including loading, transport, and storage.  As mentioned previously, the container failure variable 
“other” should be eliminated from future analysis.  Although “other” is associated with many 
incidents and consequences, it does not provide definitive information for problem analysis.  On 
the new incident form instituted by the DoT in 2004, the “other” category has been eliminated.  
Therefore, the database based on the new incident form could be the subject of future research.   
      As a different approach to developing the decision model for the hazmat release problem, the 
learning module within GeNIe could be applied to the data in order to build the association 
structure.  It would be useful to compare the association structure as determined from the three 
step modeling approach with the structure as determined using the learning module.  The 
learning algorithm provides an alternative means of establishing the model’s structure. 
      Due to modeling constraints, some decisions were made concerning categories or variables to 
eliminate during the initial phase of the simplification.  The Pareto principle could not be 
followed and applied for all variables or sets of variables.  Unfortunately, the sensitivity of the 
model and results to this constraint is unknown.  This is an area for future research and may lead 
to later-generation models of a hazardous materials release during unloading. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES - STAGE ONE 
Table 78: Stage One Residual and Component L2 Results. 
    RESIDUAL COMPONENT 
Run Model L2 df p L2 df p Significant 
1 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 125.2625 87 0.0045         
  [M C] 107.5191 86 0.0581 17.7434 1 0.0001 Y 
  [SE M] 111.9227 84 0.0226 13.3398 3 0.0040 Y 
  [SH L] 117.808 85 0.0107 7.4545 2 0.0241 Y 
  [L C] 124.3989 86 0.0043 0.8636 1 0.3527   
  [L M] 124.9873 86 0.0039 0.2752 1 0.5999   
  [L SE] 123.2545 84 0.0034 2.0080 3 0.5707   
  [SE C] 121.9592 84 0.0043 3.3033 3 0.3472   
  [SH C] 125.0906 85 0.0031 0.1719 2 0.9176   
  [SH M] 120.9113 85 0.0064 4.3512 2 0.1135   
  [SH SE] 116.2602 81 0.0062 9.0023 6 0.1734   
                  
2 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 114.1234 87 0.0272         
  [M C] 94.4533 86 0.2498 19.6701 1 0.0001 Y 
  [SE M] 104.4828 84 0.0645 9.6406 3 0.0219 Y 
  [SH L] 104.0196 85 0.0789 10.1038 2 0.0064 Y 
  [L C] 113.703 86 0.0244 0.4204 1 0.5167   
  [L M] 113.6544 86 0.0246 0.4690 1 0.4934   
  [L SE] 111.531 84 0.0239 2.5924 3 0.4588   
  [SE C] 110.4271 84 0.0282 3.6963 3 0.2962   
  [SH C] 113.9375 85 0.0198 0.1859 2 0.9112   
  [SH M] 113.0544 85 0.0226 1.0690 2 0.5860   
  [SH SE] 106.7612 81 0.0292 7.3622 6 0.2886   
                  
3 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 128.0326 87 0.0028         
  [M C] 113.3556 86 0.0257 14.6770 1 0.0001 Y 
  [SE M] 114.7256 84 0.0146 13.3070 3 0.0040 Y 
  [SH L] 120.4478 85 0.0069 7.5848 2 0.0225 Y 
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 Table 78 (continued). 
  [L C] 127.6727 86 0.0024 0.3599 1 0.5486   
  [L M] 122.4895 86 0.0060 5.5431 1 0.0186 Y 
  [L SE] 126.0251 84 0.0021 2.0075 3 0.5709   
  [SE C] 127.3769 84 0.0016 0.6557 3 0.8836   
  [SH C] 127.9781 85 0.0018 0.0545 2 0.9731   
  [SH M] 125.9098 85 0.0026 2.1228 2 0.3460   
  [SH SE] 113.5523 81 0.0099 14.4803 6 0.0247 Y 
                  
4 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 121.5583 87 0.0085         
  [M C] 110.5451 86 0.0385 11.0132 1 0.0009 Y 
  [SE M] 104.083 84 0.0679 17.4753 3 0.0006 Y 
  [SH L] 116.4828 85 0.0133 5.0755 2 0.0790   
  [L C] 121.2689 86 0.0074 0.2894 1 0.5906   
  [L M] 120.604 86 0.0082 0.9543 1 0.3286   
  [L SE] 119.7449 84 0.0064 1.8134 3 0.6120   
  [SE C] 117.9295 84 0.0086 3.6288 3 0.3044   
  [SH C] 121.2985 85 0.0060 0.2598 2 0.8782   
  [SH M] 121.302 85 0.0060 0.2563 2 0.8797   
  [SH SE] 110.1527 81 0.0173 11.4056 6 0.0766   
                  
5 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 141.63 87 0.0002         
  [M C] 115.7958 86 0.0178 25.8342 1 0.0001 Y 
  [SE M] 131.5206 84 0.0007 10.1094 3 0.0177 Y 
  [SH L] 125.0913 85 0.0031 16.5387 2 0.0003 Y 
  [L C] 141.5651 86 0.0002 0.0649 1 0.7989   
  [L M] 133.7182 86 0.0008 7.9118 1 0.0049 Y 
  [L SE] 135.4763 84 0.0003 6.1537 3 0.1044   
  [SE C] 137.6344 84 0.0002 3.9956 3 0.2619   
  [SH C] 141.5397 85 0.0001 0.0903 2 0.9559   
  [SH M] 137.4482 85 0.0003 4.1818 2 0.1236   
  [SH SE] 138.9105 81 0.00007 2.7195 6 0.8431   
                  
6 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 118.2752 87 0.0145         
  [L M] 115.9667 86 0.0173 2.3085 1 0.1287   
  [SH SE] 113.0043 81 0.0109 5.2709 6 0.5096   
  [SH M] 113.6011 85 0.0208 4.6741 2 0.0966   
                  
7 
[SE][M][C][SH][L] 
(mutual 
independence) 125.8119 87 0.0041         
  [L M] 125.5721 86 0.0035 0.2398 1 0.6244   
  [SH SE] 122.9788 81 0.0018 2.8331 6 0.8295   
  [SH M] 124.5677 85 0.0034 1.2442 2 0.5368   
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 Table 79: Stage One Correction Procedure Matrices. 
LOCATION 
     
Transition Matrix  
Inverse Transition 
Matrix 
0.998213 0.001890  1.001794 -0.001894 
0.001930 0.998174  -0.001933 1.001833 
 
UNCORRECTED  CORRECTED  
CORRECTED 
(ROUNDED) 
33 43  33.02382193 42.98378703  33 43 
11 5  10.98996722 5.01163461  11 5 
52 54  52.0110443 53.99956812  52 54 
20 16  19.99506358 16.0085406  20 16 
33 44  33.02574766 43.98196143  33 44 
8 9  8.003032316 8.99866968  8 9 
68 66  68.00555458 66.00786108  68 66 
25 29  25.011161 28.99424535  25 29 
33 27  32.99301035 27.01299663  33 27 
8 8  8.001106592 8.00049528  8 8 
31 40  31.02161956 39.98548881  31 40 
11 13  11.00537301 12.99702981  11 13 
23 28  23.01281007 27.99229593  23 28 
6 5  5.99890422 5.00219706  6 5 
36 49  36.03001408 48.97849596  36 49 
13 16  13.00757538 15.99532803  13 16 
46 36  45.98710566 36.02110386  46 36 
10 11  10.00330896 10.9987935  10 11 
55 57  55.01145927 56.99975385  55 57 
23 17  22.99162711 17.01237753  23 17 
34 34  34.00470302 34.00210494  34 34 
9 3  8.989690572 3.01151079  9 3 
73 53  72.97158317 53.04103143  73 53 
22 24  22.00689458 23.99771082  22 24 
27 27  27.00373475 27.00167157  27 27 
4 15  4.02173626 14.98016604  4 15 
50 26  49.96069882 26.0469099  50 26 
15 18  15.00785203 17.99545185  15 18 
34 28  33.99314867 28.01305854  34 28 
4 9  4.010181916 8.99111964  4 9 
38 44  38.01681066 43.99139898  38 44 
16 11  15.99258456 11.01011856  16 11 
41 29  40.9825626 29.02444551  41 29 
4 13  4.017884812 12.98381724  4 13 
49 42  48.99329781 42.01581279  49 42 
10 14  10.00908614 13.9933167  10 14 
29 29  29.0040114 29.00179539  29 29 
13 10  12.99602104 10.00628163  13 10 
51 40  50.98587156 40.02323901  51 40 
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 Table 79 (continued). 
23 22  23.00125573 22.00324953  23 22 
44 32  43.98297757 32.02463124  44 32 
8 1  7.987626524 1.01327448  8 1 
43 35  42.99054214 35.01726693  43 35 
14 11  13.99615936 11.00634354  14 11 
25 27  25.00730955 26.99789655  25 27 
8 9  8.003032316 8.99866968  8 9 
37 25  36.9820093 25.02419787  37 25 
13 13  13.00179821 13.00080483  13 13 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES - STAGES FOUR AND FIVE 
Table 80: Latent Variable Transition Matrices. 
 
LOCATION 
     
Transition Matrix  
Inverse Transition 
Matrix 
0.998213 0.001890  1.001794 -0.001894 
0.001930 0.998174  -0.001933 1.001833 
 
CONTRIBUTING ACTION 
       
Transition Matrix  Inverse Transition Matrix 
0.996606 0.002320 0.001070  1.003416 -0.002337 -0.001079 
0.003110 0.996462 0.000422  -0.003135 1.003558 -0.000422 
0.002660 0.000781 0.996557  -0.002679 -0.000780 1.003459 
 
CAUSING OBJECT 
       
Transition Matrix  Inverse Transition Matrix 
0.998978 0.000743 0.000330  1.001024 -0.000745 -0.000331 
0.001410 0.998125 0.000467  -0.001412 1.001880 -0.000468 
0.000617 0.000519 0.998823  -0.000618 -0.000520 1.001179 
 
FAILURE MODE 
     
Transition Matrix  
Inverse Transition 
Matrix 
0.998811 0.001190  1.001193 -0.001193 
0.001810 0.998190  -0.001816 1.001816 
 
FAILURE ITEM-AREA 
       
Transition Matrix  Inverse Transition Matrix 
0.998055 0.001210 0.000737  1.001953 -0.001214 -0.000739 
0.002220 0.997540 0.000245  -0.002225 1.002469 -0.000245 
0.001500 0.000278 0.998220  -0.001506 -0.000278 1.001784 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES - BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Table 81: Dollar Loss Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T1 Network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss  Failure Item-Area Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116  no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.083 0.770 0.147  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.289 0.648 0.063 
None 0.199 0.682 0.119  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.064 0.783 0.154 
Other 0.364 0.607 0.029  Closure on Top 0.103 0.737 0.160 
Contributing Action Dollar Loss  Release Quantity Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116  no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.161 0.680 0.158  Zero 0.347 0.559 0.094 
Other 0.180 0.738 0.081  Small 0.160 0.730 0.110 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.124 0.731 0.146  Medium 0.175 0.647 0.178 
Location Dollar Loss  Failure Mode Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116  no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.135 0.717 0.148  Other 0.176 0.733 0.092 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.200 0.719 0.082  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.146 0.683 0.172 
Season Dollar Loss  Shift Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116  no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
Spring 0.173 0.711 0.116  Midnight 0.174 0.720 0.106 
Summer 0.161 0.744 0.095  Day 0.163 0.702 0.135 
Fall 0.171 0.683 0.146  Twilight 0.161 0.735 0.104 
Winter 0.163 0.724 0.113      
Container Type Dollar Loss  Material Type Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116  no evidence 0.167 0.718 0.116 
Fiber Box 0.172 0.721 0.107  Flammable Liquids 0.192 0.704 0.104 
Bottle 0.151 0.707 0.141  Corrosives 0.149 0.727 0.124 
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Table 82: Dollar Loss Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T2 Network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss  Failure Item-Area Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116  no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.085 0.768 0.148  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.290 0.647 0.063 
None 0.199 0.685 0.116  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.065 0.780 0.155 
Other 0.364 0.605 0.031  Closure on Top 0.105 0.738 0.156 
Contributing Action Dollar Loss  Release Quantity Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116  no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116 
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.164 0.679 0.157  Zero 0.365 0.551 0.084 
Other 0.182 0.736 0.082  Small 0.161 0.730 0.109 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.121 0.736 0.143  Medium 0.176 0.640 0.184 
Location Dollar Loss  Failure Mode Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116  no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.137 0.715 0.148  Other 0.177 0.731 0.092 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.200 0.718 0.082  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.146 0.682 0.172 
Season Dollar Loss  Shift Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116  no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116 
Spring 0.174 0.710 0.116  Midnight 0.173 0.722 0.105 
Summer 0.167 0.739 0.094  Day 0.163 0.701 0.135 
Fall 0.162 0.689 0.149  Twilight 0.167 0.728 0.105 
Winter 0.167 0.720 0.113      
Container Type Dollar Loss  Material Type Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116  no evidence 0.168 0.716 0.116 
Fiber Box 0.174 0.719 0.108  Flammable Liquids 0.192 0.706 0.102 
Bottle 0.150 0.709 0.141  Corrosives 0.151 0.724 0.125 
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Table 83: Dollar Loss Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T3 Network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss  Failure Item-Area Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114  no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.085 0.770 0.145  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.294 0.646 0.060 
None 0.203 0.676 0.121  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.064 0.784 0.152 
Other 0.368 0.606 0.026  Closure on Top 0.104 0.735 0.162 
Contributing Action Dollar Loss  Release Quantity Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114  no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114 
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.163 0.681 0.155  Zero 0.348 0.560 0.092 
Other 0.184 0.737 0.079  Small 0.162 0.730 0.108 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.124 0.726 0.150  Medium 0.183 0.641 0.176 
Location Dollar Loss  Failure Mode Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114  no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.137 0.717 0.146  Other 0.179 0.731 0.090 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.202 0.717 0.081  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.147 0.683 0.170 
Season Dollar Loss  Shift Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114  no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114 
Spring 0.176 0.710 0.114  Midnight 0.177 0.721 0.102 
Summer 0.167 0.739 0.093  Day 0.162 0.703 0.135 
Fall 0.170 0.686 0.144  Twilight 0.168 0.730 0.103 
Winter 0.161 0.726 0.113      
Container Type Dollar Loss  Material Type Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114  no evidence 0.169 0.717 0.114 
Fiber Box 0.175 0.720 0.105  Flammable Liquids 0.193 0.705 0.102 
Bottle 0.150 0.707 0.143  Corrosives 0.153 0.725 0.122 
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Table 84: Dollar Loss Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T4 Network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss  Failure Item-Area Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118  no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.085 0.764 0.151  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.292 0.643 0.064 
None 0.200 0.681 0.119  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.062 0.780 0.158 
Other 0.362 0.607 0.031  Closure on Top 0.104 0.735 0.161 
Contributing Action Dollar Loss  Release Quantity Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118  no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118 
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.160 0.678 0.162  Zero 0.360 0.547 0.092 
Other 0.183 0.734 0.083  Small 0.159 0.729 0.112 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.125 0.727 0.148  Medium 0.186 0.626 0.188 
Location Dollar Loss  Failure Mode Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118  no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.134 0.716 0.150  Other 0.177 0.730 0.093 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.203 0.712 0.085  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.145 0.678 0.177 
Season Dollar Loss  Shift Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118  no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118 
Spring 0.179 0.705 0.116  Midnight 0.174 0.719 0.107 
Summer 0.161 0.741 0.098  Day 0.162 0.696 0.141 
Fall 0.165 0.681 0.154  Twilight 0.166 0.730 0.104 
Winter 0.164 0.723 0.113      
Container Type Dollar Loss  Material Type Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118  no evidence 0.167 0.714 0.118 
Fiber Box 0.174 0.716 0.110  Flammable Liquids 0.193 0.703 0.104 
Bottle 0.148 0.707 0.145  Corrosives 0.150 0.722 0.128 
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Table 85: Dollar Loss Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T5 Network) 
Causing Object Dollar Loss  Failure Item-Area Dollar Loss 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117  no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.086 0.766 0.148  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.291 0.646 0.063 
None 0.201 0.679 0.120  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.064 0.780 0.156 
Other 0.363 0.605 0.031  Closure on Top 0.106 0.732 0.162 
Contributing Action Dollar Loss  Release Quantity Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117  no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117 
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.165 0.677 0.158  Zero 0.357 0.551 0.092 
Other 0.181 0.737 0.082  Small 0.161 0.728 0.110 
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.123 0.727 0.150  Medium 0.176 0.637 0.187 
Location Dollar Loss  Failure Mode Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117  no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.136 0.714 0.150  Other 0.176 0.732 0.093 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.201 0.716 0.083  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.151 0.676 0.173 
Season Dollar Loss  Shift Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117  no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117 
Spring 0.176 0.709 0.115  Midnight 0.176 0.720 0.104 
Summer 0.165 0.738 0.097  Day 0.161 0.701 0.138 
Fall 0.169 0.683 0.148  Twilight 0.166 0.726 0.108 
Winter 0.161 0.722 0.117      
Container Type Dollar Loss  Material Type Dollar Loss 
no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117  no evidence 0.168 0.715 0.117 
Fiber Box 0.174 0.718 0.108  Flammable Liquids 0.192 0.705 0.103 
Bottle 0.151 0.706 0.144  Corrosives 0.152 0.721 0.127 
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Table 86: Release Quantity Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T1 Network) 
Causing Object Release Quantity  Failure Item-Area Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.017 0.876 0.106  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.037 0.852 0.111 
None 0.033 0.901 0.067  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.018 0.892 0.090 
Other 0.050 0.868 0.081  Closure on Top 0.026 0.916 0.058 
Contributing Action Release Quantity    
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094      
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.020 0.841 0.139      
Other 0.031 0.895 0.075      
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.033 0.911 0.056      
Location Release Quantity  Failure Mode Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.024 0.870 0.105  Other 0.030 0.897 0.073 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.031 0.887 0.082  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.021 0.836 0.143 
Season Release Quantity  Shift Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
Spring 0.032 0.876 0.092  Midnight 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Summer 0.023 0.880 0.097  Day 0.027 0.883 0.091 
Fall 0.027 0.884 0.089  Twilight 0.028 0.874 0.098 
Winter 0.029 0.874 0.097      
Container Type Release Quantity  Material Type Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.094 
Fiber Box 0.026 0.874 0.100  Flammable Liquids 0.028 0.874 0.098 
Bottle 0.032 0.894 0.074  Corrosives 0.027 0.882 0.091 
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Table 87: Release Quantity Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T2 Network) 
Causing Object Release Quantity  Failure Item-Area Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.017 0.875 0.108  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.037 0.850 0.113 
None 0.034 0.901 0.065  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.018 0.891 0.091 
Other 0.050 0.868 0.082  Closure on Top 0.026 0.917 0.057 
Contributing Action Release Quantity    
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095      
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.019 0.841 0.140      
Other 0.032 0.893 0.076      
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.035 0.913 0.053      
Location Release Quantity  Failure Mode Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.025 0.870 0.106  Other 0.031 0.896 0.073 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.031 0.887 0.083  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.020 0.836 0.144 
Season Release Quantity  Shift Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095 
Spring 0.033 0.873 0.094  Midnight 0.028 0.875 0.098 
Summer 0.023 0.880 0.097  Day 0.027 0.884 0.089 
Fall 0.026 0.884 0.090  Twilight 0.028 0.874 0.098 
Winter 0.029 0.875 0.096      
Container Type Release Quantity  Material Type Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.095 
Fiber Box 0.026 0.873 0.101  Flammable Liquids 0.028 0.873 0.099 
Bottle 0.031 0.894 0.075  Corrosives 0.027 0.881 0.092 
 
168 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 88: Release Quantity Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T3 Network) 
Causing Object Release Quantity  Failure Item-Area Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.018 0.877 0.106  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.039 0.852 0.109 
None 0.034 0.904 0.062  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.018 0.892 0.090 
Other 0.053 0.864 0.082  Closure on Top 0.026 0.916 0.058 
Contributing Action Release Quantity    
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093      
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.020 0.844 0.136      
Other 0.032 0.893 0.075      
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.034 0.912 0.054      
Location Release Quantity  Failure Mode Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.025 0.872 0.103  Other 0.032 0.896 0.072 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.032 0.886 0.082  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.021 0.837 0.143 
Season Release Quantity  Shift Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Spring 0.034 0.873 0.093  Midnight 0.029 0.878 0.093 
Summer 0.023 0.880 0.097  Day 0.026 0.884 0.090 
Fall 0.029 0.883 0.088  Twilight 0.030 0.873 0.096 
Winter 0.029 0.878 0.092      
Container Type Release Quantity  Material Type Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093  no evidence 0.028 0.879 0.093 
Fiber Box 0.027 0.874 0.099  Flammable Liquids 0.029 0.874 0.096 
Bottle 0.032 0.893 0.076  Corrosives 0.028 0.882 0.090 
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Table 89: Release Quantity Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T4 Network) 
Causing Object Release Quantity  Failure Item-Area Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.017 0.876 0.106  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.038 0.850 0.112 
None 0.034 0.901 0.065  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.019 0.892 0.089 
Other 0.051 0.865 0.084  Closure on Top 0.024 0.916 0.059 
Contributing Action Release Quantity    
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094      
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.020 0.844 0.136      
Other 0.032 0.891 0.076      
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.031 0.913 0.056      
Location Release Quantity  Failure Mode Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.025 0.870 0.105  Other 0.031 0.895 0.074 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.031 0.886 0.083  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.020 0.838 0.142 
Season Release Quantity  Shift Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094 
Spring 0.031 0.877 0.092  Midnight 0.028 0.877 0.095 
Summer 0.025 0.881 0.095  Day 0.027 0.883 0.090 
Fall 0.028 0.880 0.092  Twilight 0.029 0.873 0.098 
Winter 0.028 0.873 0.099      
Container Type Release Quantity  Material Type Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094  no evidence 0.028 0.878 0.094 
Fiber Box 0.027 0.872 0.100  Flammable Liquids 0.029 0.872 0.099 
Bottle 0.029 0.895 0.076  Corrosives 0.027 0.882 0.091 
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Table 90: Release Quantity Distribution by Explanatory Variable. (T5 Network) 
Causing Object Release Quantity  Failure Item-Area Release Quantity 
  ZERO SMALL MEDIUM    ZERO SMALL MEDIUM 
no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095 
Floor and water/ 
liquid 0.017 0.874 0.108  
Basic Package 
Material on Top 0.038 0.852 0.110 
None 0.034 0.901 0.065  
Basic Package 
Material on Bottom 0.018 0.890 0.092 
Other 0.052 0.867 0.081  Closure on Top 0.027 0.913 0.060 
Contributing Action Release Quantity    
no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095      
Improper Loading 
and Dropped 0.019 0.843 0.139      
Other 0.033 0.892 0.076      
Loose Fitting or 
Valve 0.033 0.910 0.057      
Location Release Quantity  Failure Mode Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095 
Suburban/ 
Commercial/ Eastern 0.025 0.870 0.105  Other 0.031 0.895 0.074 
Urban/ Industrial or 
Commercial/ Eastern 
or Western 0.031 0.885 0.084  
Punctured and 
Crushed 0.020 0.837 0.144 
Season Release Quantity  Shift Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095 
Spring 0.033 0.871 0.097  Midnight 0.029 0.876 0.095 
Summer 0.023 0.881 0.096  Day 0.026 0.882 0.092 
Fall 0.027 0.884 0.089  Twilight 0.029 0.873 0.098 
Winter 0.030 0.874 0.096      
Container Type Release Quantity  Material Type Release Quantity 
no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095  no evidence 0.028 0.877 0.095 
Fiber Box 0.027 0.872 0.100  Flammable Liquids 0.029 0.872 0.099 
Bottle 0.030 0.893 0.078  Corrosives 0.027 0.881 0.092 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
FACE VALIDATION 
Validation Questionaire 
 
Base all answers on Unloading incidents associated with highway transport from 1993-2002 and on the categories 
used in this research.  Refer to “Variables, Categories and Incident Types Considered.”   
 
 
 
Name and job function:   __________________________________________________________ 
Years of hazmat transportation experience:   _______ 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Is the hazmat release Bayesian network (slide #6) reasonable in terms of the temporal layout of 
the variables and the 5 stages?  Please comment if you wish to. 
 
 
 
 
2) Direct associations among 3 pairs of variables in Stage 1 were found using loglinear analysis.  
Which 3 pairs of variables are directly associated (related) and interpret “why” they are related.  
 
Interpretation  
   
   
a. __________and __________ _____________________________________________ 
 
b. __________and __________ _____________________________________________ 
 
c. __________and __________ _____________________________________________ 
 
 
   Eg. Go Hiking   and Encounter Bear    More likely to see a bear in a wooded area. 
 
 
3) For the 3 associations in Stage 1 uncovered using loglinear modeling, do they make sense?   
Why? 
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 4) Rank the following variables according to their degree of influence on releases involving medium 
dollar loss.  Medium dollar loss is >$500 but <= $25,000.   
Use 1 (most influential on dollar loss) through 10 (least influential), and use each number just 
once.  
 
 
No direct association 
Container Type  ________    __ 
Failure Item-Area  ________    __ 
Location   ________    __ 
Material Type  ________    __ 
Causing Object  ________    __ 
Release Quantity  ________    __ 
Season   ________    __ 
Contributing Action  ________    __ 
Shift   ________    __ 
Failure Mode  ________    __ 
 
 
 
5) For the top 3 variables, why do they strongly influence medium dollar loss?   
 
1.________________________________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6) Rank the following variables according to their degree of influence on releases involving medium 
release quantity.  Medium release quantity is >1 gal but <= 100 gal. 
Use 1 (most influential) through 9 (least influential), and use each number just once.  
 
 
No association 
Container Type  ________    __ 
Failure Item-Area  ________    __ 
Location   ________    __ 
Material Type  ________    __ 
Causing Object  ________    __ 
Season   ________    __ 
Contributing Action  ________    __ 
Shift   ________    __ 
Failure Mode  ________    __ 
 
 
 
7) For the top 3 variables, why do they strongly influence medium release quantity?   
1.________________________________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________________________________ 
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8) Assume you want to reduce occurrences of medium dollar loss releases.  For your “top” variable 
in question #4, which category of this variable would you attempt to reduce first based on its level 
of impact? 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
a. What operational changes could be made to reduce occurrences of this top category? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
9) Assume you want to reduce occurrences of medium release quantity releases.  For your “top” 
variable in question #6, which category of this variable would you attempt to reduce first based 
on its level of impact? 
 
  _____________________________ 
 
 
 
a. What operational changes could be made to reduce occurrences of this top category? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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10) Which combination of causing object and failure item-area occurs most of the time during a 
release involving medium dollar loss?  (>$500 but <= $25,000) 
“What tells the story of a medium dollar loss?” 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Causing Object floor/water other floor/water floor/water 
Failure Item-
Area 
basic material 
on top of 
container 
closure on top 
of container 
basic material on 
bottom of 
container 
closure on 
top of 
container 
 
 
 
11) Which combination of causing object and failure item-area occurs most of the time during a 
release involving zero dollar loss?  ($0) 
“What tells the story of a zero dollar loss?” 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Causing Object floor/water other floor/water floor/water 
Failure Item-
Area 
basic material 
on top of 
container 
closure on top 
of container 
basic material on 
bottom of 
container 
closure on 
top of 
container 
 
 
 
12) Which combination of contributing action and failure mode occurs most of the time during a 
release involving medium release quantity?  (>1 gal but <= 100 gal) 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Contributing 
Action 
Loose 
fitting/closure 
improperly 
loaded and 
dropped 
Loose 
fitting/closure other 
Failure Mode 
punctured 
and crushed 
punctured and 
crushed other other 
 
 
 
13) Which combination of contributing action and failure mode occurs most of the time during a 
release involving zero release quantity?  (0 gal) 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Contributing 
Action 
Loose 
fitting/closure 
improperly 
loaded and 
dropped 
Loose 
fitting/closure other 
Failure Mode 
punctured 
and crushed 
punctured and 
crushed other other 
 
Figure 23: Face Validation Questionaire. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
CORRECTION PROCEDURE SOURCE CODE – LOCATION TRANSITION MATRIX 
 
 
'CREATES THE TRANSITION MATRIX FOR LOCATION 
 
Set Excel1 = CreateObject("Excel.Application") 
Set Excel1 = GetObject("c:\Location_Classification.xls") 
Set Sheet1 = Excel1.WorkSheets.Item("Class") 
Open "c:\ Location_TransMatrix" For Output As #1 
 
 
Dim EndRow, EndCol 
Dim r, c 
Dim CondProb() As Single, ClassProb() As Single 
Dim SumMatrix() As Single 
Dim TotalProb, SumProb 
Dim NumClasses 
Dim Dim AreaTypeCol, LandUseCol, GeoDivCol 
Dim NumIndVar, NumPatterns 
Dim Prob 
Dim category 
Dim ModalCatCol 
Dim clProb 
 
NumClasses = 2 
NumIndVar = 3 
ModalCatCol = NumIndVar + NumClasses + 1 
 
'------------------------------------ 
'Set Classification Probabilities 
'Sixth position is modal category 
EndRow = 36 
EndCol = 6 
NumPatterns = EndRow 
ReDim ClassProb(EndRow, EndCol) 
 
r = 1 
c = 1 
While r <= EndRow 
  While c <= EndCol 
    ClassProb(r, c) = Sheet1.Cells(r, c) 
    c = c + 1 
  Wend 
  r = r + 1 
  c = 1 
Wend 
 
'------------------------------------   
'Set Conditional Probabilities 
Set Sheet2 = Excel1.WorkSheets.Item("CondProb") 
EndRow = 13 
EndCol = 3 
NumCategories = EndRow 
ReDim CondProb(EndRow, EndCol) 
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 r = 1 
c = 1 
While r <= EndRow 
  While c <= EndCol 
    CondProb(r, c) = Sheet2.Cells(r, c) 
    c = c + 1 
  Wend 
  r = r + 1 
  c = 1 
Wend 
 
'------------------------------------   
'Calculate transition matrix using classification and conditional probabilities 
TotalProb = 1 
SumProb = 0 
AreaTypeCol = 1 
LandUseCol = 2 
GeoDivCol = 3 
ReDim SumMatrix(NumClasses) 
For c2 = 1 To NumClasses   'true latent variable 
 For c = 1 To NumClasses  'predicted latent variable 
  CondProbCol = c2 + 1 
  ClassCol = c + NumIndVar 
  For r = 1 To NumPatterns 
    category = ClassProb(r, AreaTypeCol) 
    For i = 1 To NumCategories 
      If category = CondProb(i, 1) Then 
        Prob = CondProb(i, CondProbCol) 
      End If 
    Next i 
    TotalProb = TotalProb * Prob 
    category = ClassProb(r, LandUseCol) 
    For i = 1 To NumCategories 
      If category = CondProb(i, 1) Then 
        Prob = CondProb(i, CondProbCol) 
      End If 
    Next i 
    TotalProb = TotalProb * Prob 
    category = ClassProb(r, GeoDivCol) 
    For i = 1 To NumCategories 
      If category = CondProb(i, 1) Then 
        Prob = CondProb(i, CondProbCol) 
      End If 
    Next i 
    TotalProb = TotalProb * Prob 
    If c = ClassProb(r, ModalCatCol) Then 
      clProb = 1 
    Else 
      clProb = 0 
    End If 
    TotalProb = TotalProb * clProb 
    SumProb = SumProb + TotalProb 
    TotalProb = 1 
  Next r 
  SumMatrix(c) = SumProb 
  SumProb = 0 
 Next c  'predicted 
 Print #1, SumMatrix(1) & " " & SumMatrix(2) 
Next c2  'true 
Figure 24: Source Code for Location Transition Matrix. 
177 
  
Table 91: “Class” Worksheet for Source Code. 
281 271 1 0.0015 0.9985 2 
281 271 2 0.0012 0.9988 2 
281 271 3 0.001 0.999 2 
281 271 4 0.0006 0.9994 2 
281 271 5 0.0007 0.9993 2 
281 271 6 0.0004 0.9996 2 
281 271 7 0.0005 0.9995 2 
281 271 8 0.0005 0.9995 2 
281 271 9 0.0005 0.9995 2 
281 272 1 0.0029 0.9971 2 
281 272 2 0.0023 0.9977 2 
281 272 3 0.0019 0.9981 2 
281 272 4 0.0012 0.9988 2 
281 272 5 0.0014 0.9986 2 
281 272 6 0.0007 0.9993 2 
281 272 7 0.0009 0.9991 2 
281 272 8 0.001 0.999 2 
281 272 9 0.001 0.999 2 
282 271 1 0.9994 0.0006 1 
282 271 2 0.9992 0.0008 1 
282 271 3 0.9991 0.0009 1 
282 271 4 0.9985 0.0015 1 
282 271 5 0.9987 0.0013 1 
282 271 6 0.9976 0.0024 1 
282 271 7 0.9981 0.0019 1 
282 271 8 0.9983 0.0017 1 
282 271 9 0.9982 0.0018 1 
282 272 1 0.9997 0.0003 1 
282 272 2 0.9996 0.0004 1 
282 272 3 0.9995 0.0005 1 
282 272 4 0.9992 0.0008 1 
282 272 5 0.9993 0.0007 1 
282 272 6 0.9988 0.0012 1 
282 272 7 0.999 0.001 1 
282 272 8 0.9991 0.0009 1 
282 272 9 0.9991 0.0009 1 
AREATYPE LANDUSE DIVISION Class 1 Class 2 Modal 
 
 
 
 
Table 92: “CondProb” Worksheet for Source Code. 
281 0.001 0.9991 
282 0.999 0.0009 
271 0.3754 0.5404 
272 0.6246 0.4596 
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 Table 92 (continued). 
1 0.059 0.028 
2 0.1574 0.0941 
3 0.2691 0.1937 
4 0.0795 0.096 
5 0.1462 0.1488 
6 0.0487 0.0924 
7 0.0847 0.1277 
8 0.0592 0.0818 
9 0.0963 0.1376 
 
179 
  
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
1 Agresti, Alan, Categorical Data Analysis (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 2002), pp. xiii, xv. 
 
2 Agresti, Alan, Categorical Data Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), pp. vii, 1. 
 
3 Ref. 1, Op. Cit., pp. 1, 619. 
 
4 Personal Communication with and review of course offerings of industrial engineering 
departments at Georgia Tech, University of Michigan, Penn State, Northwestern, Purdue, 
Stanford, University of California at Berkeley, Virginia Tech, Cornell, and Texas A&M, August 
22, 2005 – September 19, 2005.  Based on U.S. News and World Report, America’s Best 
Graduate Schools, 2006 Edition. 
 
5 “Functions of the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety,”   
<http://hazmat.dot.gov/contact/ohhms_fn.htm> (accessed July 19, 2005). 
 
6 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 1. 
 
7 Kennedy, John J., Analyzing Qualitative Data Log-Linear Analysis for Behavioral Research 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. xvii. 
 
8 Vermunt, Jeroen K. and Jay Magidson, Latent Class Analysis (Belmont, MA: Statistical 
Innovations Inc., 2002), pp. 1, unpublished. 
 
9 Personal Communication with Doug Reeves, Risk Assessment Engineer, Office of Hazardous 
Materials Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, 
Washington D.C., September 24, 2002. 
 
10 Bolck, Annabel, Marcel Croon, and Jacques Hagenaars, “Estimating Latent Structure Models 
with Categorical Variables: One-Step Versus Three-Step Estimators,” Political Analysis, Vol. 
12, No. 1 (2004), pp. 4-5. 
 
11 Personal Communication with Demetra Collia, Mathematical Statistician and Project Manager 
of Safety Data Initiative, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Department of Transportation, 
Washington D.C., August 1, 2005. 
 
12 Ibid., August 1, 2005. 
 
 
180 
  
13 Safety in Numbers, Using Statistics to Make the Transportation System Safer – Safety Data 
Action Plan (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Transportation Statistics/ Department of 
Transportation, 2000), pp. 12, unpublished. 
 
14 Ref. 11, Op. Cit., August 5, 2005. 
 
15 Ref. 13, Op. Cit., pp. 15. 
 
16 “Project 10 Overview – Expand, Improve, and Coordinate Safety Data Analysis,”  
<http://www.bts.gov/publications/safety_in_numbers_conference_2002/project10/project10_ove
rview.html> (accessed July 22, 2004 and July 18, 2005). 
 
17 Ref. 11, Op. Cit., August 1, 2005. 
 
18 Guidelines for Applying Criteria to Designate Routes for Transporting Hazardous Materials 
(Washington, DC: Office of Highway Safety/Federal Highway Administration/ Department of 
Transportation, 1994), pp.14-15, unpublished. 
 
19 Personal Communication with Iris Shimizu, Mathematical Statistician, Office of Research and 
Methodology, National Center for Health Statistics, Center for Disease Control, Department of 
Health and Human Services, Hyattsville, MD., September 9, 2005 – September 20, 2005. 
 
20 Personal Communication with Doug Williams, Chief, Statistical Research and Survey Design 
Staff, Office of Research and Methodology, National Center for Health Statistics, Center for 
Disease Control, Department of Health and Human Services, Hyattsville, MD., September 19, 
2005. 
 
21 “Office of Research and Development, Federal Stewardship in Service to Homeland Security” 
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/index.jsp> (accessed August 29, 2005). 
 
22 Burns, William J., and Robert T. Clemen, “Covariance Structure Models and Influence 
Diagrams,” Management Science, Vol. 39, No. 7 (1993), pp. 816-834. 
 
23 Harwood, Douglas W., John G. Viner, and Eugene R. Russell, “Procedure for Developing 
Truck Accident and Release Rates for Hazmat Routing,” Journal of Transportation Engineering 
(1993), pp. 191, 196. 
 
24 Center for Chemical Process Safety, 19th Annual International Conference, Emergency 
Planning: Preparedness, Prevention and Response, “Fuzzy Logic Methodology for Accident 
Frequency Assessment in Hazardous Materials Transportation by Yuanhua Qiao, Michela 
Gentile, and M. Sam Mannan” (unpublished), pp. 215-224. 
 
25 ReVelle, Charles, Jared Cohon, and Donald Shobrys, “Simultaneous Siting and Routing in the 
Disposal of Hazardous Wastes,” Transportation Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1991), pp. 141,144. 
 
181 
  
 
26 Current, John and Samuel Ratick, “A Model to Assess Risk, Equity and Efficiency in Facility 
Location and Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” Location Science, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995), 
pp. 198. 
 
27 Leonelli, Paolo, Sarah Bonvicini, and Gigliola Spadoni, “New Detailed Numerical Procedures 
for Calculating Risk Measures in Hazardous Materials Transportation,”  Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 12 (1999), pp. 509. 
 
28 Ibid., pp. 511. 
 
29 Erkut, Erhan and Vedat Verter, “Modeling of Transport Risk for Hazardous Materials,”   
Operations Research, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1998), pp. 625-642. 
 
30 Harwood, Douglas W., Eugene R. Russell, and John G. Viner, “Characteristics of Accidents 
and Incidents in Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials,”  Transportation Research 
Record 1245 (1989), pp. 24. 
 
31 Harwood, Douglas W., John G. Viner, and Eugene R. Russell, “Truck Accident Rate Model 
for Hazardous Materials Routing,” Transportation Research Record 1264 (1990), pp. 12-13. 
 
32 A National Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Materials in Transportation (Argonne, IL: 
Argonne National Lab, 2000), pp. 56, unpublished. 
 
33 Moses, Leon N. and Dan Lindstrom, eds., Transportation of Hazardous Materials Issues in 
Law, Social Science, and Engineering, “Databases and Needs for Risk Assessment of Hazardous 
Materials Shipments by Trucks, by Antoine G. Hobeika and Sigon Kim” (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1993), pp. 146.    
 
34 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., February 6, 2002. 
 
35 Maher, Michael J. and Ian Summersgill, “A Comprehensive Methodology for the Fitting of 
Predictive Accident Models,” Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1996), pp. 281-
296. 
 
36 Miaou, Shaw-Pin and Harry Lum, “Modeling Vehicle Accidents and Highway Geometric 
Design Relationships,” Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 25, No. 6 (1993), pp. 689-709. 
 
37 Milton, John and Fred Mannering, “The Relationship Among Highway Geometrics, Traffic-
Related Elements and Motor-Vehicle Accident Frequencies,” Transportation, Vol. 25 (1998), p. 
395-413. 
 
 
182 
  
38 Shankar, Venkataraman, Fred Mannering, and Woodrow Barfield, “Effect of Roadway 
Geometrics and Environmental Factors on Rural Freeway Accident Frequencies,”  Accident 
Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1995), pp. 371-389. 
 
39 Shankar, V., J. Milton, and F. Mannering, “Modeling Accident Frequencies as Zero-Altered 
Probability Processes: An Empirical Inquiry,” Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 29, No. 6 
(1997), pp. 829-837. 
 
40 Ref. 27, Op. Cit., pp. 507-515. 
 
41 Bubbico, Roberto, Cinzia Ferrari, and Barbara Mazzarotta, “Risk Analysis of LPG Transport 
by Road and Rail,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 13 (1999), pp. 27-
31. 
 
42 Jorissen, R.E. and P.J.M. Stallen, eds., Quantified Societal Risk and Policy Making.  
Technology, Risk, and Society: An International Series in Risk Analysis, Volume 12, “Risk 
Criteria for the Transportation of Hazardous Materials, by Henk G. Roodbol” (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 41-47. 
 
43 Scanlon, Raymond D. and Edmund J. Cantilli, “Assessing the Risk and Safety in the 
Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” Transportation Research Record 1020 (1985), pp. 6-11. 
 
44 Rao, K. Rajeshwar, S. Venkateswar Rao, and V. Chary, “Estimation of Risk Indices of 
Chemicals During Transportation,” Process Safety Progress, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2004), pp. 149-154. 
 
45 Erkut, Erhan and Vedat Verter, “A Framework for Hazardous Materials Transport Risk 
Assessment,” Risk Analysis Vol. 15, No. 5 (1995), pp. 590. 
 
46 Iakovou, Eleftherios, Christos Douligeris, Huan Li, Chi Ip, and Lalit Yudhbir, “A Maritime 
Global Route Planning Model for Hazardous Materials Transportation,”   Transportation 
Science,Vol. 33, No. 1 (1999), pp. 36. 
 
47 Gheorghe, Adrian V., Jurg Birchmeier, Dan Vamanu, Ioannis Papazoglou, and Wolfgang 
Kroger, “Comprehensive Risk Assessment for Rail Transportation of Dangerous Goods: a 
Validated Platform for Decision Support,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 88 
(2005), pp. 247-272. 
 
48 Ref. 25, Op. Cit., pp. 138-145. 
 
49 Erkut, Erhan and Armann Ingolfsson, “Catastrophe Avoidance Models for Hazardous 
Materials Route Planning,” Transportation Science, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2000), pp. 166. 
 
50 Sivakumar, Raj A., Rajan Batta, and Mark H. Karwan, “A Multiple Route Conditional Risk 
Model for Transporting Hazardous Materials,” INFOR, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1995), pp. 20-33. 
 
183 
  
 
51 Jin, Honghua, Rajan Batta, and Mark H. Karwan, “On the Analysis of Two New Models for 
Transporting Hazardous Materials,” Operations Research, Vol. 44, No. 5 (1996), pp. 710-723. 
 
52 Glickman, Theodore S. and Mary Anne Sontag, “The Tradeoffs Associated with Rerouting 
Highway Shipments of Hazardous Materials to Minimize Risk,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(1995), pp. 62-63. 
 
53 Patel, Minnie H. and Alan J. Horowitz, “Optimal Routing of Hazardous Materials Considering 
Risk of Spill,” Transportation Research-A, Vol. 28A, No. 2 (1994), pp. 119-132. 
 
54 Abkowitz, Mark, Mark Lepofsky, and Paul Cheng, “Selecting Criteria for Designating 
Hazardous Materials Highway Routes,” Transportation Research Record 1333, (1992), pp. 30-
35. 
 
55 Ref. 29, Op. Cit., pp. 630. 
 
56 Li, Ching Chun, Path Analysis: A Primer (Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press, 1975), pp. 137. 
 
57 Loehlin, John C., Latent Variable Models An Introduction to Factor, Path, and Structural 
Analysis (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1987), pp. 9-15. 
 
58 Kendall, M.G. and C.A. O’Muircheartaigh, Path Analysis and Model Building, No. 2 / TECH. 
414 (The Hague: International Statistical Institute, 1977), pp. 1-17. 
 
59 Asher, Herbert B., Causal Modeling (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 29-35. 
 
60 Romney, David M. and John M. Bynner, The Structure of Personal Characteristics (Westport, 
CT.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 8-11. 
 
61 Hagenaars, Jacques A., Loglinear Models with Latent Variables (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1993), pp. 17, 49. 
 
62 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 239-240. 
 
63 Ritschard, Gilbert, Jean Kellerhals, Michael Olszak, and Massimo Sardi, “Path Analysis with 
Partial Association Measures,” Quality & Quantity, Vol. 30 (1996), pp. 47-49, 55. 
 
64 Fienberg, Stephen E., The Analysis of Cross Classified Categorical Data (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1980), pp. 120. 
 
65 Leitner, Helga and H. Wohlschlagl, “Incorporating Polytomous Nominal Variables in Path 
Analysis,” Bremer Beitrage zur Geographie und Raumplanung, Vol. 8 (1987), pp. 244. 
 
 
184 
  
66 Glisson, Charles A. and Henry Man-Kwong Mok, “Methodological Observations on Applied 
Behavioral Science.  Incorporating Nominal Variables in Path Analysis: A Cross Cultural 
Example with Human Service Organizations,” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 
19, No. 1 (1983), pp.95-100. 
 
67 Heise, David R., “Employing Nominal Variables, Induced Variables, and Block Variables in 
Path Analysis,” Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1972), pp. 147-151. 
 
68 Ref. 65, Op. Cit., pp. 242. 
 
69 Agresti, Alan and Barbara Finlay, Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences (Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp. 634-635, 638. 
 
70 Kelloway, E. Kevin, Using LISREL for Structural Equation Modeling: A Researcher’s Guide 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 103. 
 
71 Saris, Willen E. and Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, eds., Sociometric Research, Volume 2 Data 
Analysis, “LCAG – Loglinear Modelling with Latent Variables: a Modified LISREL Approach, 
by J. A. Hagenaars,” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 111.    
 
72 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 4.  
 
73 Vermunt, Jeroen K., LEM: A General Program for the Analysis of Categorical Data (Tilburg, 
The Netherlands: Tilburg University, September 25, 1997), pp. 41, unpublished. 
 
74 Personal Communication with Michael Denisenko, Sales and Marketing Manager, Statistical 
Innovations Inc., Belmont, MA., March 31, 2004. 
 
75 Ibid., April 5, 2004. 
 
76 Personal Communication with Jeroen Vermunt Ph.D., Professor, Department of Methodology 
and Statistics, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands, May 18, 2004. 
 
77 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 4-5. 
 
78 Marcoulides, George A. and Irini Moustaki, eds., Latent Variable and Latent Structure 
Models, “Using Predicted Latent Scores in General Latent Structure Models by Marcel Croon” 
(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), pp. 199. 
 
79 Ref. 76, Op. Cit., May 18, 2004. 
 
80 Ref. 78, Op. Cit., pp. 198. 
 
 
185 
  
81 Ref. 78, Op. Cit., pp. 198. 
 
82 Ref. 76, Op. Cit., May 11, 2004. 
 
83 Anderson, James C. and David W. Gerbing, “Assumptions and Comparative Strengths of the 
Two-Step Approach,” Sociological Methods & Research, Volume 20, No. 3 (1992), pp. 321-331.  
 
84 Ref. 69, Op. Cit., pp. 589. 
 
85 Garson Ph.D., G. David, “Log-Linear, Logit, and Probit Models,” 
<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logit.htm> (accessed March 27, 2004). 
 
86 Knoke, David and Peter J. Burke, Log-Linear Models (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications, 
1980), pp. 11-12, 22-24. 
 
87 Ibid., pp. 30. 
 
88 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 7, 14, 16-17. 
 
89  Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 130-131, 152-153. 
 
90 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 217, 228-229. 
 
91 Marshall, Kneale T. and Robert M. Oliver, Decision Making and Forecasting (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), pp. 137. 
 
92 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 71, 93. 
 
93 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 93, 127. 
 
94 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 192. 
 
95 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 192. 
 
96 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 39. 
 
97 Hagenaars, Jacques A. and Allan L. McCutcheon, eds., Applied Latent Class Analysis, 
“Directed Loglinear Modeling with Latent Variables.  Causal Models for Categorical Data with 
Nonsystematic and Systematic Measurement Errors by Jacques A. Hagenaars” (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 255.    
 
98 Dallal Ph.D., Gerard E., “Contingency Tables,” (updated October 19, 2003), 
<http://www.tufts.edu/~gdallal/ctab.htm> (accessed October 11, 2004). 
 
 
186 
  
99 Personal Communication with Jacques Hagenaars Ph.D., Professor, Department of 
Methodology and Statistics, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University, 
Tilburg, The Netherlands, December 21, 2004. 
 
100 Hagenaars, Jacques A., Categorical Longitudinal Data (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1990), pp. 60. 
 
101 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 131-132. 
 
102 Garson Ph.D., G. David, “Log-Linear, Logit, and Probit Models,” 
<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logit.htm> (accessed October 6, 2004). 
 
103 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 205. 
 
104 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., January 11, 2005. 
 
105 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., December 21, 2004 to January 26, 2005. 
 
106 Ref. 97, Op. Cit., pp. 259-260, 264-265. 
 
107 Ref. 78, Op. Cit., pp. 199. 
 
108 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 3-5. 
 
109 Ref. 76, Op. Cit., May 11, 2004. 
 
110 Ref. 76, Op. Cit., May 11, 2004. 
 
111 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 3, 6, 13-17. 
 
112 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 11. 
 
113 Ref. 78, Op. Cit., pp. 207-208. 
 
114 Croon, M., “A General Procedure for Correcting Joint Distributions of Predicted Latent Class 
Scores” (Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University, January, 2005), pp. 1-5, unpublished. 
 
115 “The Kronecker Tensor Product,” 
<http://www.mathworks.com/access/helpdesk/help/techdoc/math/mat_linalg9.html> (accessed 
January 7, 2005). 
 
116 Ref. 114, Op. Cit., pp. 4. 
 
 
187 
  
117 Vermunt, Jeroen K. and Jay Magidson, Latent Variable (Belmont, MA: Statistical Innovations 
Inc., 2002), pp.1, unpublished. 
 
118 Vermunt, Jeroen K. and Jay Magidson, Local Independence (Belmont, MA: Statistical 
Innovations Inc., 2002), pp.1, unpublished. 
 
119 McCutcheon, Allan L., Latent Class Analysis (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications, 1987), 
pp.4, 8. 
 
120 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 4-5. 
 
121 Uebersax Ph.D., John, “LCA Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” (updated October 5, 
2001), <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/jsuebersax/faq.htm> (accessed September 
16, 2002). 
 
122 Collins, Linda M. and Larry A. Seitz, eds., Advances in Data Analysis for Prevention 
Intervention Research, NIDA Research Monograph No. 142, “Latent Class Analysis of 
Substance Abuse Patterns, by John S. Uebersax” (Rockville, MD.: U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services/Public Health Service/NIH/NIDA, 1994), pp. 64-80. 
 
123 Ref. 61, Op. Cit., pp. 20. 
 
124 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 4. 
 
125 Arminger, Gerhard, Clifford C. Clogg, and Michael E. Sobel, eds., Handbook of Statistical 
Modeling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, “Latent Class Models, by Clifford C. Clogg” 
(New York: Plenum Press, 1995), pp. 334. 
 
126 Personal Communication with Jay Magidson Ph.D., President, Statistical Innovations Inc., 
Belmont, MA, October 2003 to November 2003. 
 
127 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 32. 
 
128 Personal Communication with Scott Eliason, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of 
Sociology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN., January 2003. 
 
129 Ref. 126, Op. Cit., October 2003 to November 2003. 
 
130 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 18-21, 33. 
 
131 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp.4. 
 
132 Dayton, C. Mitchell., Latent Class Scaling Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1998), pp. 12. 
 
188 
  
 
133 Uebersax Ph.D., John, “A Brief Study of Local Maximum Solutions in Latent Class 
Analysis,” (updated August 10, 2000), 
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/jsuebersax/local.htm> (accessed February 15, 
2003). 
 
134 Ref.132, Op. Cit., pp. 12-13. 
 
135 Vermunt, Jeroen K. and Jay Magidson, Latent Class Cluster Analysis (Belmont, MA: 
Statistical Innovations Inc., 2002), pp.6, unpublished. 
 
136 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 23-25. 
 
137 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 5. 
 
138 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 32. 
 
139 Ref.132, Op. Cit., pp. 20. 
 
140 Ref. 122, Op. Cit., pp. 70.  
 
141 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 251. 
 
142 Ref. 100, Op. Cit., pp. 66. 
 
143 Garson Ph.D., G. David, “Latent Class Analysis,” 
<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/latclass.htm> (accessed November 8, 2002). 
  
144 Ref.132, Op. Cit., pp.18-19. 
 
145 Ref.132, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20. 
 
146 Ref. 121, Op. Cit. 
 
147 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 35-37. 
 
148 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 3. 
 
149 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 35-36. 
 
150 Ref. 119, Op. Cit., pp. 37. 
 
151 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 7. 
 
 
189 
  
152 Ref. 143, Op. Cit. 
 
153 Ref. 125, Op. Cit., pp. 335. 
 
154 Ref. 126, Op. Cit., October 2003 to November 2003. 
 
155 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 5. 
 
156 Ref. 61, Op. Cit., pp. 25. 
 
157 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 5. 
 
158 Ref. 133, Op. Cit. 
 
159 Ref. 8, Op. Cit., pp. 5. 
 
160 Jensen, Finn V., An Introduction to Bayesian Networks (New York: Springer, 1996), pp. 18. 
 
161 Charniak, Eugene, “Bayesian Networks without Tears,” AI Magazine, (Winter 1991), pp. 50-
54. 
 
162 Murphy Ph.D., Kevin, “A Brief Introduction to Graphical Models and Bayesian Networks,” 
(created 1998), <http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Bayes/bayes.html> (accessed May 15, 2005). 
 
163 Personal Communication with Marek J. Druzdzel Ph.D., Associate Professor, Decision 
Systems Laboratory, School of Information Sciences, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA., 
April 13, 2005 and April 27, 2005. 
  
164 Jagt, Randy M, “Support for Multiple Cause Diagnosis with Bayesian Networks” 
(unpublished  M.S. Thesis, Department of Mediamatics, Information Technology and Systems, 
Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands and Information Sciences Department, 
University of Pittsburgh, Pitsburgh, PA., 2002). 
 
165 Hagenaars, Jacques A., “Categorical Causal Modeling. Latent Class Analysis and Directed 
Log-Linear Models with Latent Variables,” Sociological Methods & Research, Volume 26, No. 
4 (1998), pp. 452-453. 
 
166 Cooper, Gregory F. and Edward Herskovits, “A Bayesian Method for the Induction of 
Probabilistic Networks from Data,” Machine Learning, Vol. 9 (1992), pp. 309-347. 
 
167 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., September 14, 2005. 
 
168 Ref. 160, Op. Cit., pp. 10, 19-20. 
 
 
190 
  
169 Ref. 160, Op. Cit., pp. 16, 56. 
 
170 Personal Communication with Finn V. Jensen Ph.D., Professor, Department of Computer 
Science, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark, February 17, 2005. 
 
171 “Decision Theoretic Modeling, Probability,”<http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/GeNIeHelp/index.html>  
(accessed November 3, 2005). 
 
172 Ref. 164, Op. Cit., pp. 15. 
 
173 “Elements of Genie, Inference Algorithms, Bayesian Network Algorithms, Exact Algorithms, 
Clustering Algorithm,”<http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/GeNIeHelp/index.html> (accessed November 3, 
2005). 
 
174 Witten, Ian H. and Eibe Frank, Data Mining (San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann 
Publishers, 2000), pp. 89-94. 
 
175 Ref. 64, Op. Cit., pp. 120. 
 
176 Goodman, Leo A., “Causal Analysis of Data from Panel Studies and Other Kinds of 
Surveys,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 5 (1973), pp. 1135. 
 
177 Personal Communication with Carlisle Smith, Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Columbus, 
OH., October 31, 2002. 
 
178 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., December 2, 2002. 
 
179 Ref. 102, Op. Cit. 
 
180 Koch, Richard, The 80/20 Principle The Secret of Achieving More with Less (New York: 
Doubleday, 1998), pp. 34. 
 
181 “Census Regions and Divisions of the United States,” (created September 12, 2001, updated 
July 7, 2005), <http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf> (accessed August 2004). 
 
182 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., January 24, 2005 – January 26, 2005. 
 
183 Guide for Preparing Hazardous Materials Incidents Reports (Washington D.C.: Research and 
Special Programs Administration/Department of Transportation, January 2004), pp. 7, 
unpublished. 
 
184 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., January 24, 2005 – January 26, 2005. 
 
185 Ref. 78, Op. Cit., pp. 198.    
 
191 
  
 
186 Ref. 61, Op. Cit., pp. 41. 
 
187 Personal Communication with C. Mitchell Dayton Ph.D., Professor and Chair, Department of 
Measurement, Statistics and Evaluation, College of Education, University of Maryland, College 
Park, MD., December 11, 2002. 
 
188 Ref. 126, Op. Cit., November 17, 2003 and April 28, 2004. 
 
189 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 222-223. 
 
190 Ref. 86, Op. Cit., pp. 44. 
 
191 Pate-Cornell, M. Elisabeth and Dean M. Murphy, “Human and Management Factors in 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis: the SAM Approach and Observations from Recent Applications,” 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 53 (1996), pp. 115-126. 
 
192 Personal Communication with Ron Duych (Engineer), Steve Hwang (Chemist), Doug Reeves 
(Supervisory General Engineer), Tanya Schreiber (Scientist), Kin Wong, Ph.D (General 
Engineer), Department of Transportation, Washington D.C., August 17, 2005. 
 
193 Ref. 86, Op. Cit., pp. 44. 
 
194 Ref. 61, Op. Cit., pp. 41. 
 
195 Personal Communication with Kin Wong, Ph.D., General Engineer, Office of Hazardous 
Materials Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, 
Washington D.C., December 1, 2004. 
 
196 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 222-223. 
 
197 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 223. 
 
198 Ref. 86, Op. Cit., pp.  44-45. 
 
199 Ref. 76, Op. Cit., May 11, 2004. 
 
200 Personal Communication with Marcel Croon Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Methodology and Statistics, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University, 
Tilburg, The Netherlands, January 13, 2005. 
 
201 Ref. 2, Op. Cit., pp. 217. 
 
202 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 245. 
 
192 
  
 
203 Ref. 100, Op. Cit., pp. 68-69. 
 
204 Ref. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 243. 
 
205 Ref. 61, Op. Cit., pp. 48-49. 
 
206 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., December 21, 2004 to January 11, 2005. 
 
207 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., January 26, 2005. 
 
208 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 17. 
 
209 Ref. 97, Op. Cit., pp. 257. 
 
210 Ref. 165, Op. Cit., pp. 457, 479. 
 
211 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., November 5, 2004 and February 15, 2005. 
 
212 Ref. 10, Op. Cit., pp. 17. 
 
213 Ref. 97, Op. Cit., pp. 257. 
 
214 Ref. 165, Op. Cit., pp. 457, 479. 
 
215 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., February 15, 2005. 
 
216 Ref. 99, Op. Cit., February 27, 2005. 
 
217 Intelligent Information Systems VII Workshop Proceedings, Malbork, Poland, June 15-19, 
1998, “A Probabilistic Causal Model for Diagnosis of Liver Disorders, by Agnieszka Onisko, 
Marek J. Druzdzel, and Hanna Wasyluk,” pp. 383.  
 
218 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., March 9, 2005 to March 11, 2005. 
 
219 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., March 9, 2005 to March 11, 2005. 
 
220 Ref. 217, Op. Cit., pp. 383. 
 
221 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., March 7 and April 13, 2005. 
 
222  Ref. 217, Op. Cit., pp. 383-384. 
 
223 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., June 8, 2005. 
 
193 
  
 
224 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., June 8, 2005. 
 
225 Ref. 164, Op. Cit., pp. 23, 29. 
 
226 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., April 13, 2005 and April 27, 2005. 
 
227 Clemen, Robert T. and Terence Reilly, Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools (Pacific 
Grove, CA: Duxbury Thomson Learning, 2001), pp. 133-137. 
 
228 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., February 6, 2006. 
 
229 Ref. 9, Op. Cit., February 2, 2006. 
 
230 Ref. 163, Op. Cit., June 8, 2005. 
 
231 Ref. 163, Op Cit., April 27, 2005 and June 8, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
  
 
REFERENCES NOT CITED 
 
 
 
Boffey, T.B., and J. Karkazis, “Linear Versus Nonlinear Models for Hazmat Routing,” INFOR, 
Vol. 33, No. 2 (1995), pp. 114-117. 
 
Egidi, Demetrio, Franco P. Foraboschi, Gigliola Spadoni , and Aniello Amendola, “The 
ARIPAR Project: Analysis of the Major Accident Risks Connected with Industrial and 
Transportation Activities in the Ravenna Area,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 
49 (1995), pp. 75-89. 
 
Erkut, Erhan and Armann Ingolfsson, “Transport Risk Models for Hazardous Materials: 
Revisited,” Operations Research Letters, Vol. 33 (2005), pp. 81-89. 
 
Erkut, Erhan and Vedat Verter, “Modeling of Transport Risk for Hazardous Materials,”   
Operations Research, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1998), pp. 625-642. 
 
Kara, B. Y., E. Erkut, and V. Veter, “Accurate Calculation of Hazardous Materials Transport 
Risks,” Operations Research Letters, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2003), pp. 285-292. 
 
Kara, Bahar Y. and Vedat Veter, “Designing a Road Network for Hazardous Materials 
Transportation,” Transportation Science, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2004), pp. 188-196. 
 
Saccomanno, F. Frank and A. Y. W. Chan, “Economic Evaluation of Routing Strategies for 
Hazardous Road Shipments,” Transportation Research Record 1020, (1985), pp. 12-18. 
 
Saccomanno, F. F. and J. H. Shortreed, “Hazmat Transport Risks: Societal and Individual 
Perspectives,” Journal of Transportation Engineering, Vol. 119, No. 2 (1993), pp. 177-188. 
 
Sherali, Hanif D., Laora D. Brizendine, Theodore S. Glickman, and Shivaram Subramanian, 
“Low Probability-High Consequence Considerations in Routing Hazardous Material Shipments,” 
Transportation Science,Vol. 31, No. 3 (1997), pp. 237-251. 
 
Sivakumar, Raj A., Rajan Batta, and Mark H. Karwan, “A Network-Based Model for 
Transporting Extremely Hazardous Materials,” Operations Research Letters, Vol. 13 (1993), pp. 
85-93. 
 
Verter, Vedat and Bahar Y. Kara, “A GIS-Based Framework for Hazardous Materials Transport 
Risk Assessment,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 6 (2001), pp. 1109-1120. 
195 
